Review of Tactical Units 1989


TACTICAL DIAGRAM
OUTER PERIMETER
INNER PERIMETER
EVACUATED AREA
Tactical Officer
Patrol Officer

Ontario

ONTARIO POLICE COMMISSION

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

When we began this inquiry, our focus was on whether or not Ontario should have police tactical units at all. We quickly became convinced, however, that these units are necessary and do save lives.

The record speaks for itself. There are hundreds of examples of high-risk incidents resolved by these units without a shot being fired. We believe that the mandate of tactical units must be the non-violent resolution of dangerous situations. The major contribution of these units is not their skill with sniper rifles or their ability to assault a building, but their ability to contain and defuse dangerous situations without the use of firearms.

There have been five fatalities involving tactical units since 1983. It is easy to say, in hindsight, that none of these deaths should have occurred. What is important now, however, is to learn from those experiences and use them as lessons to make future operations safer for all involved.

In this report we have concentrated on such issues as province-wide planning for tactical units - suggesting which police forces should have them and what should be done if they do not. We have examined the selection and training of officers, their equipment and communications and the role of the incident commander.

Having determined the need for these units, we are convinced that it is imperative that they be the very best. To that end, we make the following series of recommendations for consideration by the Solicitor General and the Government of Ontario.

RECOMMENDATION 1:
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL SHOULD SUPPORT THE CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF POLICE TACTICAL UNITS IN THIS PROVINCE AND SHOULD ENSURE THAT PROVINCIAL STANDARDS ARE INSTITUTED FOR THE SELECTION AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS AND THE EQUIPMENT THEY USE.

RECOMMENDATION 2:
THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ALL POLICE TACTICAL UNITS IN ONTARIO MUST BE THE NON-VIOLENT RESOLUTION OF HIGH-RISK INCIDENTS TO SAFEGUARD HUMAN LIVES.

RECOMMENDATION 3:
TECHNIQUES OF CONTAINMENT AND DE-ESCALATION OF A CRISIS INVOLVING AN ARMED PERSON MUST BE THE PRIORITY IN THE TRAINING OF ALL TACTICAL OFFICERS.

RECOMMENDATION 4:
THE MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL SHOULD CONDUCT A REVIEW OF ALL POLICE JURISDICTIONS ACROSS ONTARIO TO DETERMINE WHERE POLICE TACTICAL UNITS ARE NEEDED AND WHO SHOULD PROVIDE THEM.

RECOMMENDATION 5:
A POLICE FORCE WITH MORE THAN 100 SWORN PERSONNEL COULD HAVE ITS OWN TACTICAL UNIT. IF IT DOES NOT, IT MUST HAVE A CONTAINMENT UNIT AND A WRITTEN AGREEMENT, APPROVED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, FOR OBTAINING TACTICAL ASSISTANCE FROM ANOTHER POLICE JURISDICTION.

RECOMMENDATION 6:
A POLICE FORCE WITH FEWER THAN 100 SWORN PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO FORM A CONTAINMENT UNIT. IN ADDITION, IT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO FILE WITH THE SOLICITOR GENERAL A WRITTEN ACCOUNT OF ITS PLANS AND POLICIES FOR RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY INVOLVING WEAPONS, INCLUDING PROVISION FOR CALLING IN OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE.

RECOMMENDATION 7:
GUIDELINES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IMMEDIATELY BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL ENABLING AND ENCOURAGING POLICE FORCES TO ACCEPT TACTICAL UNIT ASSISTANCE FROM ANOTHER POLICE FORCE, INCLUDING DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO THE SENIOR AVAILABLE OFFICER TO OFFER OR ACCEPT THIS ASSISTANCE.

RECOMMENDATION 8:
POLICE TACTICAL UNITS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED ON A FULL-TIME BASIS.

RECOMMENDATION 9:
POLICE FORCES WHICH HAVE TACTICAL UNITS THAT HAVE BEEN RARELY DEPLOYED SHOULD CONSIDER THE ADVANTAGES OF FORMING A CONTAINMENT UNIT AND ARRANGING FOR OUTSIDE TACTICAL ASSISTANCE WHEN IT IS NEEDED.

RECOMMENDATION 10:
EVERY POLICE TACTICAL UNIT OPERATION MUST BE DIRECTED AND COORDINATED BY A TRAINED INCIDENT COMMANDER.

RECOMMENDATION 11:
ALL OFFICERS WHO MAY ASSUME THE ROLE OF INCIDENT COMMANDER SHOULD COMPLETE A TRAINING COURSE IN INCIDENT COMMAND AND HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED AT THE CANADIAN POLICE COLLEGE.

RECOMMENDATION 12:
INCIDENT COMMANDERS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES WITH TACTICAL UNITS AND NEGOTIATORS AT LEAST ONCE EVERY TWO MONTHS.

RECOMMENDATION 13:
THE INCIDENT COMMANDER SHOULD BE ASSISTED AT THE COMMAND POST BY AT LEAST ONE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER.

RECOMMENDATION 14:
A LOCAL POLICE LIAISON OFFICER SHOULD BE STATIONED AT THE COMMAND POST DURING INCIDENTS INVOLVING A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA.

RECOMMENDATION 15:
THE INCIDENT COMMANDER SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ALL OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY BRIEFED ON THEIR POSITION AND ROLE IN A TACTICAL OPERATION.

RECOMMENDATION 16:
A MANDATORY, FORMAL DEBRIEFING EXERCISE SHOULD BE HELD AFTER EVERY DEPLOYMENT OF A TACTICAL UNIT. A WRITTEN REPORT ON THE DEBRIEFING SHOULD BE CIRCULATED TO ALL TACTICAL UNITS IN ONTARIO. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INCIDENT COMMANDER TO ENSURE THAT A DEBRIEFING IS HELD AND A REPORT PREPARED FOR CIRCULATION.

RECOMMENDATION 17:
THERE SHOULD BE AT LEAST ONE POLICE TACTICAL UNIT IN EACH OF NORTHWESTERN ONTARIO AND THE NORTHEAST.

RECOMMENDATION 18:
THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE SHOULD REVIEW THE CURRENT SYSTEM GOVERNING DEPLOYMENT OF THE TACTICS AND RESCUE UNITS TO ENSURE THAT THE DECISION MAKER IS RECEIVING ALL THE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO MAKE A DECISION IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF PUBLIC AND POLICE SAFETY.

RECOMMENDATION 19:
THE ONTARIO TACTICAL ADVISORY BODY SHOULD BE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED AS THE PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING POLICE TACTICAL OFFICERS IN THIS PROVINCE. IT SHOULD INCLUDE REPRESENTATION FROM THE MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND HAVE AN ESTABLISHED PROTOCOL FOR FORWARDING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MINISTER.

RECOMMENDATION 20:
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS TO JOIN A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD BE FIRST-CLASS CONSTABLE STATUS WITH AT LEAST FIVE YEARS EXPERIENCE AS A POLICE OFFICER.

RECOMMENDATION 21:
PHYSICAL FITNESS TESTING FOR TACTICAL UNIT CANDIDATES SHOULD BE STANDARDIZED.

RECOMMENDATION 22:
APPLICANTS TO JOIN A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO A FORMAL, DOCUMENTED INTERVIEW DURING WHICH THE OFFICER'S RECORD AND EVALUATION REPORTS ARE DISCUSSED AND HIS/HER ATTITUDE TO TACTICAL WORK EXPLORED.

RECOMMENDATION 23:
EACH CANDIDATE SHOULD BE EVALUATED AS TO HIS/HER MATURITY, SELF-CONTROL IN STRESSFUL SITUATIONS, STABILITY, SELF-DISCIPLINE, INTELLIGENCE, ABILITY TO WORK AS A MEMBER OF A TEAM, MOTIVATION AND DEDICATION TO THE JOB.

RECOMMENDATION 24:
AN APPROPRIATE PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST FOR USE IN THE SELECTION OF TACTICAL OFFICERS IN ONTARIO SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED OR, IF NECESSARY, DEVELOPED FOR PROVINCE-WIDE USE.

RECOMMENDATION 25:
THE CONTENT AND METHOD OF DELIVERY OF BASIC TRAINING FOR A NEW MEMBER OF A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD BE PRESCRIBED BY THE MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL.

RECOMMENDATION 26:
A BASIC TACTICAL MANUAL SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BY THE MINISTRY AND ISSUED TO ALL TACTICAL OFFICERS.

RECOMMENDATION 27:
EVERY NEW MEMBER OF A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD COMPLETE A BASIC TACTICAL ORIENTATION COURSE OF AT LEAST 15 DAYS.

RECOMMENDATION 28:
AFTER COMPLETION OF INITIAL TRAINING, NEW MEMBERS OF A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD BE UNDER CLOSE SUPERVISION FOR A MINIMUM SIX-MONTH PROBATIONARY PERIOD.

RECOMMENDATION 29:
ONGOING OR IN-SERVICE TRAINING FOR TACTICAL OFFICERS SHOULD CONSIST OF AT LEAST TWO DAYS PER MONTH.

RECOMMENDATION 30:
IN ADDITION TO REGULAR IN-SERVICE TRAINING, EACH POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN A FIVE-DAY TRAINING EXERCISE ANNUALLY.

RECOMMENDATION 31:
PHYSICAL FITNESS LEVELS OF ALL TACTICAL UNIT MEMBERS SHOULD BE TESTED AT LEAST ANNUALLY.

RECOMMENDATION 32:
INTEGRATED TRAINING EXERCISES SHOULD BE HELD REGULARLY FOR POLICE TACTICAL UNITS FROM DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS WHICH MAY BE CALLED UPON TO WORK TOGETHER.

RECOMMENDATION 33:
TRAINING EXERCISES INVOLVING POLICE TACTICAL UNITS AND OTHER EMERGENCY TEAMS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.

RECOMMENDATION 34:
PROCEDURES FOR SAFE CONTAINMENT OF AN EMERGENCY SITUATION SHOULD BE PART OF ALL PATROL OFFICER TRAINING.

RECOMMENDATION 35:
ALL POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD BE EDUCATED IN THE OPERATION AND CAPABILITIES OF TACTICAL TEAMS, INCLUDING THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INCIDENT COMMANDERS AND NEGOTIATORS.

RECOMMENDATION 36:
MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCES WHICH DO NOT HAVE THEIR OWN TACTICAL UNIT AND WHICH PLAN TO RELY ON TACTICAL SUPPORT FROM ANOTHER JURISDICTION SHOULD TRAIN DESIGNATED OFFICERS TO ACT AS LIAISON BETWEEN THE FORCE AND THE TACTICAL UNIT.

RECOMMENDATION 37:
SELECTION STANDARDS FOR CONTAINMENT OFFICERS SHOULD BE THE SAME AS THOSE FOR TACTICAL OFFICERS.

RECOMMENDATION 38:
EVERY CONTAINMENT OFFICER SHOULD COMPLETE STANDARD BASIC TRAINING PRESCRIBED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL.

RECOMMENDATION 39:
THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR DEADLY FORCE WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST THAT WILL JUSTIFY A POLICE OFFICER IN DISCHARGING A FIREARM, UNDER SECTION 9 REGULATION 790 OF THE POLICE ACT. HOWEVER, TACTICAL UNITS SHOULD BE TRAINED IN THE USE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS FOR APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES.

RECOMMENDATION 40:
PROVINCIAL STANDARDS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE WEAPONS USED BY POLICE TACTICAL UNITS TO ENSURE THAT THESE OFFICERS HAVE THE BEST AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT, APPROPRIATE FOR THE TASK INTENDED.

RECOMMENDATION 41:
ALL TACTICAL OFFICERS SHOULD BE ISSUED A 9 MILLIMETRE PISTOL, FOR USE BOTH IN TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND ON PATROL.

RECOMMENDATION 42:
AMMUNITION FOR THE 9 MILLIMETRE PISTOL SHOULD HAVE A PARTIAL METAL JACKET COVERING MOST OF THE PROJECTILE, BUT NOT THE NOSE, AND BE DESIGNED TO EXPAND ON IMPACT.

RECOMMENDATION 43:
EACH SNIPER RIFLE SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO AN INDIVIDUAL OFFICER AND USED ONLY BY THAT OFFICER.

RECOMMENDATION 44:
POLICE FORCES WHICH INTEND TO RELY ON OUTSIDE TACTICAL SUPPORT MUST MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE A MEANS OF COMMUNICATION AMONG THE TACTICAL UNIT, THE INCIDENT COMMANDER AND OTHER POLICE OFFICERS.

RECOMMENDATION 45:
THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE SHOULD HAVE COMMUNICATIONS PLANS FOR ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH THEIR TACTICAL UNITS MAY BE DEPLOYED.

RECOMMENDATION 46:
SUBJECT TO SPECIAL SITUATIONS WHERE VISIBILITY MAY CONSTITUTE A DANGER, ALL TACTICAL OFFICERS SHOULD WEAR THE SAME STANDARD UNIFORM. THIS UNIFORM SHOULD CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE WEARER AS A POLICE OFFICER. VEHICLES USED BY TACTICAL UNITS SHOULD BE SIMILARLY IDENTIFIED.

RECOMMENDATION 47:
ALL POLICE TACTICAL UNITS IN ONTARIO SHOULD HAVE A COMMON IDENTITY. THE NAME SHOULD EMPHASIZE THEIR MANDATE TO CONTAIN AND NEGOTIATE.

RECOMMENDATION 48:
A PUBLIC EDUCATION EFFORT SHOULD FOCUS ON INCREASING PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE "CONTAIN AND NEGOTIATE" ROLE OF TACTICAL UNITS AND SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PUBLIC TO CO-OPERATE WITH POLICE DURING A DANGEROUS SITUATION.

INTRODUCTION I

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On January 4, 1989, the Ontario Police Commission was directed by order-in-council to review the operation of police tactical units in Ontario. The review, conducted pursuant to Section 59 of the Police Act, was prompted by public concerns over the use of these specialized police units. The Commission was directed to inquire into and make recommendations on police tactical units, with particular regard to the need for tactical units and the functions assigned to them; the formation, development and utilization of existing units; the selection and training of personnel and the equipment provided for their use.

This review represents the first comprehensive examination of police tactical units in Ontario since the first ones were formed in the mid-1970s. The process included public hearings held by the Ontario Police Commission, and an in-depth survey of all police tactical units in Ontario, carried out on behalf of the Commission by a two-member civilian investigation team seconded to the Commission from the Ontario Police College.

The hearings were held in May and June, 1989. Representing the Ontario Police Commission were the chairman, W. Douglas Drinkwalter, Q.C., and members Jean M. Beauprie, Frank M. D'Andrea, and Professor Julio R. Menezes. Presentations made at the hearings provided detailed information and opinions on the selection, training and utilization of police tactical units and other related issues; there was also a review of five incidents in which police tactical units were involved and which resulted in fatalities.

The five incidents reviewed by the Commission are identified below by the name of the person killed, the date, location, and the police force whose tactical unit was involved:

Thomas Maxwell Post, August 26, 1988, Richmond Hill,
York Regional Police Force.
Bernard Bastien, August 14, 1988, Anderdon Township,
Ontario Provincial Police.
Steven George Scott, September 5, 1985, Clifford,
Ontario Provincial Police.
Constable Jack Ross, October 7, 1984, Woodstock,
Ontario Provincial Police.
Drew Thor N. Carlsen, January 12, 1983, Markham,
York Regional Police Force.

Those appearing before the Commission were subject to questioning by persons granted standing at the hearings. Those granted standing were: Roy McMurtry, Q.C., and Peter Shoniker, representing Dr. Lloyd Carlsen, the father of Thor Carlsen; Ian Roland, representing the Police Association of Ontario; Ontario Provincial Police Staff Sergeant Bruce Kruger for the Ontario Tactical Advisory Body; Chief Don Hillock for the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police; Chief Hillock and George Ecclestone, Q.C., for the York Regional Police Force; W.E. MacDonald, Q.C., for the Peel Regional Police Force; Dennis Brown, Q.C., and Geri Sanson, for the Ontario Provincial Police.

The Commission retained W. Graydon Sheppard of Hamilton as counsel for this review. Under Mr. Sheppard's direction, two investigators, Martin van Weert, Deputy Director of the Ontario Police College, and Calvin Bond, an instructor of Senior and Special courses at the College, spent three months visiting tactical units across the province, conducting interviews, inspecting equipment and reviewing documents. They also surveyed police forces which do not have tactical units to obtain information on how they respond to emergency situations involving weapons, particularly firearms.

The results of the investigators' work are contained in three volumes, which serve as appendices to this report.

Volume I describes each police tactical unit in Ontario, its history, selection and training procedures, the weapons, communications and other equipment provided, and utilization of the unit.

Volume II provides a comparative view of tactical units across the province, and makes suggestions for standards. The comments in this volume are those of the investigators and are based on discussions with senior police officers, tactical personnel and regular officers, a review of literature, and the opinions of forensic and tactical authorities. There is also a discussion of alternatives to tactical response by police forces which do not have such a unit.

Volume III reviews five specific incidents involving fatalities, and the recommendations of the coroner's inquest jury in each case. It also reviews statistics on other police shootings, not involving tactical units, and the seizure of firearms by police. It includes the results of an Ontario Police College survey on the frequency with which police officers discharge their firearms.

The Commission reviewed the information and advice provided by the investigators and Commission counsel. Thirty-two written submissions from organizations and individuals were received and reviewed. Eight days of public hearings were held in Toronto (four days), Windsor (two days), Ottawa (one day) and Thunder Bay (one day). In addition, the Commission considered the recommendations of the coroner's inquest juries which have commented on police tactical units.

We are grateful to all those who have contributed to this review. Our conclusions and recommendations are outlined in this report. We begin with a description of police tactical units.

DESCRIPTION AND CURRENT USE

II

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II

Tactical units have been called by different names in the last few years. One of the names commonly used is "emergency response unit". In order to understand how a tactical unit functions, it is important to understand what it does, and does not, do.

Police tactical units are not general emergency response units. They are not trained for or designed to respond to fires, floods, hurricanes, airplane crashes or earthquakes. An emergency response to these kinds of disasters might include a tactical unit, but usually only in cases where there is a perceived security threat.

The deployment of a tactical unit is focussed upon a human being who is armed with deadly force in a situation in which there is a real or perceived threat to human life. It is the function of a tactical unit to contain the suspect and disarm him. The units are commonly deployed in response to suspects who are mentally unstable or unbalanced, barricaded and threatening to kill; in some of these situations, there are hostages. Tactical units are increasingly used to execute search warrants and make arrests in situations where the suspects have let it be known they will not be "taken alive". These are called high-risk searches and arrests.

In situations where tactical units are involved, the suspect's mental capacities are often impaired by alcohol, illegal drugs or some other cause. The person may be emotionally distraught or mentally disturbed, and in the circumstances constitutes a severe danger. When tactical units are used in a high-risk arrest or search, it is probable that the suspects are heavily armed and prepared to kill anyone whom they perceive to be a threat to their freedom. Unfortunately, these are becoming increasingly common, particularly related to the drug trade.

A police tactical unit consists of a team of police officers who are trained in the use of special weapons and equipment, such as high-powered rifles and shotguns; in procedures for containing and controlling dangerous situations involving weapons, particularly firearms; and in tactical assault procedures for rescuing hostages or other persons whose lives are endangered in an incident involving weapons.

A typical situation might unfold as follows:
A patrol officer responds to a "gun call" and satisfies himself or herself that there is a person in a building who is armed with a firearm and threatening one or more human lives. The patrol officer calls for assistance; at this point, the officer on the scene is the "incident commander". Next on the scene is likely the patrol officer's supervisor, who takes control and becomes the incident commander. The person in charge of the incident changes as the police response develops. Probably next to arrive would be an officer who is specially trained in incident command, a negotiator and a tactical unit. Eventually, when the team is fully deployed, the incident commander will be responsible for the tactical unit, which has immediate control of the building in which the suspect is located; one or more negotiators; the patrol officers in the surrounding area; and firefighting and ambulance units, etc., should they be requested to stand by.

It is the function of the tactical unit to isolate and contain the suspect; it is the function of the negotiator to talk with the suspect, try to defuse the situation and have him surrender without shots being fired.

Figure l shows a typical tactical situation. The inner perimeter is held by tactical officers who keep the suspect in the smallest possible area. No one is allowed to enter the inner perimeter except members of the tactical unit. The outer perimeter is patrolled by patrol officers who direct traffic and prevent persons from entering the area. The area between the inner and outer perimeters is evacuated. This is particularly important in situations where the suspect is shooting at random.


TACTICAL DIAGRAM
OUTER PERIMETER
INNER PERIMETER
EVACUATION AREA
Tactical Officer
Patrol Officer

Figure I

A telephone link is set up so that the suspect can only communicate with the negotiator; all outgoing calls are directed to the negotiator's line, and no incoming calls are permitted. The negotiator attempts to open a discussion with the suspect by telephone. If necessary, a telephone or radio can be thrown into the building (it may be attached to the end of a line shot into the building by crossbow), or a bullhorn may be used.

In the vast majority of situations, the suspect is isolated and contained, and the negotiator talks the individual into surrendering. This may take anywhere from a few minutes to hours or days. Once the suspect is contained and while a negotiator is speaking to him,the tactical unit waits. If the incident is prolonged, officers are relieved from time to time, depending on the conditions. For example, in freezing temperatures tactical officers would have to be relieved more often than in temperate weather. However long the incident lasts, the ultimate aim is to have the suspect surrender without shots being fired.

Containment is the key principle of tactical unit operations. It involves isolating a crisis situation within a controlled area, and evacuating all people who may be at risk. While containment is their major occupation, tactical units are identified as such because they have tactical assault capability. The unit is trained in procedures necessary to take over the territory held by an armed suspect, particularly to rescue hostages. They also have the ability to clear a building in which a person may have committed suicide or may be waiting for an armed confrontation with police. The suspect may wish to kill police or be killed by them.

Tactical assault is the last option considered. It is only an option when all others have been exhausted and action is necessary to save lives. The threat to human life exists throughout the incident, but the unit will assault only when death or very serious injury becomes imminent.

TACTICAL UNIT ORGANIZATION

There are 15 Ontario police forces which have tactical units. They include the Ontario Provincial Police, Metropolitan Toronto, York Regional and Peel Regional Police Forces, all of which have full-time units. Eleven other municipal forces have part-time units: Niagara Regional, Waterloo Regional, Guelph, Halton Regional, Belleville, Hamilton-Wentworth Regional, Durham Regional, Windsor, Kingston, Brantford and Ottawa. In addition, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police maintains two tactical units in this province; however, the federal police force is not included in the mandate of this review.

In a full-time unit, the officers are assigned primarily to the tactical unit. When these officers are not training or functioning as a tactical unit, they perform routine patrol duties, normally traffic patrol, and are thus seen as an addition to the normal patrol platoon. In a part-time unit, the officers' prime responsibility is to the patrol platoon and their working schedule is coordinated with that of the platoon. When a tactical unit is deployed, these officers are "borrowed" from normal duties.

The 15 units in Ontario go under a variety of names, including emergency response, emergency task force, tactics and rescue units, among others. The lack of a common identity is an issue in itself, which we will discuss later in this report. In some cases, tactical units are part of larger emergency units within their own police forces. For example, the Metropolitan Toronto Police Emergency Task Force includes the bomb disposal squad and a special equipment unit, as well as special weapons teams.

The special weapons teams are what we call tactical units, and they are the focus of this review. But the review is not restricted exclusively to the units themselves. The relationship of these units to the rest of their own police forces, and to other police tactical units in other jurisdictions is important. We examine, in particular, the role of the incident commander and negotiators in situations involving tactical units, and the role of the regular patrol officer who is usually the first on the scene of a weapons-related emergency.

BACKGROUND AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

III

BACKGROUND AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

III

The inception of police tactical units in Ontario dates back to the mid-1970s. The rationale for their formation was two-fold - a response to fears of political terrorism and an increasing incidence of dangerous situations involving firearms.

In 1972, the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games brought political terrorism to the international stage. It was not the first terrorist incident on the modern world scene, by any means, but the attack and its aftermath - particularly the unsuccessful hostage rescue attempt by West German authorities - alerted all nations to their vulnerability in the face of terrorism. There was no reason to believe that Canada would be exempt from political violence. Preparations were already under way for the 1976 Olympics in Montreal, and the spectre of a repeat of the Munich debacle was very real. In Ontario, there was also concern that nuclear power facilities might be possible targets for terrorists. Around the same time, police forces, particularly in the larger urban centres of the province, noted an increase in the number of dangerous situations involving firearms.

The Ontario Provincial Police had responsibility for providing security at the Olympic events held in the Kingston area in 1976. Leading up to that, senior management of the OPP had already been reviewing the force's ability to handle dangerous events. In 1968, two officers, Sergeant L. J. Chapitis and Corporal J. Smith, were fatally shot in a high-risk arrest of a deranged person in Minden. In 1975, OPP Commissioner H.H. Graham authorized the formation of the first OPP tactical unit, a five-man Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU).

In the decade 1966-76, the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force had used selected officers with some special training to deal with crowd control. In 1976, the increase in the number of calls involving guns prompted the formation of the Metro Emergency Task Force (ETF) tactical unit. The unit was to respond to dangerous situations, and provide crowd control. That mandate evolved into the job of the ETF special weapons teams today.

Other police forces followed the OPP and Metro lead, in forming tactical units to deal with high-risk, dangerous situations. Most of the municipal forces which formed tactical units did not conduct a formal study of local incidents. They generally based their decision on the world-wide concern about the spread of terrorist activity, and the increase in incidents in Canadian society involving armed and dangerous persons, hostage-takings and barricaded persons. By 1978, 10 Ontario police forces had tactical units, including the OPP which by that time had six units located around Ontario. The OPP units had been created primarily to combat terrorism, but their utilization tended to be in the same area as the other police forces: incidents involving firearms and barricaded, armed persons. As more tactical units were formed, and after the RCMP formed its own anti-terrorist Special Emergency Response Team (SERT), the OPP reorganized and relocated its units. It reduced the number of units to the current three, increased the number of members in each unit, and located them in Barrie, Belleville and London. Belleville is adjacent to Trenton, the location of a Canadian Forces Base which is active in search and rescue activities. The O.P.P. also de-emphasized the anti-terrorist role of its tactical units. The RCMP maintains SERT teams in Ottawa and Toronto, which are mandated to respond to incidents involving internationally protected persons.

The feared surge in political terrorism in Canada, fortunately, did not materialize. But there is still a call for deployment of experienced security forces for special events. For example, tactical security for the 1988 Group of Seven economic summit in Toronto was organized by the Metropolitan Toronto ETF, and involved 100 tactical officers from Metro, the OPP and the RCMP.

If Ontario has been spared widespread political violence, it has not escaped an escalation in violent crime or a growing use of firearms. The Metropolitan Toronto Police Force now seizes about 1,390 firearms every year, about half of them handguns. Although there are no available statistics for the province as a whole, we believe we are being conservative in estimating that a minimum of 1,500 handguns and 1,500 assorted other firearms are seized by police agencies in Ontario annually.

The activities of police tactical units provide an indication of the current volume of dangerous incidents. The following estimates are based on statistics gathered by the investigation team for this inquiry. In the five-year period 1984-88, police tactical units in Ontario responded to more than 1,650 incidents involving barricaded or dangerous persons, more than 300 high-risk arrests, in excess of 70 hostage-takings and over 600 high-risk searches.However, the use of tactical units is not the only indicator of the environment in which police are operating. Patrol officers also become involved in dangerous situations or armed confrontations. To get a sense of the wider picture, we also reviewed Ontario Police Commission police shooting reports and verdicts of coroner's juries over the last five years. During 1984-88, there were a total of 62 persons hit by police gunfire; 25 of them died. Of those 25 fatalities, the deceased was known to be in possession of a firearm in 17 cases; in one of the 17 cases, the weapon turned out to be a replica of a handgun, used in a threatening manner. In four cases, there was a knife or other edged weapon involved. In four other cases, the deceased had no weapon (two of those involved motor vehicles, one involved an escaping offender, and the other was a situation where an officer was being beaten). Of the 62 shootings, tactical police units were involved in only seven: four fatalities and three woundings.[1]

To supplement our research, the Ontario Police College conducted a survey of police officers taking courses in Advanced Training, Criminal Investigations and Management(level 1) during the first three months of 1989. This was not meant to be a scientific statistical measurement; it was designed to give the Commission an indication of how often a police officer might discharge his or her firearm. The 316 experienced officers who participated were asked how many times they had drawn or fired their firearms, and under what circumstances. [2]

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[1] In the appendices, Volume III, Page 34, five fatalities are attributed to police tactical units. The death of Thor Carlsen in 1983 was included in the fatalities for 1984.

They drew their firearms on average 2.5 times per year (3,904 times in total for all the officers over five years). The reason for drawing a gun in about 84 per cent of the cases was in defence of a life or to apprehend a dangerous person. Other reasons included: to destroy an animal or sound an alarm.

These officers discharged their firearms 383 times over the five years, but in only four per cent of the incidents (15 times) were firearms discharged in defence of life or to apprehend a dangerous person. In such life-threatening situations, officers discharged their firearms on average .0095 times per officer per year. Calculated on a 30-year career, that statistic equates to one officer in three discharging a firearm in defence of life or to apprehend a dangerous person in the course of an entire career in policing.

These statistics indicate there was one firing of a firearm in defence of life or to apprehend a dangerous person for every 260 times a firearm was drawn for that purpose. Our investigation team noted that there are two possibilities to explain this: that officers draw their weapons more often than necessary, or that they use good judgment and discretion in discharging firearms. Although this question is not within the mandate of this inquiry, the investigating team found the second explanation to be the more probable.

We have included the statistics in this section to provide a background for the discussion which follows. The context of this discussion is a society in which firearms are becoming increasingly prevalent, and in which police are increasingly likely to be confronted with life threatening situations.

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[2] Appendices, Volume III, Page 37.

FUTURE OF TACTICAL UNITS

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FUTURE OF TACTICAL UNITS IV

This review was initiated because of public concerns about the operation of police tactical units. The announcement of the inquiry followed the death in 1988 of Bernard Bastien in Anderdon Township in Southwestern Ontario. Mr. Bastien, in an effort to protect his home and family from persons he believed to be intruders in the middle of the night, went outside armed with a shotgun. He was shot by a tactical unit of the Ontario Provincial Police whose officers mistakenly believed Mr. Bastien to be another armed individual they were pursuing. A coroner's inquest examined the Bastien incident. This Commission was directed to inquire into the operation of police tactical units across Ontario.

The purpose of this review is not to assign blame or to exonerate anyone in connection with the specific incidents we reviewed. We have looked at incidents like the one involving Mr. Bastien with a view to what can be learned from them for the future. We will refer to specific incidents in the course of our discussions where the circumstances are particularly illustrative. But first, a fundamental question had to be considered by the Commission - whether or not Ontario should have police tactical units at all.

We are aware that the problems illustrated by the incidents we reviewed have caused some members of the public and some patrol officers to question the effectiveness of intervention by a tactical unit in future high-risk occurrences. We share their concerns about the problems, but we do not believe that the solution is to disband all tactical units. We believe the solution is to ensure that these units have the best trained and equipped and most capable police officers in Ontario to deal with any dangerous situation involving weapons, particularly firearms. We are living in times in which firearms are more common and emergencies involving armed and barricaded persons and hostage-takings are more prevalent than in the past. To say that our only resource to deal with these kinds of crises should be the patrol officer would, in our view, put the public and the police at unnecessary risk. The patrol officer is not trained to deal with such situations. Teams with specialized training should be ready to respond to dangerous events to help save lives.

We base this decision not solely on the temper of the times, but also on the overall record of police tactical units in Ontario. In the last five years, in an estimated 2,600 incidents involving tactical units, there have been four fatalities. Those are four deaths too many, but they represent a very small proportion of the number of incidents involving peril to the public and police that were resolved peacefully. For example, in Metropolitan Toronto, the Emergency Task Force has not fired a shot since 1980; in that period they have handled approximately 1500 incidents. This record convinces us that a highly-trained, well-motivated, experienced, full-time tactical unit does save lives.

However, it is clear from our inquiry that there is an urgent need to institute provincial standards for the selection, orientation and on-going training of officers in tactical units. Currently, there is wide variation in these areas from one police force to another. Further, we believe that it is crucial that training emphasize that the objective of any tactical unit operation is the peaceful resolution of high-risk incidents. The major contribution of these units is not their facility with sniper rifles or their ability to assault a building, but their ability to contain and defuse dangerous situations without the use of firepower. We will have more to say about training later in this report.

Mr. Leon Paroian, counsel to the Bastien family at the inquest, said in his written submission to the Commission that the area which needs the most attention in training is attitude - "shooting straight and fast is not enough - knowing when not to shoot is more important, and probably more difficult to learn".[3] We agree with Mr. Paroian's comment, and support his contention, expressed during the hearing in Windsor, that these units must be trained and equipped properly or they should not be deployed at all. "Either send the very best or stay home". [4]

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[3] Submission of Leon Paroian, Q.C., p. 7

[4] Transcript, Vol. V, p. 184

We preface our support for the continuing use of police tactical units with that caveat. We believe these units are necessary, but they must be unquestionably the best-trained and most capable, and it must be clear what they are being used for: the non-violent resolution of high-risk incidents to safeguard human lives. The techniques of containment and de-escalation of a crisis are vital to the peaceful resolution of most dangerous incidents involving an armed person. It is our view that containment and de-escalation must be the priority in the training of all tactical officers in Ontario.

Police tactical units must also have the confidence of the public and fellow police officers. In many communities, that confidence is already secure. However, steps must be taken to ensure that whenever a police tactical unit is deployed anywhere in Ontario, we are sending out a team of police officers who have been rigorously trained not only in the use of special weapons, but also in the practice of patience and restraint under high-stress, life threatening conditions in circumstances in which split-second responses are sometimes necessary to save lives.

RECOMMENDATION 1:
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL SHOULD SUPPORT THE CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF POLICE TACTICAL UNITS IN THIS PROVINCE AND SHOULD ENSURE THAT PROVINCIAL STANDARDS ARE INSTITUTED FOR THE SELECTION AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS AND THE EQUIPMENT THEY USE.

RECOMMENDATION 2:
THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ALL POLICE TACTICAL UNITS IN ONTARIO MUST BE THE NON-VIOLENT RESOLUTION OF HIGH-RISK INCIDENTS TO SAFEGUARD HUMAN LIVES.

RECOMMENDATION 3:
TECHNIQUES OF CONTAINMENT AND DE-ESCALATION OF A CRISIS INVOLVING AN ARMED PERSON MUST BE THE PRIORITY IN THE TRAINING OF ALL TACTICAL OFFICERS.

(a) PROVINCE-WIDE PLANNING

It is clear from an overview of the history of tactical units that there was no systematic, overall planning involved in their development across Ontario. Tactical units were established where the particular police jurisdiction chose to do so. For example, there are some relatively small cities, such as Belleville and Brantford, which have their own tactical units; there are some larger urban areas, such as London and Thunder Bay, which don't have units. In the case of London, there is an OPP TRU team stationed there, but that is also true of Belleville, which has its own municipal unit. There used to be a TRU team located in Thunder Bay, but there has not been one there since 1987 when it was consolidated with the TRU team in North Bay and both were moved to Barrie.

We believe that the development and location of tactical units across Ontario should be planned on a province-wide basis. These units require a considerable investment in training time and equipment by police forces. There are 120 municipal police forces in Ontario, and 100 of them have fewer than 100 sworn personnel. In fact, 92 of them have fewer than 50 sworn personnel. It is not reasonable to expect that every police force, particularly the very small ones, have a tactical unit. But the smaller forces should have access to tactical support when they need it.

Municipal Police Strength as of February 1st, 1989

1 Member Forces	2
2-5 Member Forces	21
6-9 Member Forces	27
10-14 Member Forces	13
15-19 Member Forces	12
20-24 Member Forces	9
25-49 Member Forces	8
50-99 Member Forces	8
100 + Member Forces	20
Total	120

There should be an evaluation of the occurrences involving armed and barricaded persons, gun calls and hostage-takings in all police jurisdictions in Ontario to see how often tactical support might be needed. Consideration should also be given to where the smaller police forces might get tactical support in an emergency, either from a neighbouring municipal jurisdiction or from the OPP. The Ministry of the Solicitor General should undertake a province-wide review of all police jurisdictions to determine where tactical units are needed and who should provide them.

Our review has already gathered a great deal of information on existing police tactical units, and some information on jurisdictions which have chosen not to set up units. However, we do not have the mandate, nor was there the time, to review every police jurisdiction in Ontario to make recommendations about whether they ought to have a tactical unit or not. We believe the Ministry is the appropriate body to conduct this province-wide review, which would have to take into account such factors as population, police force size, geographic area of the jurisdiction, and the frequency of dangerous firearms occurrences. The individual characteristics, the history of the area and the proximity of other police forces would influence whether the Ministry should require the police force to establish a tactical unit or whether the force should obtain assistance from outside.

RECOMMENDATION 4:
THE MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL SHOULD CONDUCT A REVIEW OF ALL POLICE JURISDICTIONS ACROSS ONTARIO TO DETERMINE WHERE POLICE TACTICAL UNITS ARE NEEDED AND WHO SHOULD PROVIDE THEM.

We believe that the 20 largest municipal police forces in Ontario - those with more than 100 sworn personnel -could have their own tactical units.[5] Thirteen of them already have tactical units. Other considerations aside, formation of a tactical unit could be justified based on the geographic size and/or population density of these 20 police jurisdictions. However, if the Ministry concludes that a tactical unit is not necessary, these forces should at a minimum have their own containment unit and a signed agreement with another police jurisdiction for tactical support when it is needed.

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[5] The 20 municipal forces with more than 100 officers are: Brantford, Durham Regional, Gloucester, Guelph, Halton Regional, Hamilton-Wentworth Regional, Kingston, London, Metropolitan Toronto, Nepean, Niagara Regional, Ottawa, Peel Regional, Peterborough, Sault Ste. Marie, Sudbury Regional, Thunder Bay, Waterloo Regional, Windsor, and York Regional. There is one municipal force (Belleville) with fewer than 100 sworn personnel which maintains a tactical unit.

A containment unit would be trained in the techniques for controlling a crisis situation; members would not be trained in assault procedures for rescuing hostages or clearing buildings in risky situations, nor would they be trained to carry out high-risk arrests and searches. They would be trained to isolate the suspect and negotiate only. We heard from some police executives that a containment unit is a more viable option for medium-sized forces because it does not require officers to take as much time from regular duties to train.

The major disadvantage of a containment unit is that it is difficult to predict when a disturbed person may decide to turn containment into confrontation. We consider that in the case of a hostage-taking, for example, it would be advisable to summon assistance from a tactical team as soon as possible. The containment unit would be on the scene to control the situation, and to try to defuse it through negotiation, until the tactical unit could be deployed. That is particularly important in areas of Ontario, particularly the North, where distances and weather often mean that assistance from a neighbouring jurisdiction or the OPP may be several hours away.

The process of containment and negotiation is no easy matter. We reviewed five fatal incidents involving tactical units which occurred between 1983 and 1988. In four of the five cases, there was a breach of containment. In two cases, the armed suspect escaped before the OPP TRU team arrived; in another case, containment was temporarily withdrawn by regular officers because it was judged to be unsafe when the suspect started shooting at random; in the fourth case, the armed person left a residence while containment was still incomplete.

The containment or isolation of the suspect is the most important, and perhaps most life-saving, aspect of tactical response. If the armed suspect is not contained, the danger to human life is heightened. The 1985 case of Steven George Scott is one of the two cases where the suspect escaped before the TRU team arrived. Mr. Scott led police on an all-night chase by car and foot through the rural countryside and two communities in Southwestern Ontario. At various times, he was armed with a semi-automatic rifle, a shotgun and an M-16 automatic rifle. He was shot and killed by an

OPP Tactics and Rescue Unit officer after he confronted police with the M-16.

Containment units should not be considered a substitute for a tactical unit. The containment unit would not have the same capability as a fully-trained tactical unit, but it would be prepared to maintain containment until a negotiated surrender was achieved, or, in the case of a hostage-taking, until a tactical team could reach the scene.

A police force which established a containment unit would still be required to make arrangements for obtaining tactical assistance from another jurisdiction. It is important that the process for obtaining assistance be clear and formalized, and that it be approved by the Ministry. The force should have a signed agreement, approved by the Solicitor General, with another police jurisdiction setting out the terms and conditions under which tactical support will be provided.

RECOMMENDATION 5:
A POLICE FORCE WITH MORE THAN 100 SWORN PERSONNEL COULD HAVE ITS OWN TACTICAL UNIT. IF IT DOES NOT, IT MUST HAVE A CONTAINMENT UNIT AND A WRITTEN AGREEMENT, APPROVED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, FOR OBTAINING TACTICAL ASSISTANCE FROM ANOTHER POLICE JURISDICTION.

Because of the small size of many police forces in Ontario (including 50 with fewer than 10 officers), we take a different approach to the 100 forces which have fewer than 100 sworn personnel. There is one force (Belleville) with fewer than 100 officers which has a tactical unit. But it is not realistic to expect that most of the smaller forces in Ontario could or should have tactical units. We encourage the forces which are large enough to form a containment unit to do so. We would not require that these forces have a signed agreement for obtaining tactical assistance from outside, but we recommend that they file their plans and policies for responding to emergencies involving weapons with the Ministry. These plans should include provision for calling in outside help when necessary.

RECOMMENDATION 6:
A POLICE FORCE WITH FEWER THAN 100 SWORN PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO FORM A CONTAINMENT UNIT. IN ADDITION, IT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO FILE WITH THE SOLICITOR GENERAL A WRITTEN ACCOUNT OF ITS PLANS AND POLICIES FOR RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY INVOLVING WEAPONS, INCLUDING PROVISION FOR CALLING IN OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE.

We recognize, however, that these arrangements for tactical assistance from outside jurisdictions may not cover all circumstances. There may sometimes be reason for one police force to use tactical support from another jurisdiction, even though that police force has its own tactical unit. There must be some protocol to be followed to allow this to happen.

The case of Drew Thor N. Carlsen, who died in an armed confrontation with police in 1983 in the Town of Markham, is illustrative. One of the concerns of the coroner's jury which examined the circumstances of the death of Thor Carlsen was that two or more members of the Metropolitan Toronto Emergency Task Force were on the scene some considerable time before the York Regional Emergency Response Unit arrived. This delay was caused by an ice storm. The Toronto officers offered to assist, but were not asked to participate directly in the tactical operation. The jury suggested that tactical units not necessarily be governed by municipal boundaries, and that procedures and training be standardized so units could work together.

We believe that co-operation between police jurisdictions is essential. Traditionally, police forces have wanted to take care of their own turf. If there is an incident in which another police force can help, we believe it is in the interests of the public and police officers that such assistance be welcomed, regardless of whose "bailiwick" the incident is in.

In 1985, the then Deputy Solicitor General, R.M. McLeod, wrote a letter to the Solicitor for Dr. Lloyd Carlsen, commenting on the official follow-up to the jury recommendations in the case of Dr. Carlsen's son, Thor. Among other things, he wrote that police forces "should be encouraged to offer or accept the best available assistance to or from another police force (including the delegation of authority to the senior available officer on duty at the time to offer or accept this assistance)". The letter said a committee of the Ontario Police Commission would establish guidelines to facilitate this kind of co-operation.

We regret that no action was taken to develop these guidelines. We believe they should be developed immediately so that there is no impediment to police forces accepting assistance from tactical units from another jurisdiction.

RECOMMENDATION 7:
GUIDELINES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IMMEDIATELY BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL ENABLING AND ENCOURAGING POLICE FORCES TO ACCEPT TACTICAL UNIT ASSISTANCE FROM ANOTHER POLICE FORCE, INCLUDING DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO THE SENIOR AVAILABLE OFFICER TO OFFER OR ACCEPT THIS ASSISTANCE.

(b) DEDICATED UNITS - FULL TIME

We noted earlier that 11 of the 15 units now in existence are part-time. Officers must be called off regular duties to respond to emergencies. In the units which are full time, the officers are still available for regular police duties when they are not deployed for tactical purposes or involved in training. For example, in York and Peel Regional Police Forces, tactical unit officers in plain clothes conduct crime and liquor enforcement patrols, travelling in unmarked cars. The Metropolitan Toronto ETF teams wear regular police uniforms and travel in specially-marked ETF vans; they spend about 60 per cent of their time on regular police duties.

We believe that a full-time unit is preferable to a part-time unit. A full-time unit has a number of advantages: it allows for more efficient training, and it provides a single line of communication and supervision, facilitating unit management. Particularly given the importance of training to the effective functioning of these units, we recommend that police jurisdictions which have a tactical unit have a full-time one.

A full-time unit of 12 members can be provided by a force of 100 or more sworn personnel. A membership of 12 should permit the deployment of two members at all times. These two members can respond quickly to an incident, and if the situation warrants, the rest of the unit can be deployed. This type of graduated response should be appropriate for all but the largest municipalities, such as Metropolitan Toronto.

A 12-member unit should allow for relief and rotation of tactical officers when necessary. Tactical situations are stressful and sensitive; officers cannot be expected to be at their best if they are called to a tactical incident when they are exhausted after already putting in a full day's work, and such should not be done. It is dangerous. In addition, some incidents can drag on for a long time before they are resolved; "fresh" officers are needed to spell off those who have finished their shift.

RECOMMENDATION 8:
POLICE TACTICAL UNITS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED ON A FULL-TIME BASIS.

The requirement that tactical units be full-time may mean that some of the smaller forces which now have part-time tactical units will consider reorganizing to form a containment unit and make arrangements to call in outside tactical assistance when necessary. Several of the tactical units on smaller forces have been used only infrequently.[6] We believe that in order for a tactical unit to be top-notch, officers must have regular training and they must gain experience in coping with high-risk situations. In our view, one of the major reasons why the Metro ETF has such an exemplary record is that its officers are constantly testing their abilities in stressful, real-life situations. Some of the existing tactical units have been deployed less than 10 times in the last five years. These forces should seriously consider arranging for outside tactical assistance when needed.

RECOMMENDATION 9:
POLICE FORCES WHICH HAVE TACTICAL UNITS THAT HAVE BEEN RARELY DEPLOYED SHOULD CONSIDER THE ADVANTAGES OF FORMING A CONTAINMENT UNIT AND ARRANGING FOR OUTSIDE TACTICAL ASSISTANCE WHEN IT IS NEEDED.

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[6] See Chart Page 46 Volume II Appendices.

(c) INCIDENT COMMAND

The key person in any crisis situation is the one who makes the decisions and gives the orders. In the case of an occurrence involving deployment of a tactical unit, that is the incident commander.

Earlier in this report, we described how the incident command of a dangerous situation with an armed and barricaded person is passed from the first patrol officer on the scene to more senior officers as the police response develops. The incident commander is responsible for the tactical unit, the negotiators, the patrol officers in the surrounding area, and any other emergency units, such as firefighting and ambulance units, which may be needed.

It is imperative that the whole operation be under the direction of an incident commander who is a seasoned professional, who is familiar with tactical operations and specially trained in handling dangerous incidents.

The incident which resulted in the death on August 14, 1988 of Bernard Bastien provides a case study in the tragic consequences which can result from a tactical operation which is not coordinated from a central command post providing communication and direction to police at the scene. The Bastien incident involved a series of errors and deviations from policy which resulted in the OPP Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU) shooting Mr. Bastien. During this incident, the activities of the OPP TRU team were not adequately coordinated through the command post; at key times during the crisis, the incident commander had no clear understanding of what was taking place in and around the location where Mr. Bastien was shot.

The incident command post had been established in Malden Township, outside the residence of Robert Clifford Jarriett, who was known to be armed and believed to be seeking a confrontation with police. Mr. Bastien was shot in nearby Anderdon Township. The local police dispatcher and OPP communications operator were not kept adequately informed. (There were also technical problems with radio communications at the scene, but we will discuss equipment matters later in this report). Based on the information presented at the coroner's inquest, the lack of direction and coordination from the command post was a major contributing factor to the confusion at the scene.

In 1988, following the Bastien incident, the OPP changed its deployment procedures for the TRU teams and issued orders relating to incident command. Those orders emphasize that the tactical unit must operate under the direction of the incident commander, who is a commissioned officer of district command staff.

The death of Thor Carlsen is another case study in the tragic consequences that can flow from a tactical operation which is not properly co-ordinated. Before commenting on this case, we wish to point out that the summary of this incident contained in the appendices (Volume III) is seriously disputed by Thor Carlsen's father, Dr. Lloyd Carlsen. We do not intend to resolve the different opinions about certain details of the incident. It is sufficient for our purposes to focus upon the essentials.

Thor Carlsen was in a house in a residential area, with a hostage. Carlsen had been shooting randomly at and into other houses in the neighbourhood. Patrol officers attempted to establish an inner perimeter and to set up containment. They were withdrawn by a supervisor who believed that his officers were not sufficiently protected by cover. Containment was later established by the tactical unit. In spite of the fact that Thor Carlsen had fired shots at and into other houses and at an automobile, no attempt was made to evacuate the area. Eventually, Carlsen came out of the house through a second story window on to the roof of a front porch. Police officers left their cover and confronted Carlsen, who was subsequently shot and killed. If there is any justification for the confrontation, it must be found in the failure of the police to evacuate the area. Had they done so, there would have been no danger in permitting Carlsen to continue to shoot at random.

The necessity of central coordination and direction, on the authority of an incident commander who is apprised of all the information available, should be recognized in all police tactical operations.

The Coroner's jury in the Bernard Bastien case recommended that all units be reorganized to include an incident commander. We are not sure it is necessary for each individual tactical team to have its own incident commander. However, we believe it is vital that the incident commander must be someone who is specifically trained for this type of responsibility. The Canadian Police College in Ottawa has an incident commander's and hostage negotiation course. It is not clear to us how many of those officers who may potentially assume incident command have completed a training course.

In addition, trained incident commanders should have an opportunity to participate in exercises with tactical units so that they are accustomed to working together. These joint exercises, which should take place at least once every two months, should also include negotiators, who play a key role in calming a dangerous situation down and talking a suspect into surrendering.

RECOMMENDATION 10:
EVERY POLICE TACTICAL UNIT OPERATION MUST BE DIRECTED AND COORDINATED BY A TRAINED INCIDENT COMMANDER.

RECOMMENDATION 11:
ALL OFFICERS WHO MAY ASSUME THE ROLE OF INCIDENT COMMANDER SHOULD COMPLETE A TRAINING COURSE IN INCIDENT COMMAND AND HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION, SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED AT THE CANADIAN POLICE COLLEGE.

RECOMMENDATION 12:
INCIDENT COMMANDERS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES WITH TACTICAL UNITS AND NEGOTIATORS AT LEAST ONCE EVERY TWO MONTHS.

Communication between the incident command post and the tactical unit and other officers at the scene is crucial. One of the major difficulties in the Bastien incident involved communications - among the command post, the tactical unit, and municipal police. We have said that the incident commander is responsible for all these officers; the commander may also need to communicate with other emergency personnel in the area. The incident commander must have communications support at the scene to ensure that the commander knows exactly where everyone is and what they are doing.

RECOMMENDATION 13:
THE INCIDENT COMMANDER SHOULD BE ASSISTED AT THE COMMAND POST BY AT LEAST ONE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER.

The Bastien jury recommended that in addition to a communications officer, there should be a municipal police officer at the command post to provide basic information on the area and people to the OPP. We think this suggestion should be acted upon. It should be standard procedure that whenever a tactical unit is coming in to an area to assist from outside, a local officer should be stationed at the command post to assist the incident commander with information on the area.

RECOMMENDATION 14:
A LOCAL POLICE LIAISON OFFICER SHOULD BE STATIONED AT THE COMMAND POST DURING INCIDENTS INVOLVING A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA.

Another key aspect of the commander's job is the briefing that is given to the officers involved. Again, we have a case from which we can learn. In the 1984 death in Woodstock of Constable Jack Ross, it appears that the initial briefing was informal and somewhat disorganized. Discussion of the inner perimeter and danger zone was unclear. Constable Ross and another patrol officer were directed to go to a house and stay with its occupants in a safe part of the residence. When the two officers found the house empty, they took up observation of the building where the armed suspect was located. Containment had not been completed, and when the suspect left the building, the two officers confronted him. During an exchange of gunfire in the dark, Constable Ross was shot and killed by an OPP TRU officer.

Briefing from the incident commander must include clear and explicit instructions for all officers, and those orders must be followed.

Debriefings after incidents are important so that everyone involved can profit from the experiences of others, whether mistakes were made or not. Our examination of the five fatalities involving tactical units convinced us that one of the most valuable training exercises is a debriefing after an incident has concluded. There is a great deal to be learned from what was done and why. Such debriefings frequently bring to light areas where substantial improvement can be made relatively simply. We believe that the debriefing should be mandatory, structured and the results reduced to writing. The written report should be distributed to all tactical units so that lessons learned can be shared.

RECOMMENDATION 15:
THE INCIDENT COMMANDER SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ALL OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY BRIEFED ON THEIR POSITION AND ROLE IN A TACTICAL OPERATION.

RECOMMENDATION 16:
A MANDATORY, FORMAL DEBRIEFING EXERCISE SHOULD BE HELD AFTER EVERY DEPLOYMENT OF A TACTICAL UNIT. A WRITTEN REPORT ON THE DEBRIEFING SHOULD BE CIRCULATED TO ALL TACTICAL UNITS IN ONTARIO. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INCIDENT COMMANDER TO ENSURE THAT A DEBRIEFING IS HELD AND A REPORT PREPARED FOR CIRCULATION.

There are two issues related to availability of tactical support across Ontario which we have not yet discussed: one involves the situation in Northern Ontario; the other involves deployment of the OPP TRU teams.

(d) NORTHERN ONTARIO

In Northern Ontario, there is a relatively high ratio of gun calls, but there are no police tactical units. There used to be an OPP team stationed in Thunder Bay, but it was withdrawn when the Tactics and Rescue Units were reorganized. Because of the long distances involved and the difficulty of travel in the winter, it is not possible to count on the quick arrival, in a northern community, of one of the existing TRU teams from the south. We have recommended that police jurisdictions which do not have a tactical unit of their own make arrangements for tactical support from outside. However, there should be a reasonable expectation that a tactical unit can arrive in time to be of assistance. If there are no units in all of Northern Ontario, it is difficult to see how police can provide that service.

Municipal police forces in Thunder Bay, Sudbury and Sault

Ste. Marie are each large enough to justify a unit. The OPP could also station tactical units in the North. We have not undertaken sufficient study to recommend which of these police forces should provide the tactical units that are needed in the North. We are convinced, however, that regardless of who provides them, there should be at least one police tactical unit in Northwestern Ontario and one in the Northeastern part of the province.

RECOMMENDATION 17:
THERE SHOULD BE AT LEAST ONE POLICE TACTICAL UNIT IN EACH OF NORTHWESTERN ONTARIO AND THE NORTHEAST.

(e) TRU DEPLOYMENT

The second issue concerns deployment of the OPP TRU teams. After the shooting by an OPP TRU team of Bernard Bastien in August, 1988, OPP management instituted a new multi-stage approval process for deployment of the TRU teams. Prior to October, 1988, district commanders had the authority to deploy a TRU team response. The new orders require district commanders or their designates to obtain authorization, through the normal chain of command, from the Deputy Commissioner of field operations or his designated Chief Superintendent. These executive officers work at OPP General Headquarters in Toronto. The coroner's jury, which examined the case of Bernard Bastien supported the new system.

The Commission appreciates that the new system places responsibility for deployment of the TRU teams on the OPP executive, which is ultimately accountable for the actions of provincial police officers. However, we are concerned that the new system may result in reluctance by municipal forces and OPP officers to ask for TRU team assistance, based on an assumption that the approval process will take too long or based on a perception that the TRU teams are not readily available or that the request for help is likely to be rejected. Our investigators did not uncover any instances of inappropriate deployments or rejections of requests for assistance in the past, when the authority lay with the district commanders.

In Metropolitan Toronto, the authority for deploying the ETF lies with the constable on patrol or the dispatcher. Generally, front-line supervisors confirm the request for tactical support while the officers are en route. In four other forces, tactical support is usually activated by the front-line supervisor after speaking to the first officer at the scene. In the other forces, the authority is vested in the duty officer, who is generally an officer of inspector rank, acting on advice from a front-line supervisor. In some cases, the decision is made by the station officer, who may be a staff sergeant.

In all forces except the OPP, the officer making the decision to deploy the tactical unit is either at the scene or has direct contact with an officer who is at the scene. We are concerned that the OPP system places the decision-making at the end of a chain of command at a point remote from the incident. Based on this concern, we recommend that the OPP review its 1988 orders to ensure that the decision maker is receiving all the information necessary to make a decision in the best interests of public and police safety.

RECOMMENDATION 18:

THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE SHOULD REVIEW THE CURRENT SYSTEM GOVERNING DEPLOYMENT OF THE TACTICS AND RESCUE UNITS TO ENSURE THAT THE DECISION MAKER IS RECEIVING ALL THE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO MAKE A DECISION IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF PUBLIC AND POLICE SAFETY.

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SELECTION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

V

As in most occupations, the quality of policing depends primarily on the dedication of the men and women who provide it. For the highly stressful and dangerous job of the tactical unit officer, it is important that only qualified, well-motivated officers are selected, and that they are given the necessary orientation and ongoing training to fulfil this specialized function. It is vital that tactical units across Ontario meet provincial standards for selection and training. There should not be one standard for training a tactical unit officer in one part of the province, and another standard somewhere else.

We would like to refer again to the 1985 letter from the then Deputy Solicitor General, R.M. McLeod, to the Solicitor for Dr. Lloyd Carlsen, concerning the death of Dr. Carlsen's son. Mr. McLeod wrote that the Ontario Police Commission was proposing "to re-examine existing policies, procedures and training with a view to standardization and improvement". He noted that all police forces with emergency response units and/or hostage negotiators "should undergo continuous standardized training and adopt standard operating procedures which reflect the best known techniques for handling these situations. Additionally, it is recognized that all police officers should be taught the basic principles of situation-command and containment techniques to be used prior to and after the arrival of emergency response units or hostage negotiators".

In spite of the indication given by Mr. McLeod, nothing was in fact done by the Ministry or the Ontario Police Commission until this review was undertaken in January 1989. An indication of the dedication of the officers involved in these units can be seen in the fact that they, and they alone, responded to the recommendations of the coroner's jury. These officers created a province-wide organization, known as the Ontario Tactical Advisory Body (OTAB). That group has worked closely with the Ontario Police College and has written course training standards. It has also been instrumental in instigating some joint training among tactical units. These dedicated officers have done what they could, given that they lacked any official support from the Ministry or the Ontario Police Commission.

We commend OTAB for its dedication, particularly since it pursued its goals without any official sanctioning from the Ministry or other police organizations. We recommend that OTAB become an officially recognized organization, with representation from the Ministry of the Solicitor General, and with an established protocol for forwarding its recommendations to the Minister.

RECOMMENDATION 19:
THE ONTARIO TACTICAL ADVISORY BODY SHOULD BE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED AS THE PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING POLICE TACTICAL OFFICERS IN THIS PROVINCE. IT SHOULD INCLUDE REPRESENTATION FROM THE MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND HAVE AN ESTABLISHED PROTOCOL FOR FORWARDING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MINISTER.

(a) SELECTION OF TACTICAL OFFICERS

There is some variation in the selection criteria for personnel for police tactical units across Ontario. All members of tactical units are volunteers and candidates must submit an application in writing. Candidates are subject to a supervisor's recommendation in all cases. Most police organizations require that applicants be first-class constables with more than three years service. Metro Toronto requires four years; Peel Regional and Durham Regional require five. The minimum requirement in Niagara Regional and Waterloo Regional forces is two years.

This variation in initial policing experience required for the job should be rectified. It is important that the members of police tactical units be officers with sufficient experience and seasoning in the job. We recommend that five years experience be the minimum, and that the candidates must be first-class constables.

RECOMMENDATION 20:
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS TO JOIN A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD BE FIRST-CLASS CONSTABLE STATUS WITH AT LEAST FIVE YEARS EXPERIENCE AS A POLICE OFFICER.

Physical fitness is important for officers who are expected to remain alert and ready for action under protracted, high-stress situations. Candidates are generally tested for physical fitness, but the standards vary among the various police forces with tactical units.

RECOMMENDATION 21:
PHYSICAL FITNESS TESTING FOR TACTICAL UNIT CANDIDATES SHOULD BE STANDARDIZED.

The process for assessing the capability and suitability of candidates varies from force to force. Some conduct formal, structured interviews, while others do less formal talks. In view of the importance of the assignment, we believe there should be a formal, documented interview process during which the demands of the job are made clear to the applicant, and management has an adequate opportunity to assess motivation and personality of the individual.

The personal qualities of the officer should be a significant factor in the evaluation of a candidate. Characteristics or qualities which police forces should, and generally do, seek in candidates include: maturity; self-control in stressful situations; stability (if the officer is undergoing a crisis period at home, for example, the application might be postponed); self-discipline; intelligence; ability to work as a member of a team; motivation and dedication to the job.

Attitude is crucial. The officer must understand the purpose of the unit: the non-violent resolution of high-risk incidents to safeguard lives. We are concerned that in some quarters the units have acquired a militaristic image of an elite group of sharp-shooters. The overall record of Ontario police tactical units does not support that image, but the perception may nonetheless influence public attitudes to tactical units and the attitudes of officers seeking to join them.

The Commission considered the usefulness of psychological testing to assist in the selection of candidates. Eleven of the 15 forces which have tactical units use some kind of psychological testing. However, the tests and the method of testing vary. Some forces use self-administering tests which are filled out by the candidate and mailed in; in other forces, tests are supplemented by an interview with a psychologist.

We have emphasized the importance of attitude in officers who belong to tactical units. We believe that psychological testing should be a useful tool in providing a personality profile of a candidate. However, we are concerned about the suitability of some standard tests which were devised more than 30 or 40 years ago, and which contain questions which are clearly outdated and also culturally biased. One self-administering test was copyrighted in 1922!

An attempt should be made to identify, and, if necessary, develop a suitable psychological test which would become the provincial standard and would be taken by all candidates for police tactical units.

RECOMMENDATION 22:
APPLICANTS TO JOIN A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO A FORMAL, DOCUMENTED INTERVIEW DURING WHICH THE OFFICER'S RECORD AND EVALUATION REPORTS ARE DISCUSSED AND HIS/HER ATTITUDE TO TACTICAL WORK EXPLORED.

RECOMMENDATION 23:
EACH CANDIDATE SHOULD BE EVALUATED AS TO HIS/HER MATURITY, SELF-CONTROL IN STRESSFUL SITUATIONS, STABILITY, SELF-DISCIPLINE, INTELLIGENCE, ABILITY TO WORK AS A MEMBER OF A TEAM, MOTIVATION AND DEDICATION TO THE JOB.

RECOMMENDATION 24:
AN APPROPRIATE PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST FOR USE IN THE SELECTION OF TACTICAL OFFICERS IN ONTARIO SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED OR, IF NECESSARY, DEVELOPED FOR PROVINCE-WIDE USE.

(b) TRAINING - TACTICAL OFFICERS

If there is one thing that can be said about the training received by members of police tactical units across Ontario, it is that it is not uniform. We examined the issue of training under the following categories: basic orientation and probation; ongoing training provided to members of the unit; integration of training; and related training of regular police officers. The Commission's investigation team has documented the training carried out by each police tactical unit in Volume I; it has also compared each unit's training commitment in Volume II (pp. 12-14). Rather than repeat the details here, we will refer only to selected examples to show the range of training provided.

1) BASIC TRAINING

The variation in basic orientation provided to new tactical unit members is substantial. The Metropolitan Toronto Police Force conducts a 21-day orientation course for new members of the Emergency Task Force. Durham Regional Police Force uses either the Metropolitan Toronto course or the Basic Tactical Orientation course, developed by OTAB in co-operation with the Ontario Police College. The College course in 1989 was three weeks' duration. Hamilton-Wentworth provides a two-week orientation program and assigns a coach officer to new members for three months. The Kingston force provides a five-day initial training program, and then integration into ongoing training, which is 21 days a year. In Belleville, new members are integrated into the unit's ongoing training which is four hours of paid overtime every two weeks. Guelph uses the same process of integrating new members into the unit's one day of training per month. The OPP has the most extensive initial training in Ontario: applicants must go through a two-week selection course; those who complete it go on to a 15-week course, which includes search, rescue and survival, as well as tactical skills.

Most units have some kind of probationary period during which new members are under supervision. In the Guelph unit, for example, which has minimal initial training, new members are usually not judged to be fully integrated into the unit for about nine months. Units tend to use newer members only in secondary roles until they complete their probation.

The Commission has two major concerns about basic orientation training. One is the duration: we believe that there should be a minimum of 15 days training to ensure that an officer has learned the basics. It does not seem reasonable to us to expect that an officer would feel confident in how to handle these high-stress, dangerous situations in any less time. The 15-day training period should be mandatory.

The other major concern relates to the content of training. The Commission heard a great deal about the skills that tactical officers must learn, particularly in assault tactics. However, we are concerned that the basic training received by most new tactical officers concentrates too much on particular physical skills and not enough on discipline and self-control. When training people in skills of this nature, there is a very real danger that they will develop an attitude which focusses on assault and the use of force. The attitude which training must seek to inculcate is "dynamic inactivity", or, in other words, hurry up and wait. This attitude is not generally what is expected of a police officer. When an officer arrives at the scene of an occurrence, the public expects him or her to take charge and resolve the situation. The officer expects that of himself or herself. However, in a situation where there is an armed and barricaded person, the expectation must be different. The police should simply contain and negotiate.

It is our view that much more attention must be given to the crucial matter of attitude in orientation training. If the goal is to resolve a dangerous situation as quickly as possible, the primary strategy would be to conduct an assault. But the goal is to resolve the situation without injury and to achieve that goal the strategy must be to contain, negotiate and wait for as long as it takes. To ensure that the basic training for new tactical officers deals adequately with both skills and attitude, we recommend that content and method of delivery be prescribed by the Ministry of the Solicitor General, and that the Ministry develop and issue a tactical manual for all tactical officers.

RECOMMENDATION 25:

THE CONTENT AND METHOD OF DELIVERY OF BASIC TRAINING FOR A NEW MEMBER OF A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD BE PRESCRIBED BY THE MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL.

RECOMMENDATION 26:
A BASIC TACTICAL MANUAL SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BY THE MINISTRY AND ISSUED TO ALL TACTICAL OFFICERS.

RECOMMENDATION 27:
EVERY NEW MEMBER OF A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD COMPLETE A BASIC TACTICAL ORIENTATION COURSE OF AT LEAST 15 DAYS.

RECOMMENDATION 28:
AFTER COMPLETION OF INITIAL TRAINING, NEW MEMBERS OF A POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD BE UNDER CLOSE SUPERVISION FOR A MINIMUM SIX-MONTH PROBATIONARY PERIOD.

2) ONGOING TRAINING

It is important that once members of a tactical unit have acquired the necessary skills, they continue training. They must be able to work as a team, and they must have an opportunity to maintain and improve their skills. Members of the Metropolitan Toronto ETF train three days in every 10 working days. The OPP Tactics and Rescue Units train one day a week. Niagara trains 12 hours per month; Guelph one day a month; Kingston 21 days a year. The Hamilton-Wentworth unit supplements its ongoing training of 24 hours per month with a one-week annual program and a major training exercise. Maintaining physical fitness is also important for these officers. Most tactical units expect their members to maintain fitness on their own time. Metro ETF and the OPP allow one hour per day for physical fitness.

Part of the difference in training levels - both basic orientation and ongoing training - can be explained by the size of the police force and whether or not the unit is full or part-time. Obviously, the number of incidents handled by the Metropolitan Toronto ETF is much higher than what some of the smaller forces must face. However, that does not mean the incidents are any less lifethreatening when they do occur. Therefore, we believe that all tactical units must be trained to a minimum provincial standard to safeguard the lives of the public and police officers. In fact, it could be argued that tactical units on smaller forces should have more training than the larger forces because they will have less backup and less experience than tactical units on larger forces when they are called upon to defuse a crisis.

We believe that two days per month of ongoing training should be the minimum for any tactical unit. Larger forces, such as Metropolitan Toronto, will continue to do more, and should be encouraged to do so. In addition to regular training, there should also be an opportunity for the tactical unit to participate in a large-scale training exercise at least once a year for five days. Physical fitness of all tactical members should also be tested at least annually.

As we noted earlier in this report, tactical unit officers will also benefit from formal debriefing exercises held after all tactical operations. They will also learn from the experiences of other units; we have recommended that written reports of debriefings held by tactical units be distributed to all other tactical units around the province.

RECOMMENDATION 29:
ONGOING OR IN-SERVICE TRAINING FOR TACTICAL OFFICERS SHOULD CONSIST OF AT LEAST TWO DAYS PER MONTH.

RECOMMENDATION 30:
IN ADDITION TO REGULAR IN-SERVICE TRAINING, EACH POLICE TACTICAL UNIT SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN A FIVE-DAY TRAINING EXERCISE ANNUALLY.

RECOMMENDATION 31:
PHYSICAL FITNESS LEVELS OF ALL TACTICAL UNIT MEMBERS SHOULD BE TESTED AT LEAST ANNUALLY.

3) INTEGRATED TRAINING

We believe it is important that tactical units train together, where possible. This is particularly important where the units may have to work together in a crisis. Obviously, it is not possible to have a unit in Windsor train with Metropolitan Toronto once a week. However, more effort could be made to hold joint training exercises involving jurisdictions which might be called upon to work together.

There is already some joint training taking place, particularly involving some of the regional police forces. Integrated training of OPP TRU units and municipal tactical units would also be beneficial.

RECOMMENDATION 32:
INTEGRATED TRAINING EXERCISES SHOULD BE HELD REGULARLY FOR POLICE TACTICAL UNITS FROM DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS WHICH MAY BE CALLED UPON TO WORK TOGETHER.

Another aspect of integrated training concerns other emergency teams which might be involved in incidents in which a tactical unit is deployed. These could include firefighters, ambulance attendants, airport security personnel, and cleanup crews for chemical spills and so on. Opportunities for joint training exercises involving personnel from these units would also be useful.

RECOMMENDATION 33:
TRAINING EXERCISES INVOLVING POLICE TACTICAL UNITS AND OTHER EMERGENCY TEAMS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.

4) PATROL OFFICER TRAINING

We believe that training should be provided to patrol officers in the techniques of containment and de-escalation of emergency situations. The patrol officer is the first on the scene and should be familiar with what should happen to keep the situation from getting worse. We are not suggesting that about 18,000 officers across Ontario be sent on a three-week course; we know that is not practical. This training could be built into the on-going training received by all officers, as well as the orientation training given to new police recruits. Most police officers spend from five to ten days a year in training. Some larger forces also use time during role call to provide information or a quick refresher on some aspect of policing. Video tapes are becoming increasingly common for purposes such as this. We recommend that safe containment procedures be a part of all patrol officer training.

RECOMMENDATION 34:
PROCEDURES FOR SAFE CONTAINMENT OF AN EMERGENCY SITUATION SHOULD BE PART OF ALL PATROL OFFICER TRAINING.

Examination of the case of Constable Jack Ross, referred to earlier, suggests that a key problem in this incident was the lack of familiarity with tactical unit operations by patrol officers who confronted the armed suspect in the danger zone before containment was complete.

Patrol officers should be aware of the capabilities of tactical units; they should know how a tactical operation is organized; they should know the responsibilities of the incident commander, negotiator, communications officer, etc. They should be aware of what kinds of information will be most helpful to the team when it arrives. The point was made during the hearings that information about the mood and personal background of the armed person is important, as well as the more concrete details of his exact location, the weapons he has, and whether or not there are hostages. The importance of this kind of information should be communicated through on-going officer training. It should also be incorporated into the initial training of new police officers.

RECOMMENDATION 35:
ALL POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD BE EDUCATED IN THE OPERATION AND CAPABILITIES OF TACTICAL TEAMS, INCLUDING THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INCIDENT COMMANDERS AND NEGOTIATORS.

In the section on Incident Command, we recommend that a local police liaison officer be stationed at the command post during incidents involving a tactical unit from outside the area. This officer would be familiar with the neighbourhood and would know what resources are readily available in the community. It is important that police forces which are going to rely on outside tactical assistance designate and train liaison officers who are prepared to join the command post in a supporting role.

RECOMMENDATION 36:
MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCES WHICH DO NOT HAVE THEIR OWN TACTICAL UNIT AND WHICH PLAN TO RELY ON TACTICAL SUPPORT FROM ANOTHER JURISDICTION SHOULD TRAIN DESIGNATED OFFICERS TO ACT AS LIAISON BETWEEN THE FORCE AND THE TACTICAL UNIT.

(c) TRAINING - CONTAINMENT UNITS

The selection standards for officers who will become members of containment units should be no less rigorous than those for tactical officers. Members of containment units must be experienced, mature officers who are evaluated on their ability to handle stressful situations and work in a team.

These officers must also be trained in containment - in isolating a suspect and evacuating the area, and waiting while a negotiator talks a suspect into surrendering. Containment officers must receive both basic orientation training and they must continue to train after they join the unit. However, since they should not be used for tactical assaults to rescue hostages or for high-risk searches and arrests, containment officers require less training than tactical officers.

We recommend earlier in this report that forces with more than 100 sworn personnel must have a containment unit if they do not have their own tactical unit. We encourage, but do not require, smaller forces to have containment units. Because of the variation in size and resources of police forces which may have containment units, it is difficult to recommend a realistic provincial standard for how much in-service or ongoing training containment officers should have. However, every containment officer in the province must successfully complete standard basic training prescribed by the Solicitor General.

RECOMMENDATION 37:
SELECTION STANDARDS FOR CONTAINMENT OFFICERS SHOULD BE THE SAME AS THOSE FOR TACTICAL OFFICERS.

RECOMMENDATION 38:
EVERY CONTAINMENT OFFICER SHOULD COMPLETE STANDARD BASIC TRAINING PRESCRIBED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL.

EQUIPMENT VI

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EQUIPMENT VI

The Commission has reviewed extensive information on equipment used by police tactical units in Ontario, including non-lethal weapons, lethal weapons, ammunition and communications systems. While we do not make detailed recommendations on every piece of equipment that might be used by a tactical unit, we have some comments and concerns in relation to the following areas: weapons, including the use of non-lethal weapons and personal firearms and ammunition of tactical officers; communications; and identification on equipment, such as clothing.

(a) WEAPONS

Public debate over the weapons used by police tactical units tends to focus on the subject of lethal force. Many members of the public strongly suggest that non-lethal alternatives be provided. We will attempt to describe the situation that tactical units face before examining the subject of weapons.

Police tactical units deal with persons who may be emotionally distraught or mentally disturbed and who are armed with lethal weapons. The person may be acting irrationally because of alcohol or drugs or acute stress. The essential fact is that the suspect is armed with lethal force and cannot be expected to make reasonable judgments.

In the province of Ontario, a police officer is justified in discharging a firearm in very limited situations. These are spelled out in Section 9 of Regulation 790 under the Police Act as follows:

9(1)No member of the police force shall discharge a firearm in the performance of duty except where, on reasonable and probable grounds, he believes it necessary;

(a) for the defence of his life or the life of another;
(b) to effect the apprehension, when other means are insufficient, of a person whom he, on reasonable and probable grounds, believes to be dangerous;

(c) to destroy a potentially dangerous animal or one that is so badly injured that humanity requires its removal from further suffering; or
(d) to give an alarm or to call assistance for an important purpose, when no other means can be used.

Our focus here is on the clauses dealing with endangering human life. As these tests are applied to tactical units, we believe that it is fair to say that a member of a tactical unit ought to discharge a firearm only after making a decision as to whose life will be put at risk. In these situations, the suspect constitutes a clear and immediate danger to the life of a hostage, an innocent bystander or a police officer. The question then is whether it is better for the police officer to risk the life of the suspect rather than allow the suspect to risk the life of another.

While many people see the use of non-lethal weapons as an alternative to the use of firearms, there is no substitute for deadly force when circumstances exist that will justify a police officer in discharging a firearm. That is not to say, however, that non-lethal weapons are of no value or that they have no role to play in the tactics employed by these units.

1) NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

Constable Ian MacGregor, a 14-year veteran of the Ontario Provincial Police Force, did a study of non-lethal weapons and presented the results of his study to the Commission during the hearings in Toronto. He identified four classifications of non-lethal weapons: impact, electrical, mechanical and chemical. Before we discuss the various kinds of weapons, we reiterate that none of these weapons is a substitute for a firearm in conditions where a police officer is justified in shooting, although some may well be of value in other situations.

Impact weapons include: rubber bullets; plastic bullets; bean bag ammunition (a small bean bag fired by a handgun); a net gun which discharges four projectiles, each of which carries the corner of a net, the intent of which is to entangle suspects; and the ARWN or Anti Riot Weapon - Enfield. The ARWN fires a polyurethane projectile of approximately 1-1/2 inches in diameter; its range is about 100 metres. On impact it causes an abrasive or heat or chemical burn.

While rubber and plastic bullets can be fatal, they usually are not. All of these weapons will serve to disrupt activity of the suspect for a very brief period of time. In order to take advantage of this, police officers must be within a range of a very few seconds in order to subdue the suspect before he recovers his self-control. Thus, the weapons are useful only at extremely close range.

Constable MacGregor also examined two electrical weapons, a taser gun and a nova. The taser gun fires two projectiles, each carrying a wire; when the projectiles strike home, the wires impart an electrical shock. Its range is 12 feet. The nova is a stick or baton which requires bodily contact with the suspect to impart an electrical shock.

Again, in order to be of value, these weapons require use within a very short range. Should the police officer miss the target or the weapon miscarry, it is likely that the suspect will be further incensed, and the danger will increase. In a situation where a police officer is justified in discharging a firearm, these weapons may well serve to increase rather than decrease the risk.

Mechanical weapons include: a ladder; a noose at the end of a long pole; a length of chain attached at each end to a pole which when manipulated by two officers might allow them to capture a suspect; a "leg grabber" which is an eight-foot aluminum pole with jaws at the end to grasp the ankles of a suspect; and nets of the type commonly used to entrap wild animals. Because of the difficulty in disarming an armed suspect with these devices, these are of limited value to tactical units.

The last category is chemical weapons. Most tactical units have gas weapons. This gas, commonly known as tear gas, is employed by way of a cannister which can be fired through a window or a door or discharged by way of a dispersion gun. In the dispersion gun, the chemical is carried by talcum powder and is effective within 10 to 15 feet. Tear gas is used by the police to force people to leave a building or a confined space, or when discharged from a dispersion gun, to stun a suspect temporarily and provide a few seconds for officers to physically subdue him. Unfortunately, it should be noted that this gas has no affect on people who are "high" on certain illicit drugs.

During the hearings in Windsor, the Commission heard a reasoned and passionate plea for the use of tranquilizer darts. A chemically loaded dart is discharged by a firearm; when implanted in muscle tissue it is intended to deliver a drug and tranquilize the subject. There are difficulties with using this type of weapon in situations faced by tactical units. First, the dart must be loaded with an appropriate strength of chemical; if it is too strong, it will kill the suspect, if it is too weak, the suspect will not be incapacitated. Therefore, there must be a highly skilled technician at the scene to assess the size and weight of the suspect and to load the dart. If the dart is properly implanted in the suspect by a police sniper, the suspect can render it ineffective by pulling it out; the chemical requires several minutes to be effective. These darts are effective in subduing animals because animals can't grasp the dart and pull it out.

RECOMMENDATION 39:
THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR DEADLY FORCE WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST THAT WILL JUSTIFY A POLICE OFFICER IN DISCHARGING A FIREARM, UNDER SECTION 9 REGULATION 790 OF THE POLICE ACT. HOWEVER, TACTICAL UNITS SHOULD BE TRAINED IN THE USE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS FOR APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES.

2) LETHAL WEAPONS

Tactical units are supplied with an inventory of lethal weapons. Each officer has a personal firearm, generally either the standard police issue .38 calibre six shot service revolver or a 9 millimetre semi-automatic pistol with a 13 or 14-round magazine. The rifles and shotguns used by tactical teams are usually designated as team weapons.

Our investigation team summarized the inventory of team weapons. Common to all tactical units is the 12-gauge shotgun, which fires a variety of shells, from bird shot (many small lead pellets) to a one-ounce rifled slug. Some forces use the shotgun for discharging tear gas canisters. All tactical units also have .223 calibre rifles, which have a magazine capacity of 20 to 40 rounds of ammunition. Most tactical units use a .308 calibre sniper rifle with optical sight for accurate long-distance shots.

While these rifles are included as team firearms, several tactical units assign sniper rifles to specific officers who train on this weapon. Many tactical units use a 9 millimetre automatic machine gun, but they use it in semi-automatic mode for better accuracy.

We understand that to many members of the public, this array of firepower may seem overwhelming and unnecessary. The reality of police tactical work today indicates otherwise. For example, the Metropolitan Emergency Task Force has seized over 400 firearms during 365 gun related calls in the last five years. Those seized firearms included machine guns, high powered rifles, shotguns, semi-automatic pistols and a variety of handguns. It is not reasonable to expect tactical officers to be armed with pistols while facing suspects with machine guns. We concur with the conclusion of the Commission's investigation team that it would be irresponsible to ask tactical officers to respond to dangerous situations "without sufficient firepower to overcome adversary force". (Volume II, Page 24)

The Commission is not in a position to recommend for or against a particular brand or make of weapon for use by police tactical units. Our investigation team noted that the choice of equipment, including firearms, used by a particular tactical unit would depend on a variety of factors, including: what equipment is best designed for specific demands; what equipment was on the market at the time the unit was formed; the equipment budget allocated to the unit; the opinion of the officer selecting the equipment; and the geography of the unit's jurisdiction, including climate. The investigation team also noted that the intended use of certain weapons varied; different units might use a .223 calibre weapon as a containment, cover, entry or sniper weapon.

Given the life-and-death situations in which these units are involved, we want to ensure that there are provincial standards for the weapons supplied to these officers, and that this equipment is the best available and appropriate for the task intended.

RECOMMENDATION 40:

PROVINCIAL STANDARDS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE WEAPONS USED BY POLICE TACTICAL UNITS TO ENSURE THAT THESE OFFICERS HAVE THE BEST AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT, APPROPRIATE FOR THE TASK INTENDED.

3) AMMUNITION

The Commission heard from an internationally recognized expert on firearms and wounds caused by firearms. The research of Dr. Martin Fackler, Director of the Wounds Ballistics Laboratory, Letterman Army Institute of Research, San Francisco, California (whose credentials are reproduced in Appendix F) was of significant help to us in understanding the issues involved in recommending ammunition for tactical operations.

Again, the common public perception is very different from reality. We are all familiar with scenes from films and television in which a person who is shot is immediately knocked down or thrown backwards and is instantly put out of action. This does not happen in the real world. The Commission viewed a videotape of a demonstration of a man in body armour being shot with a NATO military round of about 2,700 foot pounds of energy, fired from a distance of six to ten feet. A bullet which does not enter the body should have even more force to knock a person down than one which penetrates. The demonstration shot, which had approximately the same force as that carried by a solid one ounce slug fired from a 12-gauge shotgun, struck the man in the mid-section. The man, who was wearing body armour and standing on one foot, swayed backwards slightly and touched the toe of the other foot to the ground to steady himself. There was no serious effect on his balance.

There have been many instances where someone has been shot, and sometimes fatally shot, and has carried on after the wound was inflicted. In Dade County, Florida, in 1982, a suspect who had sustained two non-survivable bullet wounds managed to kill two FBI agents and wound another, climb into a motor vehicle and attempt to drive away before collapsing. There are other documented situations where a person sustaining a non-survivable gunshot wound was able to continue activity for 30 to 40 seconds before the wound had any noticeable effect. Even if the heart is destroyed, there is still sufficient oxygen in the brain to allow a person, who is within seconds of death, to shoot other people for another 30 seconds.

Persons involved in an exchange of gunfire are also affected by stress and adrenalin. Many suspects may also be affected by drugs and alcohol. These factors make it even less likely that a gunshot wound would show any immediate effect. Indeed, many people shot under such circumstances are not even aware that they have sustained a wound until some time later. Dr. Fackler referred to literature explaining that surgery can be performed without anaesthetic within an hour of the wound being inflicted.

When a police officer discharges a firearm, the object is the immediate cessation of activity by the suspect. This can only be guaranteed by a shot which strikes the suspect in the head. This will instantly terminate activity. However, such shots are only realistically achievable by snipers and not always then. In the real world, the police officer will probably do well to hit a human body somewhere in the torso. That being the case, what is required is ammunition that will do the greatest amount of damage in order to stop the suspect's activity in the shortest possible time.

Society asks members of tactical units to put their lives on the line for our protection. It seems to us only reasonable that they be provided with the most effective ammunition possible.

In order to make a decision on what is most effective, we looked at Dr. Fackler's research on the impact of bullets on the human body.

When a bullet enters a body, it creates a hole approximately the size of the projectile, but the wound expands. The projectile creates a temporary cavity which appears to be caused by explosive pressure. The temporary cavity opens and then closes in elastic tissue, such as muscle tissue as the projectile passes through. If the bullet hits inelastic tissue, such as the liver the tissue shatters rather than expanding (stretching). But most often the bullet passes through elastic tissue, creating a temporary cavity. The permanent cavity is made by the size of the projectile and its course after it enters the tissue. It can be seen from the attached diagrams (Appendix D), prepared for the Commission by Dr. Fackler, that some projectiles will yaw through an arc of 180 degrees, travelling sideways and then backwards through part of their course. Diagrams show how some ammunition will expand upon entering the tissue and thus cause more damage. Finally, Appendix D Diagram No. 1 shows how a projectile covered by a full metal jacket will traverse the body and continue out the other side while causing minimal damage. The metal jacket is usually a copper alloy which encases the lead core.

The lead projectile is not appropriate if discharged at speeds much in excess of 1,000 feet per second. The lead has a tendency to peel away from the projectile and foul the weapon. Therefore, 9 millimetre pistols, rifles, and other weapons fire a projectile which is encased in metal. If the projectile carries a full metal jacket, it tends to pass right through the body and do minimal damage, as is shown in Diagram No. 1. If, however, the front end is flat instead of pointed, the projectile will have a tendency to expand when it enters tissue. An expanding projectile causes a permanent cavity about twice the original size of the projectile. It tends to stop within the body, rather than passing through and endangering someone else behind the target. See Appendix D Diagram 2.

The most effective for our purposes is a projectile that will penetrate deeply without passing through, and create a large permanent cavity. This is most likely to achieve the objective - immediate cessation of activity. For these reasons, except for the .38 calibre service revolver, we recommend the use of ammunition which is partially covered by a metal jacket and which is designed to expand on entry.

The standard police sidearm in Ontario is a six-round revolver. This weapon discharges a solid lead projectile at a speed slightly less than 1,000 feet per second. This ammunition was tested for us by Dr. Fackler and his results are illustrated in Diagram No. 3, Appendix D. This projectile yaws 180 degrees and causes a very large wound. Dr. Fackler's report on this ammunition is reproduced as Appendix No. E.

4) PERSONAL FIREARMS: REVOLVER VS. PISTOL

When members of a tactical unit are called upon to discharge a firearm, the object must be to stop the threat immediately. This can only be accomplished by a shot to the head which is rarely achievable. Therefore, when a member of a tactical unit discharges a firearm, the officer must continue to shoot until the danger has clearly ceased or until the officer runs out of ammunition. Thus the capacity of the weapon in terms of how many rounds of ammunition it holds, and the ease of reloading can be critical to an officer's survival and the survival of hostages or bystanders.

A revolver is a handgun in which the ammunition is carried in a cylinder. As one shoots, the cylinder revolves and each round is brought in turn to the firing pin. The cylinder will hold five, six or seven rounds. Our examination of situations in which firearms were appropriately used by tactical officers indicates quite clearly to us that this is insufficient ammunition.

In order to load a revolver, one must swing the cylinder out of the frame, unload the spent cartridges if it has been previously fired, and insert the bullets. There is a speed loader available which will permit one to insert all the bullets at the same time, but it is a clumsy, time-consuming operation. Two hands are required to load or reload a revolver. A police officer who has one hand out of service from having sustained a wound will be unable to reload.

A pistol is a handgun in which the ammunition is carried in a clip. Normally, the clip is inserted in the butt or handle of the gun. Such clips will hold at least 10 rounds of ammunition and as many as 15. When the pistol is fired, the weapon automatically brings a new round to the firing pin. In order to reload a pistol, one simply removes the clip which is empty and inserts a new one. A pistol can be reloaded with one hand.

We have been told that a pistol requires more maintenance than a revolver, but we found no concrete evidence to support that proposition. From our review, we have concluded that reasonable maintenance will keep either a revolver or a pistol in serviceable condition.

In making our recommendations on firearms and ammunition, we wish to make it clear that we have examined only the operations of tactical units and have not examined the functions of patrol officers.

We recommend that all members of tactical units be furnished with pistols because the pistol carries more ammunition and is much easier to reload. Because of the motor skills required for the accurate use of a handgun, we recommend that members of tactical units carry the pistol not only when deployed as part of such a unit, but also when deployed on patrol. We think it unreasonable to expect a person to be skilled in the use of both a revolver and a pistol and be able to switch back and forth from one to the other in high-stress, life threatening situations.

Because a solid lead projectile is inappropriate when discharged at speeds much in excess of 1,000 feet per second, and because the pistols commonly available on the market which might be used by tactical units all fire ammunition which is discharged at speeds well in excess of 1,000 feet per second, we recommend ammunition which has a partial metal jacket, which has the lead nose uncovered, and which is designed to expand on impact. This ammunition is more effective than a projectile fully encased in hard metal and it is less likely to cause injury to bystanders.

RECOMMENDATION 41:
ALL TACTICAL OFFICERS SHOULD BE ISSUED A 9 MILLIMETRE PISTOL, FOR USE BOTH IN TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND ON PATROL.

RECOMMENDATION 42:
AMMUNITION FOR THE 9 MILLIMETRE PISTOL SHOULD HAVE A PARTIAL METAL JACKET COVERING MOST OF THE PROJECTILE, BUT NOT THE NOSE, AND BE DESIGNED TO EXPAND ON IMPACT.

We would like to comment on one other firearms issue. The Commission heard concerns from police experts that in some tactical units, sniper rifles are not assigned to a particular officer, but are part of team equipment. A sniper rifle should be assigned to one officer and used only by that officer. If a sniper rifle is used, it must be accurate. If the rifle is used by more than one officer, the target sighting may be off, and this could cost lives. In addition, an officer who has particular "ownership" of a piece of equipment is likely to keep it in the best working condition and properly sighted in.

RECOMMENDATION 43:
EACH SNIPER RIFLE SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO AN INDIVIDUAL OFFICER AND USED ONLY BY THAT OFFICER.

(b) COMMUNICATIONS

Communication has been called the tactical officer's "lifeline". In a dangerous situation, tactical officers can keep the incident commander informed via portable radios of what is happening where they are positioned; they can also find out from fellow officers what is taking place in areas outside their line of vision. This passing back and forth of information, such as where an armed suspect or a hostage is located, is essential.

The need for communication goes beyond the team of officers containing the situation in the inner perimeter area. The incident commander, from the command post, may need to get information to or from patrol officers sealing off the area around the danger zone, or other emergency units such as ambulance units. The commander may want information on the mood and condition of the suspect from relatives or friends who have to be contacted. In the section of this report on Incident Command, we recommend that a communications officer be stationed at the command post to coordinate radio and telephone communications. We also recommend that in cases where the tactical unit is brought in from an outside jurisdiction, there should be a local police liaison officer to provide information on the local area and people.

The command post must be able to receive and give information to all police officers at the scene, and these officers must be able to talk to each other. That means they must have a common communications link.

Of the five fatal incidents we reviewed, the one with the most communications problems was that of Bernard Bastien.

There was a significant communications breakdown, mainly attributed to human error. As we noted earlier, the OPP tactical unit and the incident command post were not in close communication; for certain periods of time, the incident commander didn't even know where the unit was located. The police dispatchers for the area were not informed of what was occurring or where.

This became critical when Mrs. Bastien called police twice to inform them there were intruders outside her home and that her husband had gone out, armed, to investigate. This information was not passed on to the tactical unit.

The errors made in this case were compounded by the difficulty in communicating by radio at the scene. For example, an Anderdon township police officer down the road from the OPP tactical unit found out about Mrs. Bastien's calls and informed an OPP officer nearby. The OPP officer did not attempt to communicate with the tactical unit, but if he had tried, he would not have been able to reach them on the only communications equipment he had available. The message should have been passed to the unit through the command post, or delivered in person. However, to repeat, the problems with control of the whole operation were compounded by the difficulty in communication.

We recommend earlier in this report that police forces which don't have their own tactical unit should make arrangements to get tactical assistance from outside when needed. It is crucial that the incident commander, the tactical unit and the police force in whose jurisdiction the incident is occurring should be able to communicate easily.

In the 1970's the Ontario Police Commission common channel was created to facilitate radio communications between police forces. A police officer who entered another jurisdiction could talk to the police force in that jurisdiction on the OPC channel. However, while about 100 police forces have the OPC channel, we have been told it is not universal. The Ontario Provincial Police have not, until recently, had access to the OPC channel on the OPP radio system, and the OPP covers most of rural Ontario. The OPP is in the process of implementing a new communications system, which will provide the connecting link in the rural areas between the OPP and municipal forces with the Ontario Police Commission common channel. As of January 1990, the OPP has the system in place in all of Southern Ontario south of the line connecting Ottawa, Orillia and Owen Sound. Implementation in the north will follow.

All the tactical units in Ontario, except Brantford, have access to the Ontario Police Commission common channel on their portable radios. Brantford has mobile radios which give them access to the OPC channel. When tactical units are deployed in a high-risk situation, there is a radio channel dedicated to their use. Metropolitan Toronto and Niagara Regional forces have a channel dedicated to their tactical units at all times.

In order to ensure communication when a tactical unit is deployed outside its jurisdiction, we recommend that all police forces which intend to rely on outside tactical support make specific, formal arrangements concerning communications. The OPC common channel may be used, or the tactical unit may have to carry an extra supply of portable radios to hand out to officers from the jurisdiction in which the incident is occurring. We are not so much concerned with how communications are assured, as long as they are assured. In the case of the OPP TRU teams, which serve large geographic areas, mostly rural, it is essential that they have a communications plan for any jurisdiction in which an OPP tactical unit might be deployed.

RECOMMENDATION 44:
POLICE FORCES WHICH INTEND TO RELY ON OUTSIDE TACTICAL SUPPORT MUST MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE A MEANS OF COMMUNICATION AMONG THE TACTICAL UNIT, THE INCIDENT COMMANDER AND OTHER POLICE OFFICERS.

RECOMMENDATION 45:
THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE SHOULD HAVE COMMUNICATIONS PLANS FOR ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH THEIR TACTICAL UNITS MAY BE DEPLOYED.

(c) IDENTIFICATION - CLOTHING, ETC.

Given the kinds of incidents in which tactical units are involved and the weapons they carry, it is particularly important that officers are identified as police. In the Bastien incident, Bernard Bastien was not the only person who was confused by the TRU team, whose officers were wearing interrupted pattern camouflage uniforms. Two other neighbours came out of their house that night; one of them confronted police with a firearm. Another tragedy might have occurred, had a TRU team member not been able to convince this citizen that he was indeed a police officer. Since that incident, the OPP has taken the broken pattern camouflage uniforms out of service.

We realize that camouflage may be needed in certain circumstances: for example, white uniforms for winter so that officers cannot be seen against the snow, or broken camouflage uniforms for officers trying to contain an incident from an open field in a rural area. However, there should be a standard uniform for tactical officers throughout the province. There should be a clear, large POLICE identification on all uniforms; there could be flashes attached to cover the "police" insignia if necessary or the identification could be removable (if an officer felt a black police identification on a white uniform could serve as a target in the snow). However, we believe that in most circumstances, clear police identification would serve both officer and public safety.

In addition, vans and other vehicles used by these units should be clearly identified. We heard that some police forces borrow heavy equipment for emergencies. For example, the Sarnia Police Force has an arrangement with Brinks for access to an armoured car. This sounds like an excellent arrangement; if the force has not already done so, we would suggest that some kind of portable sign be available to affix to the truck to identify it as a police vehicle during a tactical operation.

RECOMMENDATION 46:

SUBJECT TO SPECIAL SITUATIONS WHERE VISIBILITY MAY CONSTITUTE A DANGER, ALL TACTICAL OFFICERS SHOULD WEAR THE SAME STANDARD UNIFORM. THIS UNIFORM SHOULD CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE WEARER AS A POLICE OFFICER. VEHICLES USED BY TACTICAL UNITS SHOULD BE SIMILARLY IDENTIFIED.

PUBLIC EDUCATION VII

PUBLIC EDUCATION VII

The last issue we will address is public education. We believe it is important that the public be better informed about the purpose and capabilities of police tactical units, which exist to protect the public.

One of the difficulties in launching any kind of public education effort is the lack of common identity among these units today. When tactical units were first organized in North America, they were known as Special Weapons Assault Teams (SWAT). This name focusses attention on the unit's expertise in the use of special weapons and assault to rescue hostages. We believe this acronym is inconsistent with the mandate of these units. Their mandate is not to resolve an incident as quickly as possible; it is to isolate the situation and wait while a negotiator talks the suspect into giving up. The acronym SWAT gives these units an unfortunate image.

The coroner's jury which examined the tragic death of Bernard Bastien recommended that all tactical units be known by the same name. We agree that a common identification is desirable, and that it would improve the public education process. The name should be one which emphasizes the "contain and negotiate" mandate of tactical units.

RECOMMENDATION 47:
ALL POLICE TACTICAL UNITS IN ONTARIO SHOULD HAVE A COMMON IDENTITY. THE NAME SHOULD EMPHASIZE THEIR MANDATE TO CONTAIN AND NEGOTIATE.

While a common identity will help, it will not provide members of the public with an understanding of how these units work, or why they are necessary. A public education effort should focus on the "contain and negotiate" tactics of these units, and on the kinds of incidents in which they are deployed (armed and barricaded person, hostage-taking etc.).

Members of the public should also be informed about what their responsibilities are in a tactical situation. They should know the importance of co-operating with police if they are advised to evacuate their homes during an incident, for example. Law-abiding citizens may believe they will never be "involved" in a tactical incident; however, they may find themselves drawn into one because there is an armed person in the neighbourhood or because they happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time when an incident occurs.

RECOMMENDATION 48:
A PUBLIC EDUCATION EFFORT SHOULD FOCUS ON INCREASING PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE "CONTAIN AND NEGOTIATE" ROLE OF TACTICAL UNITS AND SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PUBLIC TO CO-OPERATE WITH POLICE DURING A DANGEROUS SITUATION.

REVIEW

OF

TACTICAL

UNITS

1989

APPENDICES

Ontario
Executive Council

Order in Council

APPENDIX - A

On the recommendation of the undersigned, the Lieutenant Governor, by and with the advice and concurrence of the Executive Council, orders that

WHEREAS public concern has been expressed in relation to the employment of police tactical units in Ontario, and

WHEREAS it is considered desirable to cause a hearing and review to be made of these matters;

NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to clause 59(1)(b) of the Police Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.381, the Ontario Police Commission ("the Commission") be directed to inquire into, report upon and make recommendations with respect to such police tactical units, with particular regard to the following:

(1) the historical operation and utilization of such units, since their inception, by police forces in Ontario;

(2) the selection and training of the personnel comprising such units;

(3) the equipment used by such units, including weapons and communications equipment;

(4) the functions assigned to such units; and,

(5) the rationale and need for such units;

AND THAT Government Ministries, Boards, Agencies and Commissions shall assist the Commission to the fullest extent in order that it may carry out its duties and functions, and that it shall have authority to engage such counsel, expert technical advisors, investigators and other staff it deems proper at rates of remuneration and reimbursement to be approved by the Management Board of Cabinet in order that a complete and comprehensive report may be prepared and submitted to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council,

AND THAT the Ministry of the Solicitor General will be responsible for providing administrative support to the Commission.

Recommended Joan Smith
Solicitor General

Concurred Murray J. Elston
Chairman

Approved
and Ordered January 4, 1989
Date

Lieutenant Governor

APPENDIX - B

Ontario

POLICE TACTICAL UNITS INQUIRY
NOTICE

The Ontario Police Commission was directed by the Solicitor General on January 4, 1989 to examine the use of police tactical units in Ontario.

The Commission was asked to examine and make recommendations on the following:

1. the historical operation and utilization of such units, since their inception, by police forces in Ontario.
2. the selection and training of the personnel comprising such units;
3. the equipment used by such units, including weapons and communications equipment;
4. the functions assigned to such units;
5. the rationale and need for such units.

The Commission will review oral and written submissions related to its mandate.

Written submissions from members of the public are now invited. They should be forwarded to the Ontario Police Commission, 9th Floor, 25 Grosvenor Street, Toronto, M7A 2H3, by Friday, April 21, 1989.

The Commission is currently arranging a series of public hearings at which interested citizens and organizations will have the opportunity to personally state their views. Those citizens and groups who submit written briefs will have an opportunity, if desired, to expand on their submissions at these hearings.

Further information may be obtained by contacting Gordon Hampson or Cathy Boxer at the Commission offices in Toronto (416) 965-6071.

W.D. Drinkwalter, Q.C.
Chairman

APPENDIX - C (I)

INQUIRY

INTO

ONTARIO POLICE TACTICAL UNITS

VOLUME I

Submitted to The Ontario Police Commission

Ministry of the
Solicitor
Ontario General

APRIL 1989

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THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

Mr. W. Douglas Drinkwalter, Q.C.
Chairman
Ontario Police Commission

Mrs. Jean M. Beauprie

Mr. Frank M. D'Andrea

Mr. Julio R. Menezes

Dr. Bette M. Stephenson

Counsel W. Graydon Sheppard, B.A. L.L.B.

Investigators:

Mr. Martin vanWeert
Mr. Calvin Bond

Order in Council

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(3) the equipment used by such units, including weapons and communications equipment;

(4) the functions assigned to such units; and,
the rationale and need for such units;

AND THAT Government Ministries, Boards, Agencies and Commissions shall assist the Commission to the fullest extent in order that it may carry out its duties and functions, and that it shall have authority to engage such counsel, expert technical advisor, investigators and other staff it deems proper at rates of remuneration and reimbursement to be approved by the Management Board of Cabinet in order that a complete and comprehensive report may be prepared and submitted to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council,

AND THAT the Ministry of the Solicitor General will be responsible for providing administrative support to the Commission.

INTRODUCTION

The Ontario Police Commission directed by Order in Council 84-89 is committed to hold public hearings and inquire into tactical units in the Province of Ontario.

The mandate as set out in the Order in Council is to review the history, selection, training, equipment and utilization of tactical units. A three month investigation was scheduled and conducted to respect that time allotment.

The investigators have visited tactical personnel of all forces who have tactical units. Interviews, equipment checks and review of documents are the basis for this report outlining the facts about Ontario Tactical Response Units.

A second report will present a comparative overview in the mandated categories with suggestions for minimum standards and comments.

A third report will examine recent critical incidents involving tactical units. Police shootings and use of firearms will be reviewed.

BELLEVILLE POLICE FORCE

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM

HISTORY

In the late 1970's the Belleville Police Force considered and planned for an emergency response team. In 1982 volunteers began training for the emergency response team. The team is headed by a staff sergeant and consists of ten members. The team is administered by the inspector of criminal investigation who answer to the chief of police and made up of parttime members.

The original purpose for the E.R.T. was to handle emergency situations where firearms were involved. The objective at incidents is the control of situations to protect the public and the police.

SELECTION AND TRAINING

Emergency response team members volunteer for team service. Applications are reviewed by management, and selected persons undergo physical testing to Ontario Police College recruit standards. Psychological testing and interviews are then conducted by a qualified psychologist. (Dr. Wolfgaard) To qualify for E.R.T. an officer must be a second class constable.

Original training for the 1982 team was conducted by officers trained at Camp Borden and the Hamilton-Wentworth Police Force. Detective G. Goodwin also completed a training course put on by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

The team is presently undergoing a transition and filling three vacancies. Training will be integrated into the scheduled training of the existing team. This ongoing training consists of four hours every two weeks or one day a month which is in paid overtime. Budget and manpower difficulties prevent the increase of training according to Chief of Police R. Begbie and Inspector Goodwin.

Training includes role practice in firearms and containment of buildings "loaned" by public interests.

EQUIPMENT

Personal

- two piece, navy blue, tactical uniform
- baseball cap
- force issue .38 cal. Smith & Wesson revolver

Team

The following equipment is kept in the tactical van or the gun room in the police station.

Firearms

- Remington model 870 12 gauge shotguns (2 with mirrors mounted in the banels - used primarily for building entry and room clearing.
- Browning sniper rifles .243 calibre with Redfield 12 x and Weaver 2.51 x scopes - used for long range containment and cover.
- Smith & Wesson 9mm machine gun - it is of limited use due to its fire power potential and accuracy. May be useful to keep an elevated sniper down in order to get officers closer.
- AR15 rifle with an Aim Point Electronic Mark III scope - used for cover during an assault.
- 37mm Smith & Wesson gas gun - used for firing various chemical agent dispensers.

Ammunition

Shotgun:	Winchester "00" Buck
Browning:	Remington 100 Grain Pointed Soft Point
Smith & Wesson:	115 Grain FMJ Military Issue
AR 15:	Federal 55 Grain FMJ Boat Tail

Other Equipment

- heavy ceramic flack vests - (2 with groin attachment - 2 without).
- extra heavy bullet proof vests (49 lbs.)
- ballistic helmets - this equipment is used by entry officers.
- gas masks.
- Scott air-pak.
- entry tools including: a battering ram, sledge hammer, axe, machete, several pry bars.
- other tools including: binoculars, rifle slings, collapsible shovel and night sticks, ropes, blankets, spotlight, riot shield, rain gear.

The use of this equipment is dependant upon the nature of the call.

Pyrotechnics

Belleville E.R.T. uses both CS and CN tear gas. Grenades, projectiles, "Mighty-Mite", 12 gauge ferrets, and barricade non-burning rounds are stocked for use.

Smoke grenades are also available to provide cover for team movement.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Belleville E.R.T. uses HT220 Motorola portable radios with three channels. The E.R.T. uses the third channel exclusively in containment situations. The force has three repeaters strategically placed in the area and these seem to work effectively. The tactical leader and command post team leader each have two radios so that the third and common channel may be monitored.

The radios operate with an attachment, wires, an ear piece and a hand held press to talk device. This fragile equipment is subject to breakdown which cuts off communication in what could be a critical situation. Money has been budgeted in 1989 to upgrade the communication equipment including portable radios used by tactical officers.

UTILIZATION

The original purpose of deployment in firearms situations has been followed by the Belleville Emergency Response Team. Police department procedure number 79 spells out the following situations:

- hostage taking
- barricaded persons (armed)
- search or arrest warrants in which firearms are expected to be involved
- any incidents in which use of firearms may be expected, i.e. robbery stakeout

Gun calls will be ascertained by observation or confirmation of witnesses. A patrol sergeant will assess the situation and make a recommendation to the duty officer (usually a staff sergeant) who will decide about calling out the emergency response team. The duty officer will also call the inspector of criminal investigation or his alternate senior officer.

INCIDENT COMMAND

The command post and incident command will be charged to the operations inspector or one of three alternates qualified in incident command. The incident commander is advised by the emergency response team leader. One negotiator will be called out with a second on standby.

STATISTICS

The Belleville Emergency Response Team has been deployed six times in the last five years.

Three incidents involved the negotiated surrender of armed persons, one in which shots were fired.

Two incidents involved the arrest of armed and dangerous persons and the arrests were made without incident.

One incident involved an armed barricaded suspect who fired shots and was eventually wounded by police fire and taken into custody. The suspect was using a high-powered rifle.

BRANTFORD CITY POLICE

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM

History

The Brantford Police Force Emergency Response Team was implemented in November of 1977. The authorization came from Chief of Police J. G. Weir by way of departmental order. The formation of the E.R.T. followed that of Hamilton-Wentworth and considered the senior officers' view that tactical response was necessary to deal with certain situations and in particular, hostage taking and armed barricaded persons. Procedures for these events are documented in department policy.

The Brantford Emergency Response Team consists of eight members. One member is the team leader in tactical manoeuvres. A training sergeant added in February of 1989 increases the E.R.T. complement to nine members. E.R.T. is administered by the inspector, operations division who is responsible to the deputy chief of police.

Selection and Training

Candidates for membership to E.R.T. require first class constable status and an expression of interest in volunteering for the response team. Applicants are tested for physical fitness by a qualified force member.

Psychological testing involves the administration of a series of psychological tests acquired from William Mercer Limited in Toronto. These tests are evaluated by the Mercer firm and include:

- Otis self-administering tests of mental ability, copyright 1972
- California Psychological Inventory, copyright 1956
- Supervisory Practices, Quentin File, copyright 1948
- Test of Practical Judgement, (A.J. Cardall), copyright 1962
- Critical Thinking Appraisal, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, copyright 1970

Candidates who successfully complete testing may be appointed to the E.R.T. by the chief of police.

Training of new members depends on availability of a basic training course at the Ontario Police College. Generally training is the responsibility of the team training sergeant. New members will be slowly integrated into tactical response. Ongoing training consists of six hours per month organized by the team leader. Training is in local areas secured through public co-operation. A one year training plan serves as a training guide.

For physical fitness, members are allotted one half-hour per working shift when exigencies of service permit. No physical fitness facilities are available at the police station.

In 1982 and 1983 E.R.T. members attended a one week course at Canadian Forces Base, Borden.

The force has trained negotiators and incident commanders to work with emergency response.

EQUIPMENT

Personal

- one piece navy blue coveralls with shoulder flashes attached with velcro
- a vest in which to carry gas grenades, ammunition, portable radio and issued .38 calibre revolver. This allows for easy carrying and accessibility
- police style thermal boot for protection in all types of weather and which also have a heavy sole suitable for climbing and rappelling
- an unmarked baseball cap for summer wear
- an unmarked balaclava for winter wear

Team Equipment

Firearms

- Remington Model 700 .308 cal. rifle with scope. This weapon is used by one member of the tactical team who is stationed a safe distance from the scene, and can provide good visibility as to the movement of a suspect. The weapon is used to provide cover protection for other members of the tactical team who are positioned closer to the scene. The ammunition used is a partially jacketed soft point Winchester cartridge

- Winchester Model 70 Sport .308 cal. rifle with scope. Use and rationale as above

- 3 Ruger Mini 14 .223 cal. rifles. These weapons are smaller, lighter and easier to handle than the Remington or Winchester. They are used by members of the tactical team who are closer to the scene of an incident. This weapon also uses a Winchester partially jacketed soft point cartridge

- 2 Remington Model 870 12 gauge shotguns with rifled sights. Used for containment and close contact situations. During entry, the use of the shotgun minimizes the risk of over penetration. S.S.G. and rifled slugs are used in these weapons

- 2 Glock Model 17 9mm handguns - used by the entry and arrest team. This weapon is easily holstered and is an effective containment weapon.

- Smith & Wesson 37mm tear gas gun used to fire various tear gas projectiles

Other Equipment

- rappelling equipment - used for building entry, i.e. gaining access to an apartment in a high rise building. Although never used in a tactical situation, this equipment is a good training tool as it promotes team work and increases morale

- axe and crowbar as entry tools

- armoured car. A retired "Brinks" truck painted and clearly identifiable as an Emergency Response Unit. Used for transporting the team, storage of tactical equipment at the scene and also for protection of the team at the scene

Pyrotechnics

- "Mighty Midget" CN tear gas. Used for forcing suspects from a residence or building
- Smoke grenades - used to provide cover for tactical team movement
- CS tear gas canisters fired from the 37mm gas gun. Also used for forcing suspects from a building

Communications

The force uses Motorola radio equipment. Each tactical officer is issued a portable radio supplied with an ear mike. This ear mike may be controlled from either the belt or from a push-to-talk button which can be worn on the hand.

The portable radio has two channels, one of which is used solely by the tactical team during crisis situations.

Utilization

Members of E.R.T. perform regular patrol duties. One marked vehicle assigned to these members carries a shotgun, rifle, .38 gas launcher and smoke and gas grenades.

The call-out procedure for emergency response such as a gun call usually involves an on-duty E.R.T. member responding to confirm the call. The E.R.T. member acts as resource person to the patrol supervisor.

The patrol supervisor who tells the E.R.T. should be activated requires permission of the duty officer who will be the station staff sergeant or duty inspector.

When E.R.T. is called out they meet at the police station and proceed to the command post in the emergency response unit which is a converted Brinks truck. In the event of an escalated major occurrence a mobile command vehicle jointly owned with the fire department, may be deployed.

At the scene of an incident the duty inspector takes command. He is advised by the E.R.T. sergeant on tactical options. The E.R.T. sergeant is in direct communication with the tactical leader while monitoring communications from other sources.

The Brantford City Police, Emergency Response Team has been used eight times between 1985 and 1988. The calls may be categorized as follows:

- **five (5) calls involved armed barricaded persons**
- **one (1) call involved an armed hostage taker**
- One (1) call involved the arrest of a dangerous armed person
- One (1) call was to assist in a search warrant execution

The Brantford E.R.T. has been able to resolve all these dangerous situations without firing a shot. In several cases weapons were fired by suspects. The Brantford E.R.T. record reflects its commitment to safe resolution of dangerous situations.

DURHAM REGIONAL POLICE

TACTICAL SUPPORT UNIT

History

In 1985 the Durham Regional Police formed the tactical support unit. The unit was authorized by the chief of police in response to increased gun calls and dangerous incidents. The T.S.U. provides expert support in dangerous situations and is seen as the safest response to life-threatening emergencies.

The T.S.U. consists of nine constables, a sergeant supervisor and presently a sergeant leader of tactical deployment. The unit is responsible to the operations superintendent who answers to the operations deputy chief of police. The sergeants prepare and conduct training for T.S.U. as well as perform regular force duties.

Selection and Training

Openings for the tactical support unit are posted as they become available. Interested candidates apply in writing through their unit commander. Candidates whose work performance and records are suitable will then be interviewed by T.S.U. supervisors and the operations superintendent. Prospective members generally have five years of practical experience. Providing physical testing is successfully completed the applicant goes through an interview by T.S.U. supervisors and the superintendent. Prospective members are expected to commit three years to T.S.U.

Candidates originally accepted on T.S.U. were trained by Metropolitan Toronto Emergency Task Force personnel. New members will take an Ontario Police College basic orientation course if available.

Ongoing training consists of two days per month plus one week at Canadian Forces Base, Borden. In addition two full exercises are conducted annually in which incident command and negotiation is integrated with tactical training.

Unit members are expected to maintain above average physical fitness through off duty exercise.

Written precis information is handed out to unit members from time to time.

EQUIPMENT LIST

Personal Equipment

Uniform

- blue 2-piece tactical coveralls with shoulder flashes. Regular duty uniform for training and urban calls
- green camouflage shirt and pants used when undetected deployment is necessary in a rural area. This uniform has subdued shoulder flashes
- peaked ball cap with the Tactical Support Unit (T.S.U.) crest
- Watch cap - toque
- black rain suit
- 9" black "Terra boot"
- 'Sorel' winter boot
- M-17 gas mask - U.S. military style
- ear defenders - headset ear protection
- goggles for shooting and when using stun grenades
- Sam Brown belt, holster, radio case, handcuff case and ammo case
- buck knife and case
- tactical nylon belt, thigh holster, ammo pouches, handcuff pouch and extra handcuffs. This belt and equipment is for tactical response and although basically a duplicate of the Sam Brown belt, etc. is issued so the officer can change clothes etc. quickly, in an emergency situation
- equipment bag. The officer keeps the equipment bag (and equipment) with him at all times

Team Equipment

Firearms

- Smith & Wesson Model 659 semi-automatic pistol. This weapon uses 100 grain Hirtenberger soft point ammunition. Each member of the team carries this weapon at all times during his tour of duty. The 14 round capability of each of two clips and the effectiveness of the 9mm round are the reasons for using this weapon

- Winchester Model 70 .308 calibre sniper rifle with a Leupold 3.5 - 10x scope and bipod. Federal match, .308 calibre, 168 grain, full metal jacket ammunition is used. This is used strictly as a sniper rifle

- Ruger Mini 14 .223 calibre rifle used as a containment weapon

  The ammunition used is Winchester pointed soft point. One Ruger Mini 14 is equipped with a laser sight and one is equipped with an aim point light

- Remington Model 1100 12 gauge semi-automatic shotgun. Used primarily for containment in built up areas. Two of these weapons have shortened barrels and stocks, and are used as entry weapons. Brenneke '00' Buck and rifled slug ammunition is used in this weapon. All shotguns can be used for discharging tear gas

- Remington Model 870 12 gauge shotgun used to discharge tear gas ferrets

- Heckler and Koch MP5 .9mm machine pistol. This weapon is used by the entry team. Hirtenberger soft point ammunition is used

- Winchester Model 1200 12 gauge shotgun with police pistol grip. Used by the entry team

- Daewoo .223 calibre semi-automatic assault rifle

- .177 calibre pellet rifle - used for shooting out lights

- Federal 37mm gas gun - used for discharging various gas canisters

Other Equipment

- Type 17 ballistic helmets - used during an assault or when rappelling
- 'Pro Tec' ballistic body bunker - used for protection while walking down hallways

  This 20 lb. shield has POLICE in white 4" lettering across the front
- Bristol ballistic ceramic body armour vests with groin protector. For entry personnel, this vest also has POLICE written across its front
- Kermantle static rappelling rope, Forrest harness seats, Petzel descenders, carobiners, gloves, 11mm Sticht safety brake. This is the teams' main gear used when rappelling in rescue situations
- 24 foot extension ladder and ladder hooks
- Q-beam 12 volt spotlight and battery pack
- Carl Wettlar 7 x 35 binoculars
- Bausch and Lombe 7 x 50 binoculars
- range finder - 1000 MK5
- Tasco 20 x 60 spotting scope
- Tripod spotting scope
- orange hand held lanterns
- Leupold 3.5 x 10 rifle scopes used with the Winchester Model 70
- convex mirror for attaching onto the shotgun for house clearing
- Polaroid camera used to take pictures of the area where a subject is, and then used to assist in deploying the team
- pry bars, sledge hammers, bolt cutters, saws, chain saws, pick (long handle), fire axe, all are entry tools and used depending on the situation

Pyrotechnics

- #287 Tear Dust Streamer in aerosol cans
- CN 203 Muzzle Blast
- SGA-100 12 gauge ferret
- SSA-300 37mm ferret
- Mighty Midget Grenade kit c/w grenades and .38 calibre cartridges
- C.S. and C.W. grenades
- C.S. shot blast and muzzle blast
- 452 12 gauge grenade launcher
- Smoke grenades in white, yellow, red and green
- CIAI Thunder flashes
- Cyalume safety light sticks

Vehicles

- 4 x 4 Suburban equipment carrier
- 1972 Armoured car refurbished and reinforced for the tactical team. Used to move the team into or people out of the area of the subject
- 31 foot motor home mobile command post equipped with:

  a) communication tower

  b) communication repeater

  c) Motorola communication system for police, fire, ambulance and other police forces

  d) negotiators' kit - 1000 feet of phone wire and telephones

  e) cellular phone

Communications

Durham Regional Police Force uses Motorola radio communication equipment. Due to the great expanse of the region, a system of towers and repeaters is used to ensure reception.

The team uses Motorola portable radios with headsets and mike-booms. During a tactical operation the team uses a simplex channel which allows for portable to portable communication which is not recorded. A separate channel is used for other officers involved in the incident. Technical communications has not been a problem for the team.

Utilization

Tactical unit members are employed as patrol officers. The team sergeant is a criminal investigator. The tactical or second sergeant is a training officer.

The call-out authority is vested in the duty inspector on the advice of a front line supervisor. The duty inspector will take on the incident command and will be assisted by the team sergeant at the command post. The tactical leader will take charge of the inner perimeter. Team members when called out proceed to Whitby Centre Division 18 to pick up T.S.U. equipment and vehicle before reporting to the command post. Some members report directly to the incident commander, depending on the team sergeant's direction.

The T.S.U. is called out generally for high risk situations including the following:

- hostage taking
- barricaded persons
- high risk arrests
- high risk search warrants or raids
- any high risk incident at the discretion of command officers.

Since 1985 T.S.U. has answered 45 calls for service. They may be broken down as follows:

- twenty-three (23) calls involved dangerous armed persons, mostly in barricaded situations.

- seven (7) calls involved the arrest of dangerous persons.

- five (5) calls involved stake-outs or surveillance.
- five (5) calls involved security details.
- three (3) calls involved assisting at high risk searches.
- two (2) calls involved hostage situations and firearms.

In no cases did the police wound or kill any suspects. This, despite a number of shots fired in criminal acts.

In one case police fired twice at a vehicle when the suspect had fired randomly at officers in a pursuit incident involving a robbery suspect.

The Durham T.S.U. has demonstrated constraint and skill in dealing with dangerous situations. Their safety record speaks well to an expressed commitment to peaceful resolution.

GUELPH POLICE FORCE

EMERGENCY TACTICAL UNIT

The Guelph Police Emergency Tactical Unit was established in 1976 under then Chief of Police, Robert McCarron. The unit was created to provide support in special areas. In particular E.T.U. was intended to safely resolve incidents of hostage taking, armed and barricaded subjects, calls involving dangerous use of weapons, and the apprehension of dangerous persons.

The E.T.U. consists of eight weapons members. The Tactical Team Leader and the Unit are co-ordinated by the inspector in charge of uniform division who reports to the deputy chief of operations. A staff sergeant and sergeant are the team leaders who attend calls and direct tactics.

The E.T.U. has no documented mission statement or philosophy but response that their aim is "zero casualties". This philosophy is exemplified in their training and demonstrated in response.

Selection and Training

The Guelph E.T.U. recruits new members as necessary. Those officers who have expressed an interest are placed on a list for consideration.

Officers who are first class constables and appear to be physically fit are first discussed by E.T.U. members as to acceptability. The "short list" is then discussed by team leaders who include checks of performance and interviews with supervisors. After a recommendation to the deputy chief, candidates are interviewed by the E.T.U. supervisors.

Candidates who are accepted as E.T.U. members will then accompany the unit on training days until team supervisors assess him as ready to attend tactical calls. Junior members are closely supervised and used in secondary roles.

Training for new and seasoned members of E.T.U. consists of one day a month. Training is organized and designed by the team supervisors. Each member is issued with a team tactical manual which describes their response, tactics, and equipment use.

Special day-long exercises are planned by the unit supervisors. Regular force members are instructed on the tactical function and containment during in-service training.

EQUIPMENT LIST

Personal Equipment

- blue overalls with police flashes on the shoulders. This is their working tactical clothing
- tactical webbing belt - equipment carrier
- security holster for 9mm handgun
- shoulder holster for 9mm handgun. Used when attending local correctional facilities to help prevent inmates from easy access to the handgun. Also used when on special duties where concealment of the weapon is important
- heavy duty, high-cut tactical boots
- black toques for winter wear
- black baseball cap with police flash, for summer wear
- M-17 gas mask - U.S. military type. This provides protection against various tear gas chemicals
- winter parkas with police flashes on shoulders

Team Equipment

Firearms

- Smith & Wesson Model 5904 9mm handgun. This weapon is issued to each tactical officer who practices with it and uses it on calls for service. The officers do not carry it during regular tour of duty
- chemical tear gas projector. This weapon is used, in a riot situation, to dispense tear gas in a continuous fashion
- Smith & Wesson 37mm tear gas gun - used for dispensing tear gas projectiles
- Remington Model 870 12 gauge shotguns. These weapons have cut down barrels and stocks, and are used by the entry team. The reduced length provides better mobility for these officers

- Remington Model 870 12 gauge shotguns. These weapons are used by the backup officers
- Ruger Mini 14 .223 calibre rifles. These weapons are used for containment
- Remington 22-250 calibre sniper rifle. Used with a bi-pod and Bushnell 3 x 9 power scope

Pyrotechnics

- smoke canister - a white smoke which provides concealment for officers when deploying in the inner perimeter
- CS tear gas ferrets and canisters.
- Thunder Flashes - a diversionary device, thrown by hand, causing a loud noise
- Callume light sticks - for room illumination

Other Equipment

- riot sticks and helmets for riot incidents at the Ontario Reformatory and Wellington Detention Centre
- "Sacramento" body armour - ceramic armour weighing 32-40 lbs. with groin and collar protectors
- Smith & Wesson body armour - lighter armour used by the backup officers
- body shields with viewing ports - for officer protection on room entries. Also, a harness for attaching two of these shields together, providing full length protection while moving along hallways and stairways
- battery operated "Transhaler" for communication
- metal barricade ram - a metal pipe with handles used by one or two men for entry purposes
- square mirror and convex mirror, each on a telescopic pole for room searches

- a gas vest for holding tear gas projectiles
- a van used to transport men and equipment. The van is painted and decaled with "Guelph Police" markings
- a "Winnebago" fully equipped as an emergency vehicle is available to both the police and fire departments

Communications

The Motorola radio system is used by the Guelph Police Department. The tactical team currently uses G.E. portable radios with pushbutton ear phones. As of this report the team is expecting to change to a Motorola portable radio. The G.E. portable has four channels. The #1 channel is the provincial common and is used by the tactical team. In the event of that channel being used by others, the team has another channel available. This channel however, is only a portable to portable channel with a quarter mile radius. Extra portables are kept in the command post where the tactical team is monitored continuously.

Utilization

The Guelph officers on E.T.U. are deployed in regular police roles when not training or on tactical assignment. These men include patrol, investigative and traffic personnel.

The Guelph procedure No. 28 states that tactical support will be provided in specialized areas as follows:

- respond to situations involving armed or barricaded persons
- hostage situations
- persons threatening suicide and weapons are involved
- high risk arrests
- prison riot
- special security details

When engaged in tactical response the unit is under the direction of the on scene commander. A negotiator will respond if required by the commander. The tactical leader will ensure his team is on a separate communication channel. The incident commander will monitor the tactical as well as general radio channels.

In escalating or major situations an emergency mobile command vehicle is available. This Winnebago type vehicle is the joint property of fire and police service. Ordinarily the tactical unit van serves as command post at the perimeter of an incident.

In immediate response situations the incident commander will be the duty inspector or duty officer. The duty officer may be a sergeant or staff sergeant. Senior officers would only be called out if situations escalate or the situation demands attendance of senior officers.

To activate E.T.U. a first officer's request would be reviewed by his front line supervisor. The station duty officer provides the actual authority to initiate call-outs.

In Guelph from 1977 through 1988 the emergency tactical unit's 20 calls may be broken down as follows:

10	dangerous person calls
4	high risk searches
3	high risk arrests
2	surveillance detail
1	security (prison disturbance)

Guelph E.T.U. has a good record of safety in its discriminating use of tactical response.

THE HALTON REGIONAL POLICE FORCE

TACTICAL RESCUE UNIT

HISTORY

In 1981, as a result of increased gun calls and armed crisis situations, the Halton Regional Police established their tactical rescue unit. The unit (T.R.U.) was authorized under Chief of Police James Harding and the Board of Commissioners of Police.

The T.R.U. was implemented to provide expert support service in specialized areas by assisting in the resolution of high risk incidents using minimum force. Policy and procedures are set out in departmental general and administrative orders.

The Halton Regional Force is committed to specialized support to ensure the safety of the public and the "men and women on patrol". The T.R.U. objective in an operation is maximum control while employing minimum force.

The tactical rescue unit of Halton consists of sixteen constables trained in tactical response. The team has two leaders appointed for the purpose of leading tactical maneuvers. The T.R.U. sergeant has the responsibility for training and operations. The team sergeant answers to an administrative staff sergeant and the operations staff inspector. The deputy chief, operations is responsible for the unit to the chief of police.

Selection and Training

A prospective candidate for T.R.U. will have a minimum of three years of practical experience. When team vacancies occur applications are received by way of memorandum. The officer's district commander will evaluate a candidates suitability from work record and performance review. Subjects who continue from this stage will then be physically tested and appear before an interview panel consisting of T.R.U. supervisors and one senior officer.

At this stage psychological testing is conducted by Mercer-Hickling Company of Toronto. This process includes an in-depth interview as well as written response instruments.

Acceptable candidates will avail themselves of a basic orientation course at the Ontario Police College or (if not available) one week a basic training guided by the team sergeant.

Personnel have also qualified through the Ontario Provincial Police Tactical Course.

Ongoing training includes one half-hour on each tour of duty for physical fitness. One twelve-hour training day is assigned for each twenty-one day work period. In addition one week of training time is spent at Canadian Forces Base, Borden.

Specialized courses are provided for snipers and armourer and a 9mm pistol course conducted by the manufacturer.

Police force negotiators and incident commanders are trained on separate courses. Each year a large-scale exercise integrates tactical response with command and negotiation.

All emergency response calls are debriefed with those involved.

Training is conducted at the Winona, Ontario range and in various locations in the region, with public co-operation and contribution of training sites.

EQUIPMENT LIST

Personal

Clothing

The clothing worn by members of the Tactical Rescue Unit will be dictated by the situation. For rural calls for service where little or no cover or concealment is available, camouflage clothing is necessary. It should be noted that those officers have bright orange fluorescent 'POLICE' arm bands if identification is required. The blue coverall style with regular POLICE shoulder flashes and ball caps with large 'POLICE' lettering, is the standard issue for urban call outs.

- **uniforms - each member has 1 - one piece blue police coveralls, and 1 - two piece camouflage suit**
- **boots - 1 pair black combat, 1 pair of winter 'Sorel' boots**
- **rain gear - green army poncho**
- **headgear - black toque and summer ball caps**
- **webbing - nylon belt, holster, handcuff pouch,**

flashlight holder, 4" buck knife and sheath, shell dressing

Team Equipment

Firearms

- handgun, Smith & Wesson model 659 9mm auto pistol using Winchester 9mm 115 grain silvertip hollow point ammunition. Semi-automatic pistols are preferable to revolvers for tactical use due to their larger magazine capacities, higher rate of fire and speed of reloading. This weapon is kept with the officer's kit bag and is only worn during tactical situations
- assault rifles - Colt AR15 .223 calibre, both using Remington .223 calibre full metal jacket and soft point ammunition. These rifles are primarily used by officers assigned to the containment of the inner perimeter, and may be as far as several hundred yards from the subject's location. The weapons provide excellent accuracy at long range, as well as a high rate of fire
- shotgun - Remington model 1100 12 gauge automatic. One of the two weapons used by the team is cut down for better mobility
- Remington Wingmaster model 870 12 gauge. One of the 10 used by the team is a pistol grip style. Remington 12 gauge S.S.G. (buckshot) and rifled slug ammunition is used with these weapons. Shotguns, the standard police heavy weapon, have a multitude of uses by tactical units. They are very useful on the perimeters as well as a cover weapon for assault teams. They are also used to deliver tear gas projectiles
- machine pistol - Heckler and Koch MP5-A5 9mm pistol using Winchester 9mm 115 grain silvertip hollow point ammunition. A 9mm selective fire weapon capable of both semi-automatic and full-automatic fire with a minimum magazine capacity of twenty-five rounds. Like the shotgun, machine pistols are very useful to tactical units on both the perimeter and on assault teams. Their excellent accuracy at ranges under fifty metres and their high cyclic rate of fire make them the weapon of choice for assaults. With the appropriate selection of the ammunition, over penetration is avoided.

- sniper rifle - a bolt-action rifle in either 5.56mm or 7.62mm. The rifle must be equipped with a high quality magnifying optical sight. Bipods for stability and a carrying sling are also recommended. Either 5.56mm, or

  7.62mm calibres are acceptable with the deciding factor being range to the target. This will be dictated by terrain and previous experience. This weapon must be issued to their selected sniper officer for whom it is sighted in, and it is to be used only by him.

- sniper rifle - Remington model 700 .308 calibre. This weapon uses Winchester .308 calibre soft point ammunition and has a 3X Bushnell scope for sighting. A bipod is used for stability and a carrying sling is attached as well. This weapon must be issued to a selected sniper for whom it is sighted in, and it is to be used only by him.

- gas gun - Smith and Wesson 37mm gas gun. Used for firing various tear gas projectiles

Other Equipment

Gas masks

- M17 military style. Tear gas masks - they must be capable of filtering 'CS' tear gas. Maximum peripheral vision is also required with consideration given to placement of filters so that they interfere as little as possible with shoulder mounted weapons

Entry tools

- All equipment listed is issued to forcibly enter secured premises. The team must be equipped and be prepared to defeat barricades presented to them

- battering ram, pry bars of various lengths, bolt cutters with carbide blades, hooligan bar, sledge hammer, and wedges of various shapes

Illumination devices

- As a great number of tactical situations are carried out under low light conditions, adequate artificial light must be available. This requires that each team member be equipped with a powerful flashlight of sturdy construction and the team must have available spot or flood lights with external power sources; either battery or generator

- 'Q' beam lights, mag flashlights, 'stick' lights

Body armour

- Entry team officers must be issued with soft body armour capable of defeating grade III A threats, which includes all handguns up to and including .44 magnum. Also, for further protection, ceramic body armour is available. This offers protection from higher velocity projectiles.

  - Bristol heavy armour with ceramic plates - 40 lb.
  - ballistic helmets
  - Kevlar vests - standard armour issued

Optical equipment

- The ability to observe and identify subjects is an absolute necessity in tactical operations. Therefore the team will require a variety of equipment to carry out this function.

  As a great number of tactical situations entail at least some period of time in darkness, thus the requirement for night vision equipment. Primarily this equipment consists of image intensifying night vision devices or simply a pair of binoculars or a rifle scope with a large objective lens for good light gathering capabilities. The choice between these two will be based on available ambient light, terrain and other variables.

  Spotting scopes with good light gathering characteristics are also necessary. These are, for the most part used by static observation posts and their high magnification makes them extremely valuable as an aid to observation. When used properly they should be mounted on adjustable tripods for stability. An assortment of mirrors for viewing around and over cover are also necessary. These allow officers to see without exposing themselves. Their size and configuration will be determined by the needs of the individual teams.

- night vision - 'Osprey' pocket scope
- binoculars - Bushnell
- aim point projectors - 'Laserscope' EA-9 mounted on Colt AR-15

Vehicles

- a 1986 Ford cube van is dedicated for use. It is large enough to store most equipment required at any call out. This includes all weapons and ammunition. It is also large enough to transport 6 to 8 officers to the location of the occurrence.

  A mobile command post equipped with radio equipment etc., is used on all major occurrences

Rappelling equipment

- all members are trained in high level rappelling from either buildings or outdoor structures. This is a tactical capability which would allow a four man entry team to descent, enter, cover or any other tactical requirement.

  - static kermantle ropes
  - Pretzel descenders
  - figure eights, carobiners, harnesses

Pyrotechnics

- tear gas - the purpose of tear gas is to drive the suspect from his barricaded position, hopefully out to the waiting police. Disadvantages to its use are that the suspect may not be driven out, necessitating a tactical response into the suspect's location. This of course increases the difficulties for the tactical team as their observation and communication capabilities are severely hampered. Tear gas is one of the steps in the progression of force which is adhered to by the tactical rescue unit. All gas utilized by the tactical rescue unit is 'CS' type.

- tear gas grenades - all grenades should be non-burning type to reduce danger of fire. Either smoke, dust or aerosol mist dispersal systems are acceptable
- tear gas projectiles - two calibres will be required - 37mm. - both barricade penetrating and muzzle dispersion, 12 ga. - barricade penetrating
- tear gas delivery systems - one required for each calibre of projectile, 37mm - single shot, topbreak shoulder weapon, 12 ga. - pump action shotgun equipped with rifle sights
- diversionary devices - generally noise makers used to create diversions to cover a team's movements. They may be in the form of thunder flashes, artillery simulators or even simple fire crackers
- flash bang - they must be capable of emitting sufficient decibel and candlepower levels to incapacitate the suspect. The use of these devices is intended to incapacitate and confuse the suspect so that an entry can be conducted with the minimum danger to the assault team
- smoke grenades - used as both a diversionary device and to mask a team's movements across open terrain. They should be capable of emitting various colours of smoke for a minimum of 150 seconds

COMMUNICATIONS

Reliable communications are necessary for the transfer of information between the team and the command structure. A separate channel is used only by the tactical rescue unit at the scene so that their communications are not interfered with. Secondly a secure, private means of communication is necessary so that these communications are not overheard by bystanders or the suspect. This dictates the use of earphones and high intensity microphones for privacy. All radio headsets are push to talk control and equipped with an in ear speaker and high intensity microphone. Each member is issued with individual headsets.

NOTE: The force uses a General Electric radio system and the portable radios used by the T.R.U. are the same as the rest of the force.

UTILIZATION

The Halton Regional Police Force Tactical Rescue Unit officers are deployed as patrol officers when not engaged in training or tactical response.

The authority to call on T.R.U. is vested in any patrol sergeant who evaluates an incident. The mandate for calling out T.R.U. is set out in nine guideline examples as follows:

- Response to all confirmed armed and/or barricaded persons and hostage situations.
- Locating and isolating suspects.
- Establishment of an inner perimeter.
- Rescue of injured citizens or officers.
- Containment and control of sniper activity.
- Approach, entry and search using special weapons, chemical agents and tactics.
- Arrest of armed or dangerous suspects.
- Protection of crowd control units, fire fighters and medical personnel.
- Security in situation when the potential for violence is apparent.

The Halton Regional Force responded to eighty-two (82) calls from 1984 to 1988. These calls may be broken down as follows:

10 - Dangerous persons/barricaded

16 - High risk arrests

27 - High risk searches/raids/canine assists

4 - Hostage incidents

25 - Other calls for service, being security, escorts and surveillance and public information.

HAMILTON WENTWORTH REGIONAL POLICE

EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT

History

The Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police approved formulation of tactical response under Chief Gordon Torrance in January of 1976. The unit is called "The Emergency Response Unit".

The E.R.U. team came about as a result of a review of the force's emergency response capability and in preparation for the 1976 Pre-Olympic Games to be held in the Hamilton area.

The E.R.U. was formed with fifteen members and is presently composed of sixteen members and a sergeant supervisor who answers directly to a staff sergeant. Both N.C.O.'s have other responsibilities.

Administratively the unit concerns fall under the superintendent of the central patrol division. The staff sergeant of central (#1) patrol is the day to day administrative liaison for the training sergeant of E.R.U.

The E.R.U. mission statement is; "The Preservation of Life is Paramount". This mission statement is reflected in the record of performance.

Selection and Training

"Emergency Response Unit" candidates are selected from a list of volunteers. The process involves a review of work history and interviews with supervisors.

An interview with the candidates' spouse is also conducted. On completion of internal reviews and interviews the candidate submits to psychological testing.

Officers who pass the initial process are then trained for two weeks which includes one week at Base Bordon. On completion of the basic training an officer may be appointed to one of four squads consisting of four persons each. The rookie member rides with an E.R.U. coach for three months as an observer and is sometimes deployed in the least dangerous positions of tactical response. At this time a candidate becomes a full member of the unit.

Ongoing training includes 24 hours monthly of a training program. In addition one week of training per year is provided at Base Borden. Annually, two emergency exercises lasting 24 hours are also staged for training purposes. One half-hour portion of an E.R.U. officer's shift is allotted for physical fitness.

Equipment

Each member of E.R.U. is supplied with a personal equipment kit. Individual members are responsible for maintaining their kit in good working order. A medley of other equipment is available to the unit and is stored in the police station or in the tactical vehicle.

Personal Equipment

- blue tactical uniform - two piece
- white, winter, one piece camouflage uniform; used only on the command officer's authority
- green, two piece camouflage uniform; used only in the command officer's authority
- black combat style boots
- blue baseball cap with "Police" insignia
- blue wool watchcap
- military web belt or load bearing vest
- Boss holster - this is the standard police issue holster used by police officers in Ontario for carrying the 38 cal. Smith & Wesson service revolver
- canteen and carrier
- bayonet and scabbard (knife and sheath)
- belt radio holder
- handcuff case
- winter mitts

- soft body armour
- police insignia shoulder flashes with velcro fasteners for easy removal in high risk situations
- green military kit bag
- keys for the E.R.U. room and gun room
- E.R.U. manual - contains training and procedural material
- M-17 gas mask and carrier - provides protection against chemical agents CN, CS and DM
- safety glasses and case
- ground sheet
- two piece rain suit
- white balaclava
- blue winter jacket

E.R.U. Equipment

- heavy body armour - a 32 lb. vest manufactured by Rolls Royce, includes a removable groin protector. Made of 27 layers of Kevlar, this armour will contain the following rounds:
    - 357 magnum;
    - 41 magnum, 44 magnum (240 grain) 45 automatic colt pistol (acp);
    - 12 gauge rifled slug and "00" buckshot;
    - 9mm full metal jacket (fmj)
- the vest will not contain armour piercing rounds
- a second style of heavy body armour is manufactured by Smith & Wesson. It is composed of 25 layers of Kevlar supplemented by a steel insert weighing 15 lbs. The vest will contain 30 calibre carbine or under if hit on the insert. The Kevlar itself is designed to contain .38 calibre (158 grain) and under

- light body armour - manufactured by Armour of America, this vest is composed of 24 layers of Kevlar. This vest is designed to contain the following rounds:
    - 9mm 134 grain fmj
    - 22 calibre long
    - 38 special, 357 magnum
    - 41 magnum, 44 magnum and 45 automatic Colt pistol
- anti-ballistic helmet - a Vector PH-9400 class 2 helmet, designed to contain .22 calibre long, .38 calibre special, 9mm, and 357 magnum rounds
- fibreglass shields - a limited usage item stored in the tactical van. The shield is not bullet proof, but may be useful in protecting members from knife or club injury
- maniac bar - a two piece metal rod which screws together in the middle. The bar has a 'Y' bracket at one end designed to hold a suspect against a wall from a safe distance (bar is approximately 8' long)
- binoculars
- cyalume light sticks - contains two chemicals when activated, by striking together, produces a bright light. This can now be thrown into a dark room, thus providing a safer field of vision for the officers
- car rescue bar
- grappling hook
- flashlights
- metal detectors
- night scope - Litton model M-845 - a night vision aiming device incorporating the Litton "pedot" which is a red aiming dot. While designed to be mounted on a weapon, E.R.U. uses the M845 sight unmounted for perimeter observations during hours of darkness
- handcuffs and plastic temporary restraints
- Q-beam and battery pack
- range finder

- rappelling kit
- recee kit - a small kit bag containing binoculars, paper and pencil, and rope. This is used primarily when doing a preliminary assessment of a situation from the field
- shovels
- convex mirror for mounting on a shotgun for safely looking around corners
- assorted tools
- universal key - a door opening device
- rescue vehicle - a modified, reinforced armoured truck. Allows officers to move into the line of fire in order to rescue wounded persons
- command van - a mobile command post
- bomb truck and trailer

Pyrotechnics

- parachute flares - similar to a gas gun round in appearance, the flare currently in use is fired from the 37mm gas gun. The flare burns for about 12 seconds, has a range of 200 to 400 meters, and has a candle power of approximately 45,000 candela
- smoke generator - two types are used by the unit. One is in the form of a grenade and supplies approximately 45 seconds of concealment. The second type is the Hands Fireworks Smoke Pot - SC-39. The smoke pot supplies 11 minutes of continuous white smoke concealment
- smoke grenade - two types are used by the unit. One is in the form of a grenade and supplies approximately 45 seconds of concealment. The second type is the Hands Fireworks Smoke Pot - SC-39. The smoke pot supplies 11 minutes of continuous white smoke concealment
- stun grenade - the grenade is designed to make a loud noise, accompanied by a brilliant flash upon detonation, to "stun" the senses of the parties in the immediate area. This effect lasts for 5 to 7 seconds,

providing a tactical advantage to members during an entry

- thunderflashes - used as a diversion in an entry, the thunderflash provides a loud explosive sound, 5 to 7 seconds after it is ignited
- the tear gas used is CS gas and is disseminated via several ways, including; blast dispersion, grenades and ferrets

Firearms

- Remington 700 ADL sniper rifle with Redfield 2X x 7+ scope - E.R.U. currently uses this rifle as a sniper weapon. The 700 ADL is a .223 calibre bolt action, centre fire rifle, designed for minimum target, maximum range, precision shooting
- Finland/Sako 7.62mm sniper rifle with Redfield 3x x 9x scope
- Ruger mini 14 rifle
- Ruger mini 14 rifle with folding stock
- Remington Model 870 pump action 12 gauge shotgun
- Remington model 870 pump action 12 gauge shotgun shortened version
- Smith & Wesson .38 cal. K38 masterpiece revolver
- Glock 17, 9mm autoloader pistol
- laser sighted Ruger mini 14 rifle
- Walther PPK .32 cal. autoloader pistol
- Federal 1.5 cal. tear gas gun
- soft point, partially jacketed ammunition is used for all weapons except the shotgun and tear gas gun
- the ammunition for shotguns ranges from birdshot to slugs

Communications Equipment

- cellular phone in van
- MX Radio mobile telephone in command van
- Motorola mobile vehicle radio
- Motorola MX360 portable radio
- army field phones
- loud hailer in command van and van
- intelligence direct line phones
- hand signals are used

When operational, the E.R.U. use a separate tactical channel which is monitored through the dispatcher and other personnel in possession of the portable. They have ordered the earphone microphone system which reduces interference with the transmitted signal, thus increasing the quality of the received message.

Utilization

The Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police E.R.U. are platoon patrol officers when not deployed or training for tactical response.

The team may be deployed for a variety of reasons. Barricaded armed persons and hostage situations are well accepted along with gun calls as being considered for tactical response. In addition the following situations have been identified:

- disaster scenes
- containment of hijacking situations
- assistance to investigative and drug officers in high risk situations
- surveillance for armed crime
- court security
- dangerous situations at the discretion of the command officer or duty inspector

The policy and procedures are clearly set out in the force's standing orders.

The call-out procedure to incidents is begun with the first officer at an occurrence and his supervisor asking the duty officer for permission to activate E.R.U. The duty inspector will review the request and if agreed will activate a call-out of team officers. Those tactical officers on patrol may be called upon for advice and assistance.

Incident command is generally taken by the duty inspector but could transfer to a more senior officer. The team leader is responsible for communicating with the officers in the perimeter and give advice to the incident commander. In cases which escalate additional team personnel will be called to bring the command vehicle. At this point the E.R.U. co-ordinator (sergeant) will be liaison to the incident commander.

Communication in the inner perimeter by tactical officers is on channel 6. An assigned officer will monitor channel 4 to maintain communication between tactics, command and dispatch.

The Hamilton-Wentworth E.R.U. calls from 1984 through 1988 may be summarized as follows:

184	Dangerous person calls
13	High risk arrests
2	Hostage incident
94	High risk searches
144	Security details
48	Miscellaneous calls

The Hamilton-Wentworth E.R.U., has for the five years covered in our review maintained a record of zero casualities as reflected in the E.R.U. motto *The Preservation of Life is Paramount.*

KINGSTON POLICE FORCE

EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT

HISTORY

In 1981 a review of a sniper incident led to the approval of an emergency response unit by the Board of Commissioners on the recommendation of the chief of police.

The emergency response unit (E.R.U.) was created to deal with high risk situations calling for methods and equipment beyond those traditionally employed. The primary reason for E.R.U. is the protection of lives and property during unusual and high risk situations.

High risk situations are defined by the Kingston Police Force as those which involve acts of violence in which a police officer is at a disadvantage and in a dangerous situation. Sniper attacks, barricaded persons, hostage taking, terrorist and civil disorders are cited as examples.

In addition to the foregoing, Kingston E.R.U. will be able to respond to other emergencies, including, explosions, prison disturbances, and natural disasters.

The Kingston E.R.U. consists of ten constables plus a staff sergeant unit leader. A tactical team leader is selected by the staff sergeant, from the unit. The unit is responsible to the deputy chief of police.

SELECTION AND TRAINING

Candidates for the Kingston Police Force E.R.U. must be first class constables having five years experience. Desirable candidates are identified by unit members and supervisors. These candidates are then reviewed by senior officers on the force; personnel files and evaluations are examined.

Final selection is then made by police force senior officers subject to a candidate's approval.

Besides being a first class constable a candidate must be physically fit to Canadian fitness standards and a mature and stable individual.

Candidates are trained in a way which integrates them to the team. Ongoing training consists of about twenty days annually of ten hour periods. Training sessions are scheduled to fit into low demand segments of the holiday schedules. Sessions consist of one, five day session followed by two and three day sessions. New members begin service on E.R.U. with a five day training session. New members are deployed on outer perimeter functions during the first year of unit activity.

The original ten man unit received a two week course from officers trained on courses outside the force. Seven of the original ten members continue to serve on the E.R.U.

Training for Kingston E.R.U. takes advantage of two available ranges in the area. Use of buildings for exercises is arranged with co-operation from the public sector.

EQUIPMENT

Personal Equipment

- jumpsuit - midnight blue
- loading vest - with pouches for ammunition, etc.
- blue balaclava
- olive green winter parka
- kevlar bullet-proof vests
- M17 gas masks

Team Equipment

Firearms

- 37mm Smith & Wesson gas gun - used to deploy CS/CN tear gas projectiles in crowd control and barricaded suspect situations
- Heckler and Kock Mp-5 Sub-machine gun 9mm - employed as an entry-assault weapon for use in urban areas. Equipped with laser sighting devices for use in low light situations. Chosen for its reliability and for the 9mm cartridge it fires. The 9mm does not over

penetrate and will not defeat Level II body armour. The Hertenberger F.L. soft point cartridge is used with this weapon

- Ruger Mini - 14 Rifle .223 calibre - employed as an entry-assault weapon and for perimeter security. Equipped with Armson occluded eye gunsights for rapid target acquisition and low-light use. Chosen for its reliability and the inherent accuracy of the .223 cartridge. The Winchester soft point cartridge is used with this weapon

- Remington 870 Wingmaster Shotgun - 12 gauge - employed as entry-assault weapon and close range security. Used to deploy 12 gauge CS gas ferrets. Equipped with mirrors for viewing areas without exposing the officer. The "00" Buck and rifled slug are used with this weapon

- Remington Model 700 Bolt Action Rifle - .308 calibre - employed as medium-long range counter-sniper weapon. Equipped with Trijicon 3 x 9 telescopic sight for use in normal and low light situations. Capable of extreme accuracy to ranges of 300 yards. The Winchester soft point cartridge is used with this weapon

- Remington Model 700 Bolt Action Rifle - .223 calibre - employed as medium range counter sniper weapon. Equipped with Leopold 3 x 9 telescopic sight. Suitable for use to ranges of 200 yards. Capable of extreme accuracy with minimal risk of ricochet. The Winchester soft point cartridge is used with this weapon

- Remington Model 700 Bolt Action Rifle - 22-250 calibre - comments for .223 calibre apply

- Smith & Wesson Model 10 Revolvers - .38 calibre - carried as secondary or back-up weapon in the event of failure of the primary weapon. At times employed as primary weapon if tactical situation warrants

Pyrotechnics

- Schermully Grenade Simulator - used to provide a distraction or diversion to aid in entries and team movement.

- CN/CS Grenades and Projectiles - used to incapacitate or deter subjects involved in riotous behaviour. Also used to incapacitate barricaded subjects.

Other Equipment

- Rapelling Equipment - used in the event that access or entry to a premises must be gained from above.
- Riot Helmets/Shields/Batons - used in crowd control situations. Contribute to officer safety against flying objects and physical assault.
- M17 Gas Masks - used in situations where CN or CS gas had been deployed. Affords acceptable visibility and does not restrict officer movement. If properly worn affords wearer complete protection from the effects of CN/CS gas.

COMMUNICATION

The Kingston E.R.U. relies on force Motorola portable radios. During tactical operations two channels are used, one for the tactical team and the common channel to maintain overall communications. The tactical leader and the incident command location have two radios and monitor two channels. Communication is enhanced by strategically located repeaters in the city of Kingston.

Attachments for inner perimeter use are the ear piece and hand controlled microphone.

UTILIZATION

Of the ten members of E.R.U. five are patrol officers, two are criminal investigators, two are in special services and one is a community services officer.

The E.R.U. is called out to handle dangerous situations involving weapons where regular response is deemed inadequate. The first officer will be visited by his front-line supervisor who may obtain permission from the duty officer to mobilize the E.R.U. The duty officer (usually an inspector) attends the scene as incident commander. E.R.U. members are activated through police dispatch from a list of unit members.

Of seven E.R.U. calls from 1981 to 1988 one involved a vacated building. Four incidents involved arrests of persons barricaded with weapons and two involved armed barricaded persons who surrendered after negotiations.

In addition to the foregoing the Kingston E.R.U. has provided court security and short-term surveillance.

METROPOLITAN TORONTO POLICE

EMERGENCY TASK FORCE

Since 1966 the Metropolitan Toronto Force has used specially trained officers in crowd control situations.

In 1976 the Emergency Task Force was formalized to supplement regular police units and provide crowd control. By 1980 the E.T.F. had evolved to its present structure of six special weapons teams of eight officers and a sergeant. These teams provide continuous emergency response.

E.T.F. is used on gun calls, barricaded persons and hostage taking incidents. In addition the purpose of the present E.T.F. is to provide support to regular force personnel in high risk arrests and searches.

Members of Metro Toronto E.T.F. believe their service saves lives and consider their mission is the protection of lives in situations which are life threatening and requiring specially trained and equipped response.

Forty-eight emergency task force officers are supported by three training officers, an explosive disposal unit and three officers who handle special mobile equipment.

The unit is headed by a staff inspector assisted by two staff sergeants who are also trained negotiators.

Selection and Training

E.T.F. membership is from volunteer personnel who apply in writing through their divisional command. Candidates will require a minimum of four years of general police experience and be in excellent physical condition. Work record and evaluation must show above average quality.

Physical fitness is tested by qualified force personnel.

Candidates also complete a battery of psychological tests evaluated by Dr. Keith Travis who also conducts an in-depth interview with the applicant officer.

On successful completion of the foregoing criteria the applicant has an in-depth interview with the task force staff inspector and the administrative staff sergeants.

A twenty-one day basic orientation course prepares task force recruits for membership. The course covers tactics, weapons training, chemical usage, response systems, hostage negotiation and other components of the emergency task force.

Following the evaluation of successful new members by the training officer he will be assigned to a special weapons team.

As part of a team, ongoing training consists of three days training in every ten day working cycle. Training is conducted and organized by a training sergeant and two training constables.

EQUIPMENT LIST

Personal Equipment

Clothing

- two piece navy blue uniform with shoulder flashes sewn on
- navy blue winter coat with shoulder flashes. Included is a pair of blue winter 'bib' style pants
- blue baseball cap
- black tactical boots

Other Gear

- 'DIGG' drop belt holster
- M-17 U.S. military gas mask

Team Equipment

Firearms

- Smith & Wesson Model 10 .38 calibre heavy barrel revolver. This gun is the regular patrol weapon and uses .38 calibre semi-wadcutter plus P ammunition
- Glock 17 9mm semi-automatic pistol used as a tactical entry weapon. The ammunition is U.S.A. 115 grain

military ball, full metal jacket and Federal 134 grain full metal jacket semi-wadcutter

- Heckler and Koch MP-5 9mm sub machine gun. The Emergency Task Force is currently using the Heckler & Koch, MP-5 (S.M.G.) as its choice for a sub-machine gun.

  This weapon was chosen to replace the Uzi Sub-machine gun which was being used by this unit.

  The major reasons for this change was that the H & K MP-5 is a more accurate and adaptable weapon as well as being better suited for police tactical operations.

  The E.T.F. currently have 10 of these weapons all of which have semi automatic and fully automatic capability.

  It is the strict policy of the unit that although this weapon is equipped with fully automatic, the weapon will only be fired in the semi-automatic position.

  Although the H & K MP-5 is a very accurate and versatile weapon it is generally not used as a "cover" weapon by the Emergency Task Force. The main reason for this is that the shotgun with a rifled slug, the .223 and .308 rifles are much better suited to this purpose.

  This weapon is equipped with a sure fire tactical light and uses the 115 grain military ball ammunition.

- Remington Model 870 pump action 12 gauge shotgun equipped with a mounted flashlight. This weapon uses a variety of ammunition, depending on the situation, including 1 oz. rifled slug, "00 Buck", #4 shot, shot locks and tear gas ferrets. The shotgun is used as an entry and a cover weapon.

- Ruger AC556 .223 calibre assault rifle used as a tactical cover weapon. The ammunition used is 55 grain pointed soft point

- Remington 40 x 13 (7.62) counter sniper rifle used as a tactical cover weapon. The ammunition used is 168 grain, hollow point, boat tail

- Federal 203-A 37mm gas gun used as a tactical entry weapon. This gun fires Federal C.S. 37mm ferrets and Federal C.S. 37mm muzzle blast

Other Equipment

- body armour is clearly marked "POLICE" front and back which can be covered with a velcro patch if needed. Included is Bristol type 12 and custom E.T.F. designed assault armour, utilizing provincial issue soft body armour and Bristol components

Ocular Devices

- 'Tasco' 7 x 35 binoculars
- 'Osprey' night vision spotting scope
- pole mirrors

Entry Equipment

- Hooligan bar
- rake bar
- sledge hammer and fire axe

Other Equipment

- 'Nikon' camera for taking pictures of the scene subsequent to an entry
- loud hailer

Pyrotechnics

- Federal C.S. 517 Blast Dispersion, 555 Continuous combustion, and H.C. 110 smoke canisters
- Federal CN 287 Tear dust (aerosol). All used for tactical situations or crowd control
- Percussion grenades made by Accuracy Systems Models 425 and 429. Used as a tactical entry weapon

  The Percussion Grenade would generally be used for formal assault type entries, where there would be a high degree of risk of injury to team members.

The circumstances would have to be such that there were no other alternative measures to resolve the situation available, a "last resort" so to speak.

It is possible that there may be a use for this device in combination with tear gas in disarming an armed subject.

Vehicles

- two 3/4 ton Chev front line special weapons vans and one spare. These vans are used by the officers while on patrol and carry the equipment previously described

Communications

The force uses a Motorola M4300 series communications system. The E.T.F. uses M x 340 and M x 360 Motorola portable radios with a headset and boom-mike. They are also using a transducer system which as an ear mike is a combination speaker and mike. (**NOTE:** percussion protection can be worn over the ear mike.) They also have two divisional portable radios if required. The tactical team has its own frequency and this frequency is not compatible with any other system. Each of the tactical vehicles has a divisional radio used by regular patrol and a fixed radio maintained on tactical frequency.

The sergeant for the team keeps a cellular phone with him. This phone is portable and can be used in a command post.

Utilization

Members of the Emergency Task Force are engaged in general patrol duties when not training or responding to emergency calls for service. Patrol is carried out in E.T.F. vehicles which are clearly identified. Officers dress in the uniform of the day.

The Emergency Task Force is generally directed to respond at the request of any field officer. First officers at an occurrence will determine need for emergency response based on whether the occurrence fits in one of the following categories:

- a hostage taking incident
- a barricaded armed suspect
- a weapons or gun call
- other high risk situations

In deciding on E.T.F. deployment the front line supervisor will often assess the situation. E.T.F. assistance is also used for high risk arrests, searches and security details.

Where E.T.F. is called to an occurrence the team sergeant will organize a command post and the situation will be commanded by the first senior officer trained in incident command. The team sergeant will act as his advisor and liaison with the special weapons team. The actual tactical manoeuvres will be led by one of the weapons team members chosen for that role.

Command of an incident generally stays with the first incident commander but may be turned over to more senior command officers.

The emergency task force staff sergeants are trained negotiators and will work with the weapons team at most incidents. The Metro force does have other personnel trained as negotiators.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Emergency Task Force calls were reviewed for the years 1984 through 1988. During this five year period E.T.F. carried out about one hundred high risk security details annually. These five hundred plus calls generally involved dangerous prisoners and some involved security of V.I.P. or other citizens. In addition E.T.F. is assigned weekly to airline security escorts. These demonstrations of security by two officers occur about eighty times a year.

The remaining E.T.F. calls from 1984 through 1988 may be broken down as follows:

- 554 dangerous person calls
- 118 high risk arrests
- 191 raids or searches involving high risk premises
- 22 hostage incidents
- 58 unfounded calls
- 14 other calls for assistance

The dangerous person calls deal generally with citizens armed with guns and involve criminal, domestic and mentally unstable demonstrations of violence. This category includes barricaded armed persons and armed suicidal persons.

The high risk arrest occurrences are generally for armed wanted persons who are in buildings, residences, apartments or hotel rooms. Many are for persons wanted for homicide or armed robbery. All are situations where gunplay is a real possibility.

In reviewing occurrences from 1984 - 1989 the Metropolitan Toronto Emergency Task Force has in these calls resolved highly dangerous situations without discharging firearms at suspects. Professionalism, skill and restraint is very evident in calls from day to day by all E.T.F. members.

NIAGARA REGIONAL POLICE

EMERGENCY TASK UNIT

HISTORY

In 1975 Chief of Police Albert Shennan authorized special two-day training in crowd control for fourteen officers. This unit evolved into the present Emergency Task Unit.

The unit is designed to a membership of forty, this allows for about six E.T.U. members to be working at all times.

The unit is supervised by a staff sergeant who is also the training officer. The staff sergeant is assisted by the training sergeant. The unit is responsible to an operations inspector who in turn is accountable to the deputy chief, operations.

The purpose of the unit is reported in a memorandum of 1977 to division and bureau commanders. "The E.T.U. is to be summoned when gunfire is reported or when a barricaded gunman or an armed individual present a threat to force personnel or to the civilian population". This statement reflected a change from the original crowd control unit of 1976.

In Niagara Regional Police Policy 87-33 a statement is made regarding E.T.U. being trained to deal with anti-sniper situations as well.

SELECTION AND TRAINING

Candidates for E.T.U. are acceptable with a minimum of two years experience. Applicants must be physically fit and have a good work record. Applications are made by submitting a "Request For Training Form" through channels to the deputy chief of operations. Divisional commanders will recommend interested officers who are mature, team players, and possessed of above average firearm skills.

Acceptable officers will participate in a interview with E.T.U. supervisors and the inspector of field operations. After physical testing and firearms testing the deputy chief of field operations will make the final decision.

Training of new E.T.U. members is by integration into ongoing training. New members are not used in critical tactical positions until supervisors or team leaders are satisfied with the progress of the recruit.

Until and including 1988 training consisted of sixteen hours per month. This training commitment had been occasionally cancelled due to force exigencies. In 1989 the training schedule is for one twelve hour day per month for training.

Each member receives a training manual as a reference guide. Incident commanders courses have been taken by some of the regional force inspectors. Trained negotiators are generally criminal investigation officers.

EQUIPMENT

Personal

- navy blue work pants and shirt
- navy blue squall jacket
- combat boots, either "Sunbeam" or "Grebb Kodiak"
- "Sorel" boots - winter wear
- white winter coveralls
- watch cap or winter police cap with badge removed, and baseball cap with NRPF flash
- kit bag - storage bag for above equipment

Team Equipment

Firearms

- Smith & Wesson Model 10 and 14 .38 calibre service revolver. This revolver is standard police issue and fires .38 calibre semi-wadcutter + P ammunition
- Glock 17 9mm semi-automatic pistol. This weapon fires 9mm soft point, semi-jacketed ammunition. The team has two of these weapons on order and they will be issued to selected officers when responding to a crisis incident

- Ruger Mini 14 .223 calibre assault rifle. This weapon used Federal .223 calibre soft point semi-jacketed ammunition

- Heckler and Koch Model 91 .223 calibre assault rifle. This weapon uses the same ammunition as the Ruger Mini 14. Both assault rifles are used by the entry team

- Remington Model 870 12 gauge shotgun. One of the 36 shotguns has an extended magazine and four have rifle sights. A variety of types of ammunition are used including; "00" Buck, Slug, and #4 Buck (less wall penetration)

- Winchester Model M70 .243 calibre sniper rifle. The weapon uses Federal .243 calibre soft point ammunition, and is used when an extremely accurate shot is required

- Federal 37mm gas gun. Used for firing various tear gas projectiles

Pyrotechnics

- smoke grenades, Federal. A white smoke producing projectile that provides concealment for officer movement

- "Thunder flash" - a bright light and noise producing diversionary device. Used to temporarily stun a subject in order to gain advantage

- 12 gauge CS gas ferrets

- 37mm CS gas ferrets. Both types of ferrets are used designed to penetrate windows, doors etc., in order to deploy CS gas

- "Muzzle blast" a CS gas projectile used at close range with a subject

- para-flare - fired into the air, provides a bright light for a short period of time

Other Equipment

- M-17 gas mask - US military style

- Litton - night scope - mounted on the Heckler and Koch Model 91 assault rifle for improved night sighting
- Pentax binoculars
- Redfield spotting scope. A 40X scope mounted on a tripod
- one telescoping and one non-telescoping mirror and post units. Used for room searches, etc.
- three mirror units mounted on shotguns
- rappelling gear including ropes, helmets, descenders, carabiners and body harness
- Hooligan entry tool
- pry bar and hammer
- various lights including halogen lamps, flashlights, etc.
- clear plastic crowd control shields with "POLICE" written on the front
- Kevlar bomb disposal sled. Used for exposed approaches to buildings
- "Armour of America" ceramic body armour in a navy blue carrier
- 3 patrol cars containing various pieces of equipment (previously recorded)
- 1 E.T.U. van equipped with a loudhailer, flood lights, maps, and other equipment (previously recorded)
- 1 Mobile Command Post, which is a large cube van, equipped with 3 radios, tape recorders, a generator, a 50' antenna and a repeater station
- 1 police car - (S/Sgt's) with a cellular phone, maps, and other equipment (previously listed)

Communications

The Niagara Regional Police Force uses a General Electric radio system. The E.T.U. uses the same portable radios as the regular members. The E.T.U. members are issued remote ear piece mikes. These are push button activated.

The portable radio has eight channels dedicated as follows:

1 - for the use of the tactical team. This channel works off of a repeater that is not activated until the E.T.U. requests it be turned on. The E.T.U. van is also equipped with a repeater station.

5 - operational channels for divisional units.

1 - the Provincial common channel for communicating with other police forces.

1 - a portable to portable system that has a restrictive range.

Utilization

Members of the Emergency Task Unit are deployed as patrol officers on platoons throughout the region. The E.T.U. may be activated for one of the following reasons:

- barricaded persons
- hostage situations
- anti-sniper operations
- any situation where the threat of firearms is present or anticipated.

When a patrol officer deals with any of the foregoing and calls for E.T.U. the on-duty members are dispatched. The front line supervisor and duty officer will confirm the request for tactical response. The incident commander will take command of the situation and be advised by the E.T.U. sergeant. The tactical team leader will be a liaison between situation command and deployed team members.

The Niagara Regional Police Force Emergency Task Unit calls including 1978 through 1988 number seventy-seven. These calls may be broken down as follows:

- barricaded armed persons	34
- high risk arrests	14
- dangerous person/armed	7
- search assistance	13
- hostage situation	2
- security	3

The Niagara Regional Police, E.T.U. have a good record of safety. One occurrence involving a James Perkins resulted in that person being fatally shot after the police had been fired upon and the subject decided on armed confrontation.

The number of calls attended by E.T.U. varies from year to year and in 1988 and 1989 seems to be increased from the years 1984 to 1987 to an average of one per month.

ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE

TACTICS AND RESCUE UNIT (T.R.U.)

History

In the late sixties and early seventies events occurred which prompted the Ontario Provincial Police senior management to review its handling of some dangerous events. A need was seen for expertise and equipment which would provide life-saving response to dangerous situations.

Included in considerations was the murder of Detective Sergeant L. Chapitis and Corporal J. Smith in December of 1968. These officers attempted to arrest an armed person who was deranged. These high risk arrests now constitute over 20% of assignments of the tactics and rescue units.

In January of 1975 a bungled robbery attempt resulted in the kidnapping of five people by Donald Cline who was armed and had fired at a police officer. Lack of tactical response resulted in mobile pursuits through a number of police jurisdictions. Donald Cline was eventually captured without injury to persons.

The 1976 Olympic Games included Ontario Provincial Police onus to provide security in the Kingston area. In 1975 predicated partly on 1972 Munich terrorist activity the Ontario Provincial Police Commissioner H. H. Graham approved the formation of a five-man tactics and rescue unit.

Later in 1975 four additional teams were formed for deployment in strategic provincial locations. A sixth team was added in 1980 to be posted in Mount Forest in order to provide security for the nuclear facility being constructed in Bruce County.

Terrorist activity in England and throughout the world provided further influence on tactical response. Deputy Commissioner J. W. Lidstone was instrumental in shifting T.R.U. emphasis to a more anti-terrorist profile and capability. Semi-automatic pistols and sub-machine guns were acquired. Blue two-piece tactical uniforms and camouflage uniforms were obtained.

In training T.R.U. members increased emphasis was placed on fitness and discipline. House entry and clearing techniques were improved and training was provided on the psychology of terrorism, assault techniques and hostage negotiation.

The anticipated increase in terrorist activity in Canada did not materialize. The actual practice of T.R.U. involved mostly containment and negotiations in dangerous barricaded and armed person calls. The public image of T.R.U. during this time continued to be one of an anti-terrorist unit.

The death of Constable Jack Ross in 1984, in a tactics incident, prompted a review of the T.R.U. team program.

The 1985 committee under Deputy Commissioner Lidstone previewed the mandate, composition and practices of T.R.U. Study included review and liaison with other tactical response organizations including the Federal Bureau of Investigations in the United States.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police at this time formed a Special Emergency Response Team S.E.R.T. to deal with anti-terrorist situations. The R.C.M.P. commitment allowed the Ontario Provincial Police to change emphasis while maintaining an assault capability.

In March of 1988 the Ontario Provincial Police responded to the committee, "Program Review With Recommendations". From this report evolved the present T.R.U. program.

The Ontario Provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Units are comprised of three twelve-man teams stationed respectively in Barrie, London and Belleville.

Administratively the T.R.U. program is headed by the Director of Field Co-ordination assisted by an Inspector of Field Support and Administration. An administrative Staff Sergeant at Headquarters is employed as the fulltime T.R.U. Co-ordinator for the Province.

Each team of ten constables is supervised by one sergeant and a staff sergeant. Teams are deployed in general police duties when not training or engaged in tactical response. This deployment supplements the regular forces and maintains for T.R.U. members a high level of acceptability while discouraging elitist concepts.

The philosophy of T.R.U. is reflected in the training manual objective; "Resolution Of All Situations Using The Minimal Amount of Force". The practice of containment with negotiation to resolve situations is foremost in the practices demonstrated by Ontario Provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Units.

Selection of T.R.U. Personnel

Membership on a T.R.U. is on a voluntary basis. As vacancies occur the force is canvassed and applications accepted from qualified personnel. Only mature persons free of marital or personal stress are accepted. Physical health and fitness criteria are examined as well as soundness of judgement under stressful situations. An aspiring applicant should be prepared to serve as a T.R.U. member for a minimum of five years.

A battery of psychological tests are administered and the candidates participate in an oral review board. Physical and medical tests must also be taken.

On successful completion of the foregoing demands candidates attend a two week selection course. The objective of this course is to test the candidates commitment through physical and psychological stressors.

Training of T.R.U. Personnel

Upon successful completion of the selection process members attend the first available training course.

The T.R.U. training course is of fifteen weeks duration and includes search and rescue components. Much of the course involves role practice of tactical skills.

Extensive instruction and role practice is given about the deployment of T.R.U. teams in containment of dangerous situations. "Model I" segment of the course introduces officers to tactical planning, equipment, firearms and defensive tactics. Classroom instruction also includes legal issues.

"Model II" deals with all the foregoing concerns in assault situations. Communications, scouting, securing and evacuation are among the important components in this model, significantly, dealing with open air and motor vehicle situations.

"Model III" impacts on clearing buildings in a safe manner. Explosive devices, booby traps and firearms maneuvres are significant at this stage of the course. Officers are also introduced to survival equipment, survival first aid, shelter and rescue. Further role practice with equipment and firearms is included in this as in all other stages.

"Model IV" of the course impacts on principles of security and V.I.P. protection. Site security, mobile security and prisoner security are addressed.

On completion of the T.R.U. course candidates receive an evaluation and return to regular duties until posted to a T.R.U. team.

When assigned to a T.R.U. team a new member is assigned a coach officer for one year. On tactical assignments he will generally be deployed in secondary positions. Each T.R.U. member is allowed one hour per day to maintain physical fitness.

Ongoing training is conducted four days a month. This training would include canine team training and other related tactical concerns.

Special courses such as hostage negotiation and special firearms courses are made available on a selective basis.

Occurrence debriefings, team meetings and discussions round out the training of T.R.U. members.

The Ontario Provincial Police have a very significant commitment to training T.R.U. members and to maintaining members standards of professionalism.

ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE

TACTICS AND RESCUE UNIT EQUIPMENT

Each member of the T.R.U. Team is provided with a wide array of equipment required to perform their duties as conditions and circumstances dictate. The care and maintenance of this equipment is the responsibility of the individual. There is also a large variety of equipment issued to each of the three teams. It is the teams' responsibility to maintain this equipment in a state of readiness at all times.

PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

Clothing

Foul weather clothing:

- parka - uninsulated 'Gore-Tex' fabric shell
- pants - uninsulated 'Gore-Tex' fabric shell
- therma fleece jacket and pants - warm inner clothing
- liner insert - for the parka for extra warmth
- polypropylene underwear - lightweight, warm, etc.
- squall jacket - lightweight utility gear
- light wool mitts or gloves with a 'Gore-Tex' overshell
- baseball cap, toque, white balaclava

This clothing is designed and intended to allow team members to dress accordingly, for whatever weather conditions, maintaining a high level of comfort throughout lengthy occurrences.

Tactical clothing:

1) Tactical Uniform

    - navy blue pants with numerous pockets and bloused cuffs.

- navy blue long sleeved shirt with O.P.P. shoulder flashes and "O.P.P." in black letters over the left breast pocket. The shoulder flashes are attached with velcro for easy removal, as the bright yellow on the shoulder flash may become a target or assist detection in certain circumstances.

2) Camouflage Uniform

- olive drab green pants and shirt.
- winter white nylon pants and shirt.

The tactical uniform is the teams' utility gear and is the clothing usually worn. There are circumstances that necessitate members dressing in a manner such that their movements are not easily detected by a subject. This in turn increases personal safety of the members as well as increasing the opportunity for a successful operation.

Web Holster and Harness

- nylon belt and harness. Designed to hold a variety of equipment including strong side open holster, extra magazine and flashlight - both on the weak side. The placement of the rest of the equipment is left to the discretion of the officer.
- Alessi holster (plain clothes duties).
- tactical holster (strong side).
- magazine carrier.
- buck knife and sheath.
- knife and utility kit and carrier.
- Mag light and carrier.
- G.E. 5 watt radio (harness, carrier and charger).
- spare radio "AA" pack.
- handcuff pouch (customized).

- water bottle and carrier.
- Silva compass.

Soft Body Armour

- 2 front and 2 rear 'Kevlar' soft body armour.

This is standard O.P.P. issue equipment. For maximum protection, all panels are worn.

Gas Mask

- Model 17 gas mask with twin filters, split eye pieces and voicemitter.
- provides protection against chemical agents CN, CS and DM.

TEAM EQUIPMENT

Load Carrying Vest

- a nylon mesh vest with interchangeable pockets. This vest is designed to carry all equipment used by an 'entry team' in a tactical operation. The weight of the equipment is evenly distributed around the torso.

Armour

1) Bristol Armour

- ceramic armoured jacket, approximately 26 pounds. This is worn by the entry team during high threat entries. This affords maximum torso protection for the members.

2) Body Bunker

- a Kevlar constructed shield with a ballistic viewing port. This 19" x 46" shield weighing 22.5 pounds is equipped with arm bars and strap for carrying. This shield is used when crossing open areas such as hallways or ascending/descending stairwells.

Optics

1) **Nightscopes**

- Litton model 845 and Star-tron MK700.
- a passive and infra red night vision device (may be mounted on a rifle).

2) **Zeiss 8 x 30 Binoculars**

- hand held vision aid with individual eyepiece focusing.

3) **Rifle Scopes**

- Redfield 10 x and Zeiss 3-9x. For precision focusing and observation. These scopes are mounted on the Remington model 700 rifle.

4) **Bushnell Spotting Scope**

- a target spotting scope.
- 60 mm with 45x, eyepiece and stand. Used for long distance viewing in the field and on firing ranges.

5) **Armssun O.E.G. Combat Gunsight**

- a day or night optical gunsight. This gunsight is mounted on the H.& K. MP5 or 12 gauge shotgun and is used for precision focusing and observation.

6) **Rangefinder**

- optical device consisting of a 6 x 18 power telescope and range finder. This device is used for calculating distances.

Barnett Crossbow

- Commando crossbow.

This is used for setting land lines in rescue operations. It may also be used for tire and radiator punctures in stationary vehicles.

Pyrotechnics

1) CS Gas in the form of:

   i) Flite Lite Projectiles - fired from a 37 mm gas gun.

      - sufficient force to penetrate most windows or hollow core doors (as examples)

   ii) Blast Dispersion - fired from a 37 mm gas gun.

      - creates a cloud of C.S. Gas.

   Used for controlling people with weapons other than guns.

   iii) 12 Gauge Ferrets

      - a cartridge filled with C.S. Gas.
      - fired from a 12 gauge shotgun.

2) Smoke Grenade

   - non toxic chemical.
   - produces a white smoke.

   The Smoke Grenade is used to provide cover where natural cover does not exist.

3) Thunder Flashes

   - a diversionary device that causes a loud noise.
   - thrown by hand.

4) **Para Flare**

- an illumination device creating a bright light for between 6-10 seconds.
- fired from the hand.

Used for target sighting, identifying and exposing large areas.

5) **Stun Grenades**

- a flash and percussion device.
- it affects a persons balance, sight and hearing for a short period of time.

Used during an entry to gain advantage.

Entry Tools

- sledgehammer - 8 lbs.
- hooligan bar - 3 ft. entry tool
- pry bar - 3 ft. entry tool
- ram bar - door crasher with handles
- Kelly bar - smaller version of the hooligan bar.

The selection of each tool will be determined by a variety of factors including; type of occurrence, degree of threat, structure type and speed required.

Rappel Equipment

This equipment is used in rescue operations and includes; rope, pulleys, descenders, ascenders, carabineers.

Team Survival Equipment

- tents and tarps.
- sleeping bags and foam ground rolls.
- chain saws, fuel and oil, axes.
- lashing cord.
- cooking pots and utensils.
- snowmobiles.
- snow shows - light metal alloy.

This equipment is used during training exercises and becomes necessary for rescue or surveillance missions.

Portable Light

- a hand held 'Q' beam which operates off of a 12 volt battery or household current.

This light may be used for illuminating in both the 'flood' and 'spot' light function.

Field Phone Kit

- 2 phone headsets.
- call buzzer and built in microphone.
- 6 volt battery power source.
- 150 yards of phone cable.
- tape recorder adapter plug.

Used in situations where a subject does not have a telephone.

Cellular Phone

- mobile telephone.

Each "Tactical Operation Centre" (T.O.C.) cube van is equipped with a cellular phone.

Portable Generator

- Honda portable gas fired power source.

This unit provides electrical power in remote areas or areas where the normal electrical service is out.

FIREARMS

Tru Team Personal Firearm

i) Browning 9mm High Power Pistol

The 9mm Browning P-35 High Power was first manufactured in 1935 by Fabrique Nationale. The 9mm single action semi-automatic pistol is the standard force tactical issue. The issued Browning uses a 9mm parabellum cartridge, also known as the 9mm Luger, and has a 13 round magazine capacity.

The Browning High Power is used as a personal defense weapon and also in situations with limited space requiring rapid, accurate fire power. Its outstanding features are durability and reliability.

Specifications

Calibre	9mm Luger
Magazine Capacity	13 Cartridges
Length:	
Overall	196.8mm / 7.75 inches
Barrel	118.3mm / 4.66 inches
Height	127.0mm / 5.0 inches

Rifling:

Number of Grooves	**6**
Twist	**Right Hand, 1 in 10**
Weight	**907 grams / 32 ounces**
Sights	**Fixed Front, Drift Rear**

Ballistics

Ammunition

Manufacturer	Type/Weight	Velocity	Effective	Use
Winchester	115 Grain Full Metal Jacket	1160 ft/sec	50 yds.	Training
Hertenberger	100 Grain Soft Point	1400 ft/sec	50 yds.	Operational

ii) Heckler and Koch 9mm P7 M8 Pistol

The P7 M8 9mm handgun was designed by Heckler and Koch to meet the needs of modern tactical law enforcement.

This 9mm pistol is issued to tactical personnel who are left-handed as it is more suitable for left-handed shooters than the 9mm Browning.

The P7 M8 uses a 9 mm parabellum cartridge, with a 13 round magazine capacity.

The P7 M8 is used as a personal defense weapon and in limited space situations where rapid, accurate fire power is required.

Specifications

Operating principle	Recoil operated
Action	Retarded inertia bolt

Feed	**Straight magazine**
Magazine Capacity	**13 rounds**
Calibre	**9mm Parabellum (Luger)**
Muzzle velocity (approx.)	**351 m/sec. (1150 fps)**
Mode of fire	**Single fire**

Dimensions

Length	
Overall	**171mm (6.73 in.)**
Barrel	**105mm (4.13 in.)**
Height	**129mm (5.07 in.)**
Width (across grips)	**29mm (1.14 in.)**
Sight radius	**148mm (5.83 in.)**

Ballistics

Same as the Browning 9mm.

T.R.U. Team Firearms

i) **Heckler and Koch 9mm MP5 and MP5 SD are selective fire, automatic weapons. They were designed to be safe, reliable, accurate, simple to handle, easily maintained weapons.**

The MP5 permits either single shots or burst to be fired from all positions (modified not to fire in automatic mode).

The MP5 offers absolute safety because it fires from the closed bolt position.

Ammunition is fed from either 15 or 30 round magazines.

The MP5 is a secondary personal defense weapon used in situations where the range capabilities of the handgun are insufficient and accurate firepower is required. It is used by special tactics teams throughout the world, e.g. FBI,

GSG-9, SAS, RCMP SERT, and T.R.U.

For T.R.U. purposes the MP5 can only fire in a semi-automatic mode. It is used as a short-range house clearing weapon, and it is the most versatile weapon in the T.R.U. arsenal.

The force tactics team has various models of the MP5. The MP5 A2 and MP5 SD come with fixed butt stocks, however, both can be fitted with retractable butts when concealability is required. The MP5 SD is a silent weapon which is identical to the MP5 A2, except that it is designed to fire rounds below the speed of sound. It is the quietest factory produced submachine gun presently in existence. This weapon is used when stealth is required.

The MP5 K is available to force tactics teams for specific assignments. The ultra short design allows it to be used in very limited spaces and is specially suited for carrying in a concealed manner, e.g., in a briefcase, for V.I.P. security details. The handling and operation of the MP5 K is the same as for other MP5 models.

Specifications

Lengths	MP5 A2	MP5 SD	MP5 K
Weapon	N/A	N/A	12.80 in.
With Fixed Butt Stock	26.77 in. 680mm	30.42 in. 780mm	N/A
With Retractable Butt Stock Extended	25.89 in. 660mm	30.42 in. 780mm	N/A
With Retractable Butt Stock Retracted	19.29 in. 490mm	23.97 in. 610mm	N/A
Radius (line of sight)	13.39 in. (340mm)	13.39 in. (340mm)	10.25/ 7.48 in. (260/ 190mm)

Barrel	(225mm) 8.85 in.	(146mm) 5.73 in.	(115 mm) 4.53 in.
Width	1.96 in. 50mm	1.96 in. 50mm	1.96 in. 50mm
Height	8.26 in. 210mm	8.26 in. 210mm	8.26 in. 210mm

NOTE: MP5 K - The sights consist of a rigid front sight and an open notch adjustable rotary rear sight with different notch widths.

Ballistics

Ammunition

Calibre	Manufacturer	Type/Weight	Velocity
9mm	Winchester	115 grams	1312 ft/sec

ii) Heckler and Koch 5.56mm Model 33 Assault Rifle is a modern advanced combat rifle. From the closed bolt position, this weapon will fire single shots and burst from all shooting positions.

The HK 33 is a medium to long-range assault rifle. It is fairly versatile as it can be used in both urban and rural settings when effective accurate rifle fire is required.

Specifications - Assault Rifles (Model 33)

Mode of Fire	Single rounds and bursts
Rate of Fire (approximate)	700 rpm (rounds per min.)

Muzzle Velocity **(approximate)**		3020 fps (feet per sec.) 920 ms (metres per sec.)
Weights		
with loaded magazine	(20 rnd)	3.98 kg (8.77 lb)
	(40 rnd)	4.14 kg (9.26 lb)
Lengths		
Weapon		390mm (36.22 in.)
Barrel		390mm (15.35 in.)
Range of Sight		200, 300, 400m

Ballistics

Ammunition

Calibre	Manufacturer	Type/Weight	Muzzle Velocity
5.56mm	Federal	55 grains	3020 ft/sec

The Heckler and Koch system of weapons is founded on familiarity. Learning the operation of one will provide the ability to operate the others. All of these weapons share identical characteristics and certain parts are interchangeable. These factors shorten training time and give personnel added confidence with a variety of weapons.

iii) The F N 7.62mm C1 Rifle was originally manufactured by the Belgian arms firm Fabrique Nationale. It was adopted as the principal small arms weapon and main battle rifle for infantry use by the Canadian Forces.

The FN C1 is a semi-automatic rifle which uses 7.62 mm (.308 calibre) ammunition. Tactical personnel use it primarily as an assault weapon. Its distinguishing feature is its heavy penetration power, making it ideal in brush or heavily barricaded armed person occurrences.

Specifications

Mode of Fire	Single Rounds, Semi-Automatic
Muzzle Velocity (approximate)	838 metres per second (m/s) 2750 feet per second (fps)
Weight	
loaded (with 20 round magazine)	4.29 kg. (11 lbs 5 oz)
Length	
Overall	112.7cm (44.75 inches)
Barrel	53.4cm (21 inches)
Range of Sight	183-550 metres (200-600 yds.)

Ballistics

Ammunition

Calibre	Manufacturer	Type/Weight	Muzzle/Velocity
7.62mm	Remington	150 grains	2860 ft/sec
7.62mm	Hertenberg	165 grain s/p	

iv) The Remington Model 700 is a heavy barrelled, bolt action rifle designed for minimum target, maximum range, precision shooting. These qualities have made it one of the premier sniper rifles in the world.

Equipped with a high grade optical sight, the Model 700 is the chosen sniper rifle for T.R.U. It is issued in both 5.56mm (.223) and 7.62mm (.308) calibres. Choice of weapon depends on location and range of target.

Specifications

Type	Bolt Action, single shot Right hand
Muzzle Velocity (approximate)	920 m/s (metres per second)
Weight (loaded)	
5.56mm (.223 cal.)	10.2 lbs.
7.62mm (.308 cal.)	10.7 lbs.
Length - Overall	110.5cm (43.5 inches)
- Barrel	61.0cm (24 inches)
Magazine Capacity	
5.56mm (.223 cal.)	6 rounds
7.62mm (.308 cal.)	4 rounds

Ballistics

Ammunition

Calibre	Manufacturer	Type/Weight	Muzzle/Velocity
.223	Winchester	55 grain	3020 ft/sec
.223	Hertenberg	55 grain s/p	

v) Remington Model 870 Pump Action 12 gauge shotgun. The 12 gauge shotgun has limited tactical application as it has been superseded as an entry weapon by the greater flexibility of the 9mm handgun and H&K MP5. The Model 870 is a pump action, 12 gauge shotgun and is the standard force issue. Its outstanding characteristics are ease of operation and massive terminal ballistics.

Specifications

Modes of fire	Pump action Single fire

Muzzle Velocity (approximate)	
SSG	500 m/s (1650 fps)
Slug	520 m/s (1700 fps)
Weight - loaded	3.5kg (7.8 lbs.)
Length	
Barrel	50cm (19.7 in.)
Chamber	7.8cm (3.0 in.)
Overall	102.25cm (40.25 in.)
Magazine Capacity	4 rounds

vi) Smith & Wesson 37mm Gas Gun

This weapon is used strictly for firing CS gas Blast Dispersion and Flite Lite Projectiles.

COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT

There have been a multitude of adjectives used to describe the importance of communication equipment in Tactical Response, but none so accurate as "The Lifeline". In the minds of many tactical officers, based on literally hundreds of calls for service, it is the most vital equipment they possess, yet that which causes the greatest concerns.

To explain all the capabilities of the new system would necessitate the inclusion of a sizeable manual and an eight hour in-service training session. The highlights of the system, in relation to the problems of the past, are as follows:

1) Ontario Police Commission Common Channels - which provide for instant communication with all police forces subscribing to that system;

2) Simplex Channels - provides each district with operational channels to be used for regular patrol transmissions and special support groups, i.e. T.R.U.

3) The 5-watt portables will have a range of 10-11 km and will also be boosted by a repeater in each mobile. Each portable will have the same frequency access as the mobiles.

4) The District Headquarters Communication Centres will have a direct 'tie-line' to bordering communication centres.

5) As technology advances this system can be adapted and upgraded.

A study of several internal reports and letters attest to the ongoing difficulties with this equipment over the last ten years. This list does not include all correspondence by individual members of the T.R.U. Team.

- June 1/79. Reported problem with portable radios. Officers experienced difficulty with clarity of messages, even on short distance transmissions. An apparent solution was offered in which a "relay" would be added to the tactical vans in order to increase the power of transmission.

- July 3/79. A response to the above which indicates: the portables were purchased in 1977 and were and still are the best available on the market. The "relays" referred to are in fact "repeaters" and although thirty were purchased there was none allocated to T.R.U. vehicles. The best batteries were not being used, although available, thus affecting range and audio qualities.

- Aug. 21/79. In reference to the repeaters this letter puts the cost at approximately $4000.00/repeater. The lack of money in the budget is also stated.

- May 13/82. This is another report of problems with T.R.U. radio equipment, specifically with range, reception and length of battery life. It also includes a request for a T.R.U. tactical frequency to be installed in the force helicopters, and a tape recording system to be installed in T.R.U. vans.

- May 18/82. This reports that the force helicopters will be outfitted with the tactical frequency.

- Dec. 17/84. The T.R.U. team is given new portable radios to be tested for their suitability for use during the 'Papal Tour'.

- Feb. 25/85. A favourable report is submitted with regards to the Motorola MX300-5 portable radio. (This was the radio to be used during the Papal Tour).

- Mar. 4/85. In the debriefing of an occurrence it is noted that the radio communications were poor. There was also a lot of "clutter" as there were four radio channels being used. All persons included in the debrief request speedy action to rectify this problem.

- Mar. 5/85. "It seems that at almost every operational function, our radio equipment is inadequate to properly do the job."

- Mar. 18/85. This report states the Motorola radio was used and tested and is superior to the existing O.P.P. portable radio. The difficulty is that the Motorola portable is not compatible with the O.P.P. car radio. The report also includes a proposal to equip the T.R.U. teams with 5-watt Low-Band portables. These portables would be compatible with O.P.P. car radios, and also have a separate channel for tactical operations.

- Oct. 7/85. Included in this letter is a request for tape recorders for the T.R.U. team vans and also one for the provincial co-ordinators' van.

- June 2/88. This letter follows the policy for requesting cellular phones and is asking that the T.R.U. team vans be equipped with cellular phones.

Included at this time is a quote from the "March 1986 T.R.U. Program Review", conducted by officers of the Ontario Provincial Police as a result of the recommendations of the coroners' inquest into the death of Constable Jack Ross in 1984.

"The single most troublesome and constant source of concern to the Tactics and Rescue Unit is communications. The ability to talk and hear during emergent situations is paramount and yet to this day, we are unable to do just that in a reliable, constant and safe manner. While not wanting to be critical of Telecommunications Branch, we must be realistic and focus our attention on just what causes the problems and what must be done to alleviate them. Almost without exception, this same problem of poor communications is echoed by tactical teams throughout North America. In order to successfully resolve most tactical situations, you must be able to communicate promptly, accurately and privately. The equipment that is supplied by Telecommunications Branch has not been tested or researched adequately enough for tactical situations. In studying the F.B.I. hostage rescue team's response to this problem we are of the opinion that we must do the same. A member of Technical Support Branch thoroughly trained in police communications needs and equipment must be assigned to work closely with the T.R.U. Teams to develop, research and test the latest technology through a close hands-on approach to our needs and problems. This TSB member should be able to bring some sort of order to what is, at present, a chaotic and dangerous environment.

In addition, we feel that the remaining T.R.U. Team van chassis at Transport Branch should be outfitted under the direction of T.S.B. to be utilized as a mobile communications centre. This vehicle will carry a supply of hand-held portable radios, batteries, tools and parts in order to maintain a high level of communications capability at every occurrence. The assigned T.S.B. member will utilize the latest in ruggedized versions of portable radios together with suitcase repeaters which will greatly enhance the audio delivery of the portable units. Additionally, a tactical audio recovery system will be developed by T.S.B. to be utilized by T.R.U. members. This system will greatly assist in pinpointing a suspect(s) in a building as well as helping to determine the physical condition and/or imminent danger faced by hostages. The T.S.B. member must be given a clear mandate to develop, design, test and put into operation a functional and thoroughly dependable communications set up for all of T.R.U."

The present communications equipment was installed in 1947, at which time the O.P.P. had 650 members and 300 mobiles (cars, trucks, etc.). The system had two channels or frequencies. One was car to car, with a range of approximately 10-11 km. The other was car to station, with a range that varied with such elements as; weather, terrain, distance, and other more dominant signals on the same frequency. There were many "dead zones", where communicating with headquarters just could not be done. The portable radios associated to this system emitted a signal that at times was lost within 100 yards because of the low wattage or strength of the signal. The portable radios had the same basic capabilities of the car radio and were subject to the same limitations.

In the late seventies - early eighties "repeaters" were added to about 100 mobile units. The repeaters were designed to boost the strength of the signal, improving communications. The tactical vans were never equipped with boosters.

The new "Motorola" communication system currently in operation in London detachment, (at the time of writing this report) and to be installed throughout the province by 1992, has a lengthy history already. As far back as 1973 the Ministry of the Solicitor General recognized a need for a new system and appointed a group of engineers and O.P.P. personnel to do a study. A report was submitted to Management Board in 1979 and in 1980 they approved 22.5 million dollars to implement a new system. In 1982 Motorola was awarded a contract for 22 million dollars to supply the basic equipment for the system. That same year Management Board was presented a revised estimate of 54.5 million dollars. This resulted in a new committee, the O.P.P. Telecom Review Committee, established to do an estimate of the system. They submitted two reports, with a new cost for the system of between 66 and 71 million dollars. In December of that year Mr. Scott Campbell was appointed project manager for the O.P.P. Telecom Project, which was now formed under direction of the Ministry of the Solicitor General.

During the years 1983 through 1986 an implementation alternative report was submitted which included a study of owned vs lease in regards to the system, as well as audits performed to ensure proper management and financial guides maintained. Also during this time equipment purchased from Motorola was tested in London detachment. In March 1986, 106.9 million dollars was approved for implementation of the new system.

This new system went operational in London detachment in December 1988. The three T.R.U. Teams will be equipped in February 1989 and even though the rest of the province will not be completed until 1992 (scheduled), the new equipment will

provide compatibility with the old until that time. The T.R.U. Teams will also maintain the old equipment until the rest of the province is completed.

No communication system is perfect and difficulties may very well surface with this system, however, early reports from the London district are encouraging.

Utilization

Officer members of T.R.U. are deployed in patrol duties assigned by the individual units staff sergeant. These patrols supplement the regular forces in traffic and liquor law enforcement as well as protection of property.

Call out of tactical response is generally for hostage taking incidents, or barricaded and armed person calls.

Full or partial T.R.U. response is also utilized for high risk warrants for arrest or search, specialized surveillance, prisoner security, and rescue operations.

In emergency response situations the policy before October of 1988 was that the field officer could request T.R.U. through the detachment commander. The detachment commander obtained authorization from the district commander who would be a superintendent or his duty inspector. If the request was from outside a T.R.U. team district a courtesy and information call was made to the district commander of the T.R.U. area.

In October 1988 this policy was changed and the activation of T.R.U. teams was taken out of the hands of district superintendents and placed with the deputy commissioner, field division or one of his three designated chief superintendents. Thus the district commander now calls senior force executives in Toronto for permission to deploy T.R.U.

When a T.R.U. team is used at an incident the team leader (staff sergeant) works in concert with the incident commander. The incident commander is a senior officer (inspector or above) who is trained in taking charge of hostage or barricaded person incidents.

The team leader maintains a liaison with the assistant team leader or tactical leader and communicates instruction and intelligence to the perimeter officers through the tactical leader. The tactical leader communicates with the incident commander through the team leader.

Investigative and other personnel direct all communications through the incident commander at the command post.

Where an incident is or enters into another police jurisdiction the officer in charge of that jurisdiction is notified of T.R.U. presence.

The Ontario Provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Unit began operations in 1977. Calls are represented here in broad categories for the twelve year period and broken down as follows:

224 - Dangerous person calls (barricaded)

247 - High risk arrests

116 - Raids or searches

45 - Hostage incidents

351 - Security details

187 - Other calls for assistance - surveillance, outlaw motorcycle gang activity, special events

The figures indicate that about 44 percent of T.R.U. activity involves potentially life threatening situations with barricaded persons and hostages making up 23 percent of the calls. In addition it should be noted that about 30 percent of assignments are security oriented.

Despite the tragedies of Constable Jack Ross and citizen Bernard Bastien the Ontario Provincial Police demonstrate a commitment to well trained units which are dedicated to the safe resolution of dangerous situations.

OTTAWA POLICE FORCE

TACTICAL TEAM

HISTORY

The Ottawa Police Force Tactical Team was authorized and implemented in 1976, by order of Chief of Police Leo Sequin. The original rationale for the tactical team was to deal with situations which were beyond the capabilities of regular law enforcement units.

The team's mandate is to provide assistance during high risk situations such as hostage taking and armed barricaded persons and to supply explosive technicians to deal with bombs and explosives.

The primary responsibility of the Ottawa Police Force Tactical Team is the safety and protection of the general public and of police officers present at an incident. Peaceful resolution is a general principle and dynamic action a last resort. The discharge of firearms will not be effected unless authorized and in the direct defence of life.

The tactical team is led by two sergeants and the team has fourteen members. Included within the unit are police explosives technicians and firearms specialists. The team non-commissioned officers answer to the staff inspector of field operations who is responsible administratively to the superintendent of field operations.

SELECTION AND TRAINING

Candidates for the Ottawa Police Tactical Team will be volunteers with at least three years of service. These officers submit written applications to the staff inspector, field operations. General criteria include practical police experience, an excellent work record and performance evaluations. The candidates present personal situation should be stable.

Physical fitness of applicants is tested after approval of the application.

Tactical team applicants undergo psychological testing through a psychologist approved by the Ottawa Police Force. Officers who do not meet test criteria will be ineligible for membership on the tactical team.

Successful candidates will be subject to a six month probationary period. During this period they will attend scheduled training generally beginning with a ten day training session. Close supervision during the first six months is followed by a report to the staff inspector. At this time the staff inspector, superintendent and team NCO's will discuss the report and decide on accepting or rejecting the candidate.

Training of tactical team personnel is of "paramount importance" to the Ottawa Police Force. Training for tactical officers includes weapons handling, tactics, use of chemical agents, night operations and related emergency response skills.

Each team member is held accountable for his physical fitness. Tactical needs are trained in accordance with a yearly training schedule. Two ten day sessions are scheduled, one for spring and one for autumn. In addition team members get one day of training per month which is generally concerned with weapons training and physical fitness.

The ten day sessions impact on tactical skills through role practice and exercises.

Officers on the explosive disposal unit will receive annually an additional four days of training.

EQUIPMENT

Personal Equipment

It is necessary that the tactical team dress differently from standard police issue uniform. This is based on several considerations:

The duties and actions expected from a tactical team officer make the standard uniform impractical. The team member is expected to carry substantial and varied pieces of equipment making numerous and large pockets essential. Members must crawl, climb and manoeuvre in unorthodox manners and clothing worn must therefore be durable.

Members are trained to occupy static concealed positions for long periods of time in all forms of weather conditions. The clothing must be comfortable and warm.

There are times when team members must rely on a clothing pattern which is designed to break up the normal human appearance in cases where there is concealment with little or no cover.

Tactical officers must be readily identifiable to each other as well as to other police officers at the situation. The distinct uniform helps tactical officers identify other members moving within the inner perimeter.

The distinct dress has operational advantages by making the tactical member recognizable to other tactical and emergency response teams involved in the situation or detail. In addition, there is pride and professionalism cultivated as a result of the wearing of the tactical uniform.

- black combat boots
- camouflage combat pants
- black T-shirt
- black pullover sweater (alternates with black turtleneck sweater)
- camouflage all-season combat jacket
- black or dark blue baseball cap with Ottawa Police crest mounted on the front
- black gloves
- load bearing vest - radio pouch and other pouches
- kevlar bullet proof vest - force issue to all

The mixture of team dress is at the discretion of the individual member based on weather and personal operational requirements.

In addition to the above uniform items, other seasonal or special items of operational clothing are:

- green wool balaclava
- black cotton balaclava
- blue nylon snow pants
- blue snow boots
- blue winter shooting mitts

At the discretion of the superintendent or staff inspector of field operations, the tactical team may be authorized to operate in an alternate mode of dress for a specific operation, such as:

- old clothes for surveillance/ambush operation
- jacket and tie for a VIP security detail
- regular uniform for a visible security detail

It is assumed that the question of the identification of tactical team officers would not be an issue when the team is operating within a contained outer perimeter against a barricaded offender or hostage-taker - who cannot possibly be confused about the identity of those on scene.

In other operations such as raids and road blocks, the tactical team members will wear their force baseball caps or a highly-visible "POLICE" armband.

In plainclothes operations or other special duties, the tactical officers will identify themselves as any other officer would by verbally stating they are police officers and producing a force badge and identification card as the circumstances permit.

Team Equipment

Firearms

- Smith & Wesson 459 Semi-automatic pistol 9mm - used by all tactical officers while so engaged. The officers are afforded ample time for practice with this weapon. Federal soft point jacketed ammunition is used.
- Heckler and Koch MP5 Sub-machine gun 9mm - used by the entry-assault team. Same ammunition as above.
- Colt M-16 X M177E2 assault rifle .223 calibre - this weapon has a telescoping butt and short barrel. Used by the entry-assault team, this weapon uses full jacketed hard point ammunition as well as boat-tail (tapered end) hollow point ammunition, both manufactured by Federal.
- Colt M-16 assault rifle .223 calibre - same general characteristics as above except for the telescoping butt and short barrel. Both weapons have a fully automatic capability.
- Colt AR-15 assault rifle .223 calibre - a semi-automatic rifle used by the team in controlled circumstances where over penetration is not a concern. May be used for disabling a motor vehicle (stationary). This weapon also uses the Federal boat-tail hollow point and full jacketed hard point ammunition.
- Remington Model 700 sniper rifle .22-250 calibre - used as a sniper rifle - has a scope, and used Federal soft point jacketed ammunition.
- Winchester Model 70 sniper rifle 22-250 calibre - also a sniper rifle - same ammunition.

- Winchester Model 70 sniper rifle .308 calibre - also a sniper rifle, using Federal soft-point jacketed ammunition.

- Remington Models 1100, 870, 870 modified 12 gauge shotguns - also used for house clearing and cover. These weapons use "00" Buck or rifled slugs made by various manufacturers.

- Winchester modified 12 gauge shotgun - as above. The 870 modified and Winchester modified have shortened barrels to facilitate concealment during security duties.

- Federal 201-2 37mm gas gun - used for firing various gas projectiles.

Pyrotechnics

- the force has CN gas in stock, however uses only CS gas when gas is required.

- CS gas is fired from the gas gun or 12 gauge shotgun.

- Shermully stun grenades are used to create a diversion in order to facilite team movement.

- Superior burning and non-burning smoke is used for cover purposes.

Other Equipment

- a "step-van" is used as a tactical van and command post. There are two radios in the van - one for monitoring the teams' movement, the other for maintaining communication outside the team

- a regular van for bomb disposal is also used by the team

- battering ram - made from a bus axle, this two man ram is used for entry through locked or barricaded doors

- sledge hammers and pry bars are also available for entry

- binoculars - Bushnell and Weis

- spotting scope - Bushnell
- night scope - Litton Starlight image intensifier
- bullet-proof vests - ceramic 30 lbs. with groin protectors
- bullet-proof vests - kevlar, soft (other than regular force issue)
- gas mask - Giat Corp. - full clear plastic mask with expanded vision from regular masks
- rappelling gear - Swiss made harness arrangement
- ropes used in rappelling situations
- mirror - truck size mirror on a bar capable of extending to six feet

COMMUNICATIONS

Ottawa uses Motorola communication equipment. There are six operational channels including: 2 for patrol zone use, 1 for parking control, 1 for car to car operation (no repeater system), 1 for the Provincial common channel, and 1 used by the tactical team. The channel used by the tactical team is not dedicated solely for their use, but in crisis situations is cleared of other uses.

The team utilizes portable radios which are the same style used by regular patrol officers. In addition, the tactical officers are issued an "ear mike" which is designed to reduce the interference from outside sources.

UTILIZATION

The N.C.O.'s and members of the tactical team perform regular police functions in addition to their tactical roles. Presently members perform criminal investigation, traffic and general patrol duties.

Besides hostage and barricaded person incidents the tactical team may be deployed for execution of warrants under dangerous circumstances, arrest of dangerous persons, prisoner and VIP security, and building searches.

The team also conducts shotgun training for force personnel.

The Ottawa Tactical Team follows the principle of containment and negotiation to resolve situations involving barricaded persons or hostage incidents.

Tactical team deployment is obligatory in cases of a prolonged hostage taking incident or the apprehension of an armed and barricaded person.

In cases of suspected bombs, explosives or military ordinance the explosives disposal unit will be activated.

Deployment of tactical response is optional and may be utilized for:

- entry and security in executing raids or search warrants where use of weapons or violence is anticipated.
- static or mobile security for courts, prisoners, special functions or V.I.P.'s where violence may be expected.
- approach, entry and search of buildings for suspected dangerous persons.
- roadblocks.
- at the discretion of appropriate senior officers for situations requiring tactical team capabilities.

Call out authorization is vested in the superintendent or staff inspector of field operations, in the absence of these officers the duty inspector, field operations is the authorizing commissioned officer. Requests are generally made by front line supervisors for the first officer at the scene of an incident.

Provisions exist for partial activation of the tactical team. This is done with consultation of team N.C.O.'s.

On being mobilized the tactical team is under the command of the incident commander who is generally the authorizing commissioned officer.

The incident commander will be advised by the tactical team leader. The tactical squad leader will take his instruction from the team leader (sergeant) who will be at the field command post.

Tactical deployment for planned response such as raids and evidence searches will be under the officer in charge of the event/occurrence.

From April 1982 to February 1989 the Ottawa Police Force has been called upon 42 times.

- 21 security assignments including V.I.P., demonstrations and court security.
- 5 assisting at raids and execution of search warrants.
- 3 assisting in the arrest of dangerous wanted persons.
- 4 hostage taking incidents.
- 4 armed barricaded person incidents.
- 2 roadblocks for dangerous wanted persons.
- 2 surveillance (stake-out) details.
- 1 call for assistance cancelled en route.

All the foregoing calls were successfully completed without injury or the discharge of firearms by the police.

In several calls involving hostage taking and one call to arrest the murderer of a police officer the Ottawa Police Tactical Team demonstrated a great deal of skill, professionalism and restraint.

PEEL REGIONAL POLICE FORCE

TACTICAL AND RESCUE UNIT

History

The Peel Regional Tactical and Rescue Unit was implemented in 1976 with amalgamation of police forces in the region. Originally the regions proximity to the airport and world terrorist activity was a stimulus to implementation. Of equal consideration, and now a primary function, was the resolution of high risk incidents involving weapons.

The present purpose of the unit is set out in police procedures. The primary mission is to assist regular patrol officers in their assigned duties. The isolating, containment, control and apprehension of dangerous and armed person is within the mandate of the tactical and rescue unit. Particularly the unit will be dispatched to all hostage and barricaded person calls or a dangerous situation involving weapons.

The mission of the tactical and rescue unit includes providing for added safety where a significant level of violence might reasonably be expected.

The unit is supervised by the tactical and rescue unit sergeant who is responsible to a staff sergeant who is a part time supervisor of the tactical and rescue unit. Administration of the unit is the responsibility of the staff inspector of special services who answer to the deputy chief of special services.

The tactical and rescue unit consists of twelve constables and two supervisors. Members are full time unit officers and work in plain clothes.

Selection and Training

When vacancies occur in the tactical and rescue unit applications in writing are received through the chain of command to special services staff inspector. Candidates must have five years experience, a good work record and the recommendation of their supervisor. Unit members are also polled as to applicants acceptability. Physical testing and an interview with unit supervisors precede psychological testing by Thomas Westcott and Associates. Successful officers are expected to commit five years to the tactical and rescue unit.

Training of new members consists of a two week orientation course. The recruit member then joins the regular one day a week training sessions. Each new member is teamed with a senior tactical officer and closely supervised. New members also are deployed on calls in secondary roles.

The weekly training sessions are supplemented by allotting one hour a day for physical fitness.

Quarterly exercises are held at the airport to supplement regular training.

Each unit officer is issued with a tactical and rescue unit manual as a reference guide.

The Peel Regional Unit has co-operation in securing training sites for tactical exercises. Outside ranges at Canadian Forces Base, Borden and Winona augment the region's own indoor range.

EQUIPMENT LIST

Personal Equipment

The following equipment listed, is what has been issued to each tactical officer. This equipment is carried with the officer both on and off duty.

Clothing

- two piece, navy blue tactical uniform with sewn on shoulder flashes, worn during training
- navy blue tactical coveralls with sewn on shoulder flashes, worn when the team is operational
- blue rain suit with "POLICE" in white letters on the back
- Blazer jacket with crest, for winter wear
- white nylon shell to aid concealment during snow conditions
- black leather gloves

- insulated underwear
- black toque, white toque
- blue baseball cap with crest
- black balaclava
- navy blue nylon wind breaker with crest, and "POLICE" in white letters on the back

Other Gear

- equipment bag
- Kevlar vest body armour
- spare 14 shot clips for Model 459 handgun (2)
- pouch for above clips
- shoulder holster for Model 459 handgun
- regular black holster for Model 459 handgun
- fluorescent orange police arm band
- utility tactical vest with adjustable strings, for carrying equipment
- rappelling gloves
- 'Prolight' flashlight
- pair of spare handcuffs with pouch
- M17 or Smith & Wesson gas mask
- ear piece for use with portable radio

Team Equipment

Firearms

Each officer is issued two handguns. The Smith & Wesson Model 459 9mm is the tactical weapon. The Smith & Wesson .38 calibre snub nose is used during deployment in 'old clothes'.

- Smith & Wesson Model 459 9mm semi-automatic pistol using 9mm Luger soft point ammunition

- Smith & Wesson .38 snub nose with a 3" barrel 5 shot capacity using 158 grain, .38 calibre, semi-wadcutter, solid lead configuration ammunition

- Remington Model 870 pump action shotgun with 5 shot capacity utilized as a cover weapon inside a residence or premises. Uses 12 gauge 1 oz. rifled slug or "00" Buck Remington ammunition

- Remington Model 1100 semi-automatic shotgun with 5 shot capacity utilized primarily as a residential entry weapon. Used for its ease of movement. Mirrors are attached for room clearing. Uses the same ammunition as the Model 870

- Mossburg Model 500 pump action shotgun with 8 shot capacity utilized as an entry weapon. Uses the same ammunition as the Model 870

- Heckler and Koch MP-5 9mm semi/full automatic rifle purchased for use at Pearson International Airport during security details. It was selected for its ease of concealment. Uses 95 grain jacketed 9mm Luger soft point ammunition

- Colt Model 1A M-16 semi/full automatic rifle utilized as a long range cover weapon. Uses 55 grain pointed soft point .223 calibre ammunition

- Remington Model 700 .308 calibre sniper rifle uses 165 grain, Federal Premium soft point ammunition

- Smith & Wesson 37mm gas gun used for discharging various tear gas projectiles

Rationale:

The Tactical and Rescue Unit is responsible for responding to weapon related offences.

During past tactical operations, the Unit has been faced with a wide variety of weapons, including semi-automatic handguns, shotguns, and machine guns. The present inventory allows the Unit to respond to a given or perceived threat in like fashion.

The use of the bullet in the .308 calibre sniper rifle is specifically restricted to those tenuous situations where circumstances may deteriorate to a level where drastic actions are required.

Rappelling Equipment

- rappelling ropes
- "D" rings
- tie-off ropes
- rappelling seats
- ascenders
- figure eight ring

To effect the rescue of police personnel or civilians as required. To effect entry into multi-level dwellings where conventional methods are impractical.

Pyrotechnics

Tear gas grenades, projectiles, and ferrets give the unit the capability, from a distance of saturating a premises with tear gas where a subject is refusing to surrender. This is done prior to police entry. Blast dispersion is tear gas which can be directed at an individual to assist in apprehension.

Smoke grenades are used to mask the movement of police personnel when required.

Thunder Flash stun grenades are used as a last resort when all avenues of negotiations have failed and a tactical entry must be made into a hostile environment. Percussion and a brilliant flash of light used to disorientate the subject, giving police personnel the advantage.

Smith & Wesson Pepper Fogger maintained by the Tactical and Rescue Unit for use by the Emergency Response Unit in the event of a riot situation. This equipment is capable of discharging large amounts of tear gas or smoke for extended periods of time.

- CS dust dispenser. An aerosol container of CS gas that dispenses the gas in cloud

- CS gas streamer. An aerosol container of CS gas that dispenses the gas in a single stream

  Both aerosol containers of gas are used in close encounter situations.

- S18 CS grenades
- Smith & Wesson CS grenades #1
- SGA-300 CS gas 37mm ferrets
- SGA-100 CS gas 12 gauge ferrets
- 12 gauge CS projectiles
- 501CS Blast dispersion
- 203 CN Blast dispersion
- #16 smoke projectiles and smoke grenades
- 37mm 5 GA ferrets
- 517 flameless CN grenade
- 518 CS grenade
- 503 Blast dispersion
- Thunder Flashes
- parachute flare - fired into the air providing a short period of bright light

Armour

- Bristol armour vests with steel insert and groin protector. Weighing approximately 40 lbs.
- Kevlar light armour vests
- Ceramic vests weighing approximately 30 lbs.
- Bristol large body bunker
- Bristol small body bunker

The body bunker is a hand held ballistic shield used primarily when travelling in open areas or stairways

- ballistic blanket - an 8' x 8' blanket produced from 21 layers of Kevlar. To hand on a wall to prevent the exit of projectiles
- light ceramic vests

Optics

- Smith & Wesson spotlight
- I-beam and battery pack
- portable hand held spotlights
- flood lights and cables
- road flares
- Bushnell 7 x 50 binoculars
- monocular
- Bushnell 20 x 45 power spotting scope
- Pentax 8 x 30 binoculars
- Startron hand held night scope
- Colt 3 power scope mounted on the M16 rifle
- Laser sights for the Model 870 shotgun, Colt M16 rifle, and MP5 rifle
- mirrors with attachments for mounting on various weapons
- rangefinders

Entry Tools

- battering ram - 2 man
- hooligan bar

- 16' and 20' extension ladders - aircraft assault
- crow bar
- axe
- sledge hammer
- bolt cutters

Entry tools are utilized when gaining access to secured premises during assaults or searches

Other Equipment

- loud hailer - for situations where telephone access is not available
- spike strips - strips of sharp spikes to disable a vehicles' movement
- MSA air packs - self contained breathing apparatus for use when room air is contaminated
- "police line" tape used to cordon off an area
- Air Canada ramp coveralls to be used in situations at the airport
- orange plastic ground sheets
- water bottles
- electrical gloves for shock protection when working with high voltage wires
- riot helmets
- booster cables
- emergency blankets
- Honda generator - used to supply electricity for flood lights, etc.
- ear protectors - head set type for use on the range

- colourburst Polaroid Camera and film used to take pictures of the area where a subject is in order to plan tactical movements

Vehicles

G.M.C. Astro duty van unmarked. The Unit officers use this van for patrolling and attending staging areas. It is used to store some equipment and is on the road whenever the Unit officers are working.

A second G.M.C. Astro van is used when more than two officers are on duty.

A 19' G.M.C. step van carries the majority of the Units' equipment. This is a fully marked vehicle and has the regular police radio installed.

A 1970 Ford armoured vehicle that has been specially reinforced is used to rescue trapped officers or civilians. It may also be used to move officers into strategic positions.

Communications

The Peel Regional Police Force uses a General Electric radio system. There are three operational channels for divisional work, one channel is used as a back up, and one is the Provincial Common.

All force personnel use the G.E. portable radio. The Tactical and Rescue Unit uses a Simplex channel when deployed. This only provides about a quarter mile radius, therefore there may be occasions where a divisional channel has to be dedicated to the Tactical and Rescue Unit. When this occurs air traffic normally using that channel will switch to one of the remaining two.

The Unit officers use a portable radio with a headset. The headset has a boom mike, and a push button control for message sending is located near the officer's hand for quick and easy access.

A negotiator's kit is stored in the duty van and includes a telephone, a tap recorder, a speaker, a clock, and extra telephone line. The kit has A.C. or D.C. capabilities. An extra telephone and tape recorder are available if needed. A crossbow may be used to deliver a telephone line to a subject. (The crossbow may also be used to deliver a rescue line.)

Utilization

The Tactical and Rescue Unit officers are deployed in plainclothes patrol in unmarked vehicles in teams of two. Officers supplement divisional operations and special services when requested, by providing static surveillance or patrolling areas of increased criminal activity. Unit officers also engage in patrol for liquor and drug enforcement. Tactical response is available from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m. inclusive.

The Tactical and Rescue Unit is called upon to deal with barricaded persons, hostage incidents, high risk arrests and confirmed gun calls. During hours of patrol Tactical Unit officers are also used on calls involving weapons, robbery and generally calls where violence may be anticipated.

During operational hours the Tactical and Rescue Unit will assess the need to call out further unit members. A call out of additional members will be authorized by the front line supervisor. When tactical officers are not operational the duty inspector is responsible for ascertaining the need for the Tactical and Rescue Unit. The officer-in-charge of the tactical unit will determine how many officers will be called out after being apprised of the situation.

At a major incident the duty inspector will be the incident commander and will be assisted by the tactical and rescue staff sergeant at the command post. The sergeant team leader, will be in charge of actual tactical manoeuvres.

The objective is always the safest resolution possible and to that end the Peel Regional Tactical and Rescue Unit officers generally provide initial support with two who are generally available on duty. The Peel T.R.U. provides a great deal of partial rather than full team support on potentially dangerous incidents. Calls over the last five years number 957 and may be broken down as follows:

582 -	Dangerous person calls
87 -	High risk arrest calls
74 -	High risk searches
4 -	Hostage situations

210 - Unfounded calls, mostly reports of gunshots which were "heard" in areas where rural and bush terrain abut on densely populated areas

In addition to the foregoing the Peel Region T.R.U. has been used on about fifty security details especially involving dangerous prisoners. T.R.U. also provides considerable directed patrol and surveillance as investigative support.

The duties by T.R.U. officers in all functions enhances their reputation and acceptance throughout the Peel Regional Force. The force commitment to training, equipment and personnel ensures a professional response team with a commitment to safety.

WATERLOO REGIONAL POLICE FORCE

EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT

In 1977, then Chief of Police S. Brown and Commission members authorized an Emergency Tactical Unit to deal with firearms occurrences. This unit was utilized for almost one year as a special patrol unit and as respondents to twenty-four weapons calls. As a result of complaints the unit was disbanded in August of 1978.

In September of 1978 Deputy Chief Kunkle and then Deputy Chief Harold Basse recommended a re-organization of tactical officers to form an emergency response unit. Training was co-ordinated by Force Constables S. White and D. Paquette. The E.R.U. members would be part of the normal patrol strength.

The E.R.U. was implemented to safely resolve gun calls and other dangerous situations. The unit would also conduct search and rescue and bomb disposal. VIP security and major crime scene searches may also employ E.R.U. officers.

The Waterloo Regional Police Force works a ten hour shift, on a five platoon system. Each platoon has a team of five officers trained as emergency response officers making a total of twenty-five (25) and a sergeant who is the co-ordinator.

At any given time five Emergency Response officers are on duty (subject to sickness, holidays, court) and these officers are geographically located in the Region.

The unit sergeant is responsible to the inspector field support who answers to the operational superintendent.

Selection and Training

Candidates for the E.R.U. require a minimum of two years service and are tested for physical fitness. The emergency response co-ordinator reviews applicants evaluations with appropriate supervisors.

A candidate who meets the force criteria is then tested and interviewed by a qualified psychologist (Dr. Torney). All E.R.U. candidates are volunteers.

Training of new members consists of eight weeks of tactical and weapons instruction from the E.R.U. co-ordinator. Sergeant

Dan Paquette is well qualified experientially and through training courses. A training manual guides the instruction.

Officers who successfully complete initial training are members of E.R.U. and return to regular patrol duties.

Ongoing training consists of thirty-two (32) hours of training for each thirty-five (35) days work schedule. In addition each members lunch break is extended by one-half hour for maintaining physical fitness. Each spring members spend three days at Camp Borden on the Confidence, Survival Course and Ranges.

EQUIPMENT

Personal

- blue two piece summer coveralls, blue with Waterloo Regional Police flashes
- blue two piece winter coveralls, blue with W.R.P. flashes
- combat boots
- winter boots
- toques and blue baseball hats with W.R.P. flashes
- two piece rain suits

Team Equipment

Firearms

- AR-15 carbines .223 calibre
- AR-15 sporter .223 calibre
- Mini Ruger 14's select AC-556K .223 calibre
- Mini Ruger 14 AC-556 .223 calibre

  The above mentioned rifles are required for approaches and containment. They may also be used for clearing depending on the situation. All are equipped with 20 and 30 round magazines.

- Remington Model 700 .308 calibre bolt action rifles with 4 round magazine. These weapons are used by the snipers
- Remington Model 870 12 gauge shotguns with folding stocks. These weapons are used for room clearing
- Remington Model 870 12 gauge shotguns with solid stocks. These weapons are used by team members containing the house or premises
- Glock Model 17 9mm pistols. These weapons are carried by the team members and are used because of their magazine capacity and reliability
- Remington .22 calibre rifles - semi-automatic. To be used to shoot small animals suspected of having rabies
- 437mm Federal gas gun. Used to fire CS gas projectiles, muzzle blast shells and ferrets

Other Team Equipment

- M-17 gas masks - protection from CS gas during entry of gassed premises
- Smith & Wesson 434-C vests
- Sacramento vests
- Bristol armour type 12 armour jackets. The body armour is capable of stopping up to .308 calibre bullets
- bullet proof helmets
- rappelling equipment
- blow horns
- binoculars
- transparent shields, 1 1/2 lbs., covers 3/4 of the officers' body for riots and knife calls
- ropes, wedges, pry bars and bolt cutters
- laser sight

- quick-point sight
- Bushnell 2 x 8 power scopes
- a five ton truck equipped with the Emergency Rescue and Explosive equipment. The truck is equipped with a generator and a number of portable lights. It is also used as a command port in emergency situations
- a four wheel drive vehicle containing scuba equipment
- a Zodiac (boat) and 20 hp motor
- one ton van used to carry personnel and equipment

Pyrotechnics

- Flite-Rite projectiles No. 230
- Blast dispersion grenade No. 121
- SGA-110 CS gas ferrets (shotgun)
- SGA-310 CS gas ferrets (37mm gas gun)
- No. 21 muzzle blast shell

The use and need for gas varies depending on the situation.

Ammunition

- shotguns - Federal "00" Buckshot and rifled slug
- AR-15 and Mini Ruger rifles - Federal .223 calibre - 55 grain soft point
- .308 calibre rifle - Federal .308 and 150 grain soft point
- Glock 17 - Federal 9mm 95 grain soft point

COMMUNICATIONS

The Waterloo Regional Police Force uses a Motorola radio system. The Emergency Response Unit uses 6 "Midland" portable radios. They are the same portables used by the regular officers. The E.R.U. members are issued head sets with a voice activated switch. The voice activated switch allows the officer to communicate and keep his hands free for other duties; i.e. watching a suspect while holding a rifle and relaying his movements to other officers.

The E.R.U. van is equipped with a repeater which improves reception for the radios.

The E.R.U. operates on a separate channel during crisis situations.

UTILIZATION

Officers of the Waterloo Regional Police Force are members of the regular patrol strength.

The E.R.U. may be called out for the following occurrences:

- gun call or incidents involving weapons
- bomb calls, explosives and military ordinance
- evacuation and rescue
- recovering drowned victims
- clearing buildings in which suspects may be hiding
- co-ordinate ground searches (missing persons)
- crowd control and V.I.P. security
- dangerous chemicals or radiation occurrences
- disaster management

The call out procedure involves a patrol sergeant or staff sergeant evaluating a report from officers at the scene. Authorization is requested from the duty officer or senior officer who will take command of the incident.

At the command post the incident commander is advised by the E.R.U. sergeant. The team or tactical leader is in charge of carrying out orders in the inner perimeter.

The Waterloo Regional E.R.U. has attended sixty-seven (67) calls for service in the last five years. These calls may be broken down as follows:

-	30	Dangerous person calls
-	9	High risk arrests
-	1	Hostage situation
-	19	Searches and raids
-	0	Security details
-	3	Miscellaneous

In the foregoing calls, many involved distraught, hostile, mentally ill or criminal persons with firearms. Shots were fired by suspects on a number of occurrences. During the last five years the Waterloo Regional Force Emergency Response Unit has not discharged a firearm at any person.

The wide range of calls handled by this unit demonstrates its versatility.

WINDSOR POLICE FORCE

EMERGENCY SERVICES UNIT

The Windsor Police Force's Emergency Services Unit (E.S.U.) was first formed in 1978. The E.S.U. was authorized under Chief of Police, John Williamson.

E.S.U. was implemented to increase the force's capability of dealing with hostage taking incidents, barricaded suspects and other dangerous situations.

Originally E.S.U. consisted of two staff sergeants, two sergeants and eight constables. In 1983 the unit was reorganized with one sergeant in charge and ten constables. It is intended to increase the unit to twelve constables in 1989. The unit is responsible to an operations inspector who is accountable for the unit to the deputy chief of police for operations.

E.S.U. Policy and Procedure was issued in written form in 1985 and is being updated at this time. Drafted policy includes documentation of appropriate call-out situations (see utilization). The mission of E.S.U. is the safe resolution of dangerous situations and this is reflected in the Record of Performance.

Selection and Training

Prospective members of E.S.U. may apply to the inspector responsible for the unit. Applicants will be checked for work record, performance and maturity. Members must be first class constables with stable personal lives. Members of E.S.U. must be in above average physical condition.

A candidate who meets the criteria and is recommended by his divisional staff inspector will be interviewed by a selection committee including the unit sergeant and inspector.

An officer who is successful to this point will take part in two weeks of orientation training presented by the unit sergeant. A formal assessment of the recruit E.S.U. member will be documented for the inspector, force adminstration and E.S.U. files.

Ingoing training is conducted two days a month for all E.S.U. members. Training also includes two five-day sessions at

Canadian Forces Base, Ipperwash, and training integrated with other tactical response units. An increase of two days training per month is being considered. Physical conditioning is supported by the Windsor force for its E.S.U. members. Time for physical conditioning is now being considered.

EQUIPMENT LIST

Personal Equipment

Clothing

- All items of clothing mentioned are worn by the team members, both for their comfort and wearability. A team member in utilities will not hesitate to crawl through mud, or climb over fences and walls, as he might if he was dressed in his normal police uniform which he is always reminded must be clean and neat. The design of the utilities also provides for pockets for the carrying of extra equipment he may need. The boots offer more support than the normal police boot, and the baseball cap and balaclava are not as visible as the regular police hat with red band and silver badge. They are also more comfortable and apt to stay on. The webbing and load bearing vests also provide a means by which the member can carry the necessary equipment.
- uniforms - navy blue two piece utilities with velcro flash attachment
- boots - black leather "Greb Kodiaks"
- coat - black U.S. military M-65 field jacket
- hats - navy blue baseball caps with Windsor Police Force flash, and navy blue balaclavas
- webbing - U.S. military LC1 harness consisting of waist belt, shoulder straps, ammo pouches, canteen and holder
- load bearing vests - black nylon load bearing assault vests which are adjustable with various pouches depending on the assignment of the member. Also a black nylon vest with pockets for carrying tear gas projectiles and grenades.

Team Equipment

Firearms

- Smith & Wesson Model 38 calibre police special. Each officer is issued this weapon and it is used when assigned to an entry position on either a search or an assault

- Colt AR-15 and Ruger AC-556 5.56mm assault rifles. Primarily used as a cover weapon by members assigned to perimeter positions. The accuracy of the weapon allows for a response capability at longer ranges

- Remington Model 870 12 gauge shotguns - used primarily as a cover weapon by perimeter personnel when they are inside a house or structure. The lower penetration threat with a shotgun is preferable when inside. They are also used to deliver the 12 gauge tear gas projectiles

- Heckler and Koch MP5 9mm machine pistol. This is normally used as a cover weapon by entry and search teams. The high rate of fire and excellent accuracy of this weapon makes it the choice for tactical work. This weapon may also be used as a cover weapon on the perimeter depending on the distance from the suspect's location

- Remington Model 700 5.56mm sniper rifle equipped with a Redfield 3 x 9 variable scope, a sling and bipod. Used by the sniper/observer teams to afford a response to threats presented by the suspect. It has excellent accuracy and the optics attached allow for very efficient observation of the suspect's location

Ammunition

- Smith & Wesson Model 10 - Federal 158 grain Semi-wadcutter + P

- AR15 and Ruger - Federal 55 grain full metal jacket and soft point

- Shotguns - Winchester "00" Buck and Remington rifled slug

- MP5 - Federal 9mm 115 grain full metal jacket

Pyrotechnics

Grenades and projectiles containing CS gas are used to drive the suspect from his barricaded position. They are of the non-burning type to lessen the danger of fire. The 37mm muzzle dispersion round is intended to be used against suspects who are armed with less than fatal weapons such as knives or clubs. The CS tear gas impregnated powder is fired at the suspect to make him drop his weapon so that he can be safely subdued. Smoke grenades are used to mask the team's movements. They are also at times used to attract the suspect's attention to one area while the team moves in another. Diversionary devices are used to divert the suspect's attention, in a similar fashion as the smoke grenades. They could on occasion also be used to temporarily incapacitate the suspect on an assault. Gas masks are of course used by team members so that they are not affected by the tear gas used.

- grenades - Smith & Wesson #ICS and AA1MP6 in CS tear gas (non-burning)
- projectiles - AA1 "Ferret" in both 12 gauge and 37mm. S & W muzzle dispersion shells, 37mm in CS gas
- delivery system - Smith & Wesson Model 276 37mm gas gun and 12 gauge shotguns
- smoke grenades - Superior "professional"
- diversionary devices - Schurmuly Model MTY81 stun grenades
- gas mask - M-17 U.S. military

Other Equipment

Rappelling equipment

- All rappelling equipment has the operational use of allowing team members to be lowered to the suspect's location, either to deliver diversions, make an entry, or make observations. In training, rappelling is an excellent means of building confidence, both in the team member himself, and in the team as a whole
- ropes - 100, 200, and 300 feet lengths of PM1 5/8" static Kernmantle rope

- descenders - Petzel "stop" with braking cam
- belay plates - figure eights
- carabiners - large locking "D" rings
- helmets - Premier MC helmets

Entry tools

- all tools listed are to be used as a means of entry into the suspect's location. Ladders allow access to high places, and door wedges are used to either wedge doors open or closed
- one 4 man battering ram
- two 24' extension ladders
- sledge hammers and door wedges
- hooligan bars
- pry bars and axes
- fire axe

Lights

- all used to assist the team members in low light conditions
- Mag-lite and Mini Mag-lite flashlights
- Q-beam spot lights and battery packs
- halogen flood lights and gas generator
- Canadian military paraflares
- Cyalume lights

Protective armour

- used for personal protection against hostile fire

- Armour of America soft body armour made of 24 layers of 'Kevlar'
- Bristol Type 12 armour jackets with ceramic inserts
- Bristol Type 17 ballistic helmets

Optics

- used to increase the team's ability to observe the actions of persons in the suspect's location. The binoculars and monoculars are normally used by the personnel on the perimeter, while the spotting scope is normally used by the sniper/observer team
- Bushnell 7 x 50 binoculars
- Bushnell 10 x monoculars
- Cal Wetzler 15 x 50 spotting scopes

Vehicles

- the team shares a Ford cube van with the dive team and must load any equipment needed when the call comes in
- some members of the team will attend the scene via regular cruisers

Communications

The force uses a Motorola radio system and the team members use Motorola HT220 portable radios, each equipped with an ear-mike EM200 privacy unit. The portables are activated by a push-to-talk button that is separate from the radio. There are currently five channels on the portable, including; 3 operational, 1 provincial common and 1 Simplex. The team uses the Simplex channel which has approximately 400 yard radius. The incident commander has a cellular phone at his disposal. The field phones are used to communicate with the suspect when he does not have access to a phone. The suspect's phone has a probe installed so that conversation and activity in the suspects location can be monitored.

Utilization

Emergency Services Unit officers are deployed as patrol officers on regular platoons. The officers may be called out for the following reasons:

- barricaded suspects
- hostage taking incidents
- high risk searches or arrests
- any occurrence in which violence may be expected
- leading raids
- V.I.P. security or violent prisoner security
- static surveillance for violent crime
- strikes, civil disorder or special arrest teams
- an occurrence at the discretion of an officer in charge of an investigation on agreement of the duty officer

Call-out procedure for activating E.S.U. is originated by the field officer and confirmed by the front line supervisor. On request of a front line supervisor the duty officer, (staff sergeant at No. 1 Division) will call out E.S.U. Members on duty will proceed to the incident area to assess the situation and begin safe containment.

The duty inspector or senior officer trained in incident command will take charge of an incident and set up a command post. The E.S.U. sergeant will remain at the command post as advisor and liaison with the members who are maintaining the perimeter. The actual leader of tactical manoeuvres maintains communication links with command and E.S.U. members.

The Windsor E.S.U. in the last five years has responded to eighty-five calls which can be broken down as follows:

10 - dangerous persons (barricaded)

22 - high risk arrests

37 - high risk searches

1 - hostage incident

15 - other calls for service mostly being static surveillance (stake-out)

The Windsor E.S.U. has demonstrated its commitment to safe resolution of dangerous situations by its commendable record of success.

YORK REGIONAL POLICE FORCE

EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT

In 1980, the York Regional Police Force implemented their Emergency Response Unit. The unit was authorized by Chief of Police B. Crawford and the Board of Commissioners of Police.

The E.R.U. was formulated to deal with hostage situations, barricaded persons and situations involving weapons and violence.

The first unit consisted of five constables and one sergeant. Presently an increase of two officers is being considered. The E.R.U. is administered by a staff inspector who is accountable to the superintendent of operations.

The York Regional E.R.U. is committed to safest possible resolution of dangerous situations.

SELECTION AND TRAINING

Candidates for E.R.U. apply in writing through their unit commander to the staff inspector in charge of the unit. Qualifying officers will be first class constables with a good work record and have the approval of the unit commander.

A structured interview is held with the supervisors and the staff inspector. This interview lasts about one hour and explores the commitment of the candidate and his onus of membership to the unit. Physical testing is also a prerequisite to E.R.U. appointment as is passing the promotional examinations.

Psychological testing is done by Dr. Keith Travis of Toronto who administers a number of tests and conducts an in-depth interview.

The original training consists of three weeks of basic training. This is followed by six months of training with the unit for four days a month. Each member receives an E.R.U. manual for a reference guide. On completion of this training a member may be deployed in tactical response with increasingly responsible duties.

The unit's ongoing training is every Tuesday and is supplemented by an annual major exercise which includes negotiators and incident commanders.

Several unit members have taken sniper courses and seminars. Negotiators and incident commanders are separately trained. Training locations include Canadian Forces Base, Borden.

EQUIPMENT LIST

Personal Equipment

Clothing

- blue tactical pants and jacket with removable shoulder flashes - operational
- white cloth coveralls - winter wear
- blue military wool sweaters
- thermal long underwear
- camouflaged pants, jacket and hats (for training only)
- watch caps and balaclavas
- Mahar tactical boots
- Sorel Kaufman winter boots
- M16 winter coats with shoulder flashes
- green rain ponchos
- winter gloves
- camouflage tee-shirts (for training only)
- blue tee-shirts

Other gear

- 9mm duty holster
- 9mm shoulder holster

- 9mm leg holster
- ear protectors - headset style
- lightweight ballistic vests, Kevlar
- M17 US military gas mask with canvas carry bag

Team Equipment

Firearms

- Smith & Wesson Models 59, 5904, 459 and 659 9mm handguns. This semi-automatic weapon provides members with a 14 or 20 round capacity. The 9mm has better stopping power than a .38 calibre, yet does not tend to over penetrate. The ammunition used is Winchester 115 grain, hard ball, full metal jacket

- Heckler and Koch Model MP5 A2 9mm assault rifle. This 9mm select fire semi-automatic assault rifle has a 30 round capacity and is extremely maneuverable for use in tight quarters. This weapon is extremely accurate and comes with a unique slinging system which can allow the gun to be operated with one hand. It is equipped with a tactical foregrip lighting system. Used for house clearing, and uses the same ammunition as the handguns

- Colt AR15 semi-automatic .223 calibre assault rifle. Used for containment purposes. The .223 calibre provides better accuracy and stopping power over a greater distance. Winchester 55 grain soft point ammunition is the ammunition used

- Steyr Aug-Sa .223 calibre assault rifle. Used for containment as above. This weapon is more maneuverable than the AR15 and it is a more up-to-date assault weapon. Uses the same ammunition as the AR15

- Ruger Mini 14 select fire .223 calibre assault rifle. This weapon with its collapsible stock is concealable and therefore can be used on high risk details. The weapon is very accurate, and also uses the same ammunition as the AR15

- Remington Model 870 pump action 12 gauge shotgun. Used to launch tear gas canisters, fire "shock lock" rounds, or Federal '00' Buck and rifled slugs.

- Remington Model 700 .308 calibre sniper rifle with Leupold 3 x 9 scope and bi-pod. Used as a sniper weapon for extremely accurate shot. The .308 calibre provides consistent true flight for better accuracy. Federal 165 grain, boat tail, soft point ammunition is used
- Smith & Wesson Federal, and Tru-Flite 37mm gas guns are used to launch various non-lethal chemical agents

Other Equipment

- "body bunker" ballistic shields for use in hallways, staircases, and places with no natural cover
- 'Bristol' heavy armoured vests with ceramic plates for better ballistic protection, weighing approximately 22 lbs
- entry mirrors for house clearing

Optics

- mini flashlights
- Kassnar spotting scope
- Bushnell 7 x 35 binoculars

Rappelling

- leather rappelling gloves
- Petzl stops, self locking descender
- Forester Ultimate rappelling harness
- SMC roof roller Model DH1480
- steel carabiner guides
- rappelling harness
- PMI and nylon ropes

Pyrotechnics

- CS gas in canisters and 12 gauge ferrets
- smoke in 37mm ferrets and canisters by Federal and Smith & Wesson
- paraflares
- "Shock-Lock" rounds

Vehicles

- a large step van used for carrying equipment and people. With the York Regional name, colours and logo, this vehicle is easily identified as a police vehicle
- 26 foot mobile home used as a command post. The communication centre in the command post has one station for the tactical operation and one station for the regular radio dispatch. There is also a cellular phone port

Communications

The force uses a Motorola communications system. Messages sent out are 'encrypted', which means they are converted to computer language at the source, sent out as such, then re-converted at the receivers' end. The portables used by the tactical team have two channels. The team generally uses the portable to portable channel during an operation. Each officer has a headset with lapel mike, and a remote push to talk button.

Utilization

Officers of the Emergency Response Unit work in unmarked police vehicles in plain clothes. Duties include patrol of licensed premises for provincial and federal offences. Assistance is provided to drug enforcement and other units requiring plainclothes assistance or surveillance.

E.R.U. may be called out for any situation involving armed or barricaded persons, hostage taking, suicide threats or incidents requiring special weapons. Unit members will also assist at calls of violence, major crime scenes and high risk arrests.

In emergency response situations the first officer, confirmed by the front line supervisor calls out E.R.U. The tactical leader is contacted by phone or pager and advised. Members are contacted and report to a central location for equipment and vehicles. (1st District C.I.B. Aurora)

The front line supervisor will turn over command to the duty inspector on his arrival. The incident commander will be advised at command post by the E.R.U. sergeant. The sergeant will be the liaison between command and the tactical officers. The tactical leader will keep contact with the sergeant and lead tactical maneuvres.

The York Regional E.R.U. had 228 calls for service from 1984 through 1988; of these nineteen were unfounded and the remainder may be broken down as follows:

- 172 barricaded or dangerous persons
- 23 high risk searches
- 9 high risk arrests
- 5 hostage situations

CONCLUSION

The York E.R.U. has a good record of resolving dangerous incidents. The commitment of the York Regional Force indicates a willingness to support an effective and well trained unit.

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police maintains tactical response in contract provinces where it is charged with the responsibility of day to day policing. These emergency response teams, E.R.T., are deployed in circumstances similar to municipal and provincial tactical teams, barricaded persons, hostage calls, and appropriate weapons calls.

In Ontario E.R.T. is structured in a similar manner to contract provinces units. The mandate in Ontario differs in that E.R.T. is primarily implemented to respond to incidents involving internationally protected persons. Original response is likely to be a municipal or provincial unit with R.C.M.P. Emergency Response dealing with escalated or ongoing incidents. In addition to this preparedness E.R.T. is involved in large scale security such as required by the Economic Summit held in Toronto in 1988.

E.R.T. in Ontario is stationed at Ottawa and Toronto. Teams consist of fourteen members led by a member selected by the team who is the tactical leader. Teams are divided into two units of seven members and are co-managed by senior officers of inspector rank.

SELECTION AND TRAINING

Candidates for E.R.T. membership apply in writing through the chain of command. Applications are checked by staffing branch and the E.R.T. Co-ordinator. Officers with a good work record and four years experience may be further considered. Supervisors are interviewed and the candidate undergoes physical testing monitored by qualified force personnel.

Candidates are given an indepth interview by the team leader and E.R.T. inspectors. In addition unit personnel are polled as to the suitability of applicants.

Successful officers partake in a pre-course assessment by training with local E.R.T. From this point officers attend a five week basic training course in Ottawa. Each officer receives training precis material from the basic course.

Ongoing training consists of two days each month with the E.R.T. of which the officer is member.

The unit inspectors are operations commanders and have been trained as incident commanders.

UTILIZATION

E.R.T. in contract provinces may be activated by the officer commanding the sub-division or his second in command.

At the scene of an incident the operations commander may be one of the co-managers (inspectors) of the E.R.T. Tactical maneuvers are led by the team leader who is picked by unit members.

The officers who are members of E.R.T. are employed in all the general duties to which the R.C.M.P. are assigned in Ontario.

In Ontario deployment of E.R.T. is expected to be a infrequent occurrence. Since inception in 1985 E.R.T. has seen limited use in large scale security assignments and tactical response.

EQUIPMENT

Clothing

Urban use and standard working dress is blue/grey and black

Rural use as required by situation, camouflage clothing, summer (British Woodland Pattern) and winter (White nylon)

Jackets worn with standard working dress have removable shoulder flashes

All personnel wear identification bibs on operations. These have appropriate "POLICE" marking front and back

Firearms

- Sig Sauer P226 9mm Pistol - personal issue
- Heckler & Koch MP5 9mm Submachine gun
- Remington model 870P shotgun with folding stock

- Colt M16 Carbine .223 cal
- Ruger 22-250 cal. marksman rifle with Startron night scope
- Ruger 22-250 cal. marksman rifle with 6X Redfield day scope
- Ruger .308 cal. marksman rifle with 6X Redfield day scope
- 37mm gas gun

Ammunition

- 115 grain jacketed hollow point for the 9mm
- rifled slugs and "00" buck shot for the 12 gauge
- 168 grain match boat tailed hollow point for the .308 cal.
- 55 grain match boat tailed hollow point for the 22-250 cal.
- 55 grain jacketed hollow point soft tip for the .223 cal.

Pyrotechnics

- CS gas (canisters, ferrets, blast dispersion)
- Smoke canisters

Vehicles

- Suburban 4X4 - (two) - with front bumper mounted winch

- Cube Van - (one) - rear compartment outfitted to carry equipment and as a mobile ERT command post

Communications

E.R.T. uses a G.E. portable radio with a frequency unique to E.R.T. Communication with other police forces would be done through the command post at the scene.

Force	Year Implemented	Tactical Personnel	Immediate Response	Call-out Procedure	Full-Time Plain Clothes	Full-Time in Uniform	Part-Time
Belleville City Police Emergency Response Team	1982	10	Limited	On duty Officer in Charge			Patrol and other duties
Brantford City Police Emergency Response Team	1977	8	Limited	Authority Duty Officer			Patrol Officers
Durham Regional Police Tactical Support Unit	1985	10	Limited	Authority Duty Inspector			Patrol and other duties
Guelph Police Force Emergency Tactical Unit	1976	8	Extremely Limited	Authority Duty Officer			Patrol and other duties
Halton Regional Police Tactical Rescue Unit	1981	16	Limited	Supervisor			Patrol Officers
Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Emergency Response Unit	1976	16	Limited	Authority Duty Inspector			Patrol Officers
Kingston City Police Emergency Response Unit	1981	10	Extremely Limited	Duty Officer			Patrol and other duties
Metropolitan Toronto Police Emergency Task Force	1976	48	24 hour coverage	Activated by 1st Officer		Assigned patrol duties tactical uniform	

Force	Year Implemented	Tactical Personnel	Immediate Response	Call-out Procedure	Full-Time Plain Clothes	Full-Time in Uniform	Part-Time
Niagara Regional Police Emergency Task Unit	1975	40	24 hour coverage	Activated by by duty officer's authority			Patrol Officers
Ontario Provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Unit	1975	36	Often involves distance to travel	Authority Deputy-Commissioner		Assigned to to priority patrol duties	
Ottawa City Police Tactical Team	1976	14	Limited	Authority Duty Inspector			Patrol Officers
Peel Regional Police Tactical & Response Unit	1976	14	Limited	Authority of Supervisor	Crime and Liquor enforcement patrol		
Waterloo Regional Police Emergency Response Unit	1978	25	24 hour coverage	Activated by duty officer			Patrol Officers
Windsor City Police Emergency Services Unit	1978	10	Limited	Authority of Supervisor			Patrol Officers
York Regional Police Emergency Response Unit	1980	9 ~~68~~	Limited	Authority Supervisor	Crime and Liquor Enforcement		
TOTALS		274 ~~244~~			2	2	11

* Limited response indicates one or two members may be available for immediate advice and support.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

"00 Buck"	Similar to SSG
#4 Shot	An unspecified number of small pellets in a shotgun cartridge.
9mm Pistol	A handgun which is semi-automatic and holds a magazine of ammunition.
Ammunition	Any projectile discharged from a firearm.
Assault Rifles	Generally rifles used in gaining entry and control.
Assault	Gaining forcible control over a suspect or location.
Ballistics	Science of projectiles or firearms.
Blast Dispersion	Fired from a gas gun, creates a cloud of CS gas.
Boat Tail	A bullet specially shaped for truer flight.
Body Armour	Bullet proof vest.
Body Bunker	A constructed shield for ballistic protection.
Bolt Action	Lever and slide mechanism to place a bullet in firing position.
Bristol Armour	Ceramic armoured jacket.
Calibre	Is the diameter of the bullet or interior of a gun barrel.

Capacity	-	The number of rounds in a magazine.
Clearing	-	Systematic search to locate a threat.
CN Gas	-	Tear gas same as CS but less effective.
Command Post	-	Vehicle or building used for incident command.
Confrontation	-	A direct challenge to police.
Containment	-	Isolating a threat within defined limits.
Cover Weapon	-	Any weapon used to protect movements of personnel.
CS Gas	-	Tear gas which affects moist parts of body.
Cyalume Light Sticks	-	Chemical apparatus providing light.
Entry	-	Tactical method of entering a building.
Entry Tools	-	Used to gain access.
Ferrets	-	A 12 gauge cartridge fired from a shotgun and filled with CS gas.
Full Metal Jacket	-	A bullet covered by copper or copper alloy.
Grain	-	The weight of the discharged portion of the bullet.
High Band	-	Higher modulation frequency which is more exclusive than low band.

Hollow Point - A bullet with the leading lead portion indented or "hollowed out".

Hooligan Bar - A three foot entry tool.

Incident Commander - The senior officer in command of an incident.

Inner Perimeter - The area in which a subject is contained or restricted.

Kelly Bar - A small version of a hooligan bar.

Low Band - Low modulation frequency with reduced exclusivity.

Magazine - The loading device which holds the rounds (bullets).

Military Ball - A type of bullet which is of rounded configuration.

Mode of Fire - Term used to describe manner in which bullets are fired. Single rounds, bursts, semi-automatic.

MP - As in MP5 and MP5 SD are selective fire, automatic weapons or machine pistols used only in semi-automatic mode.

Muzzle Velocity - The speed at which a projectile leaves the barrel of a firearm.

Negotiation - Verbal communication to persuade accommodation or surrender.

Night Scopes - Night vision devise.

OPC Common Channel - A frequency subscribed to by police departments which is governed by the Ontario Police Commission.

Outer Perimeter - Area outside of the inner perimeter established as a security zone.

Para Flare - An illumination flare 6-10 seconds of bright light is provided.

Personal Firearms - Hand gun used exclusively by the person to whom it is issued.

Plus P Ammunition - The standard load of gun powder for a .38 calibre bullet.

Pointed Soft Point - A bullet with an exposed lead point.

Police Tactics - Developed methods used by specially trained and equipped personnel to resolve dangerous situations as safely as possible.

Pump Action - A slide mechanism to place a cartridge in firing position.

Pyrotechnics - Diversionary devices and tear gas.

Radio Channel - A programmed frequency for radio communication.

Ram Bar - A door crasher with handles.

Rangefinder - Optical device used to calculate distance.

Rappelling Equipment	-	Used in rescue operations and consists of rope, pulleys descenders, ascenders and carabineers.
Rate of Fire	-	Number of bullets discharged in measured time frame.
Repeater System	-	A technological device which repeats a radio signal at maintained strength.
Rescue Vehicle	-	Specially equipped armoured vehicle used in rescue.
Semi-Wadcutter	-	A lead bullet with a flat top.
Slug	-	A one ounce lead bullet fired from a shotgun.
Smoke Grenade	-	Non-toxic chemical producing white smoke.
Sniper Rifle	-	A rifle used for minimum target at maximum range.
Soft point	-	A bullet with an exposed lead point.
Soft Point Partially Jacketed	-	A copper covered bullet with an exposed soft point
Spotting Scope	-	For long distance viewing and target location.
SSG	-	A cartridge load of 10-14 lead pellets fred from a shotgun.
Stun Grenades	-	A flash and percussion device used to disorient persons.

Tactical Channel	-	Frequency used exclusively by tactical teams when activated.
Tactical Representatives	-	Supervisor at command post who advises incident commander.
Tactical Leader	-	Officer who leads tactical maneuvers.
Thunder Flashes	-	A hand-thrown diversionary device that makes a loud noise.
Toc Van	-	Vehicle used as tactical operations centre.

APPENDIX - C (II)

INQUIRY

INTO

ONTARIO POLICE TACTICAL UNITS

VOLUME II

Submitted to The Ontario Police Commission

Ontario

Ministry of the
Solicitor
General

APRIL 1989

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INTRODUCTION

The second report will offer a comparative view of tactical units in Ontario along with suggestions for standards. Problems identified will be discussed offering the view of tactical officers and others.

This volume will proceed in accordance with the original mandate which directs a review of tactical units in Ontario in four parts:

History and purpose,
Selection and Training,
Equipment / Communications,
Utilization and Rationale.

To properly deal with the rationale for tactical units a section will discuss alternatives to tactical response.

A third and separate volume will review jury recommendations and the incidents that led to them. Police shootings and use of firearms will be discussed.

Opinions in Volume II are based on discussions with senior police officers, tactical personnel and regular officers. We have reviewed articles and books by experts and heard the opinions of forensic and tactical authorities.

OVERVIEW REPORT

ON

TACTICAL UNITS IN ONTARIO

HISTORY AND PURPOSE

History of tactical response in Ontario began to be formalized in the mid 1970's. The Metropolitan Toronto Police Force from 1966 to 1975 had rudimentary response to crowd control situations by selected officers with minimal specialized training. Toward the middle seventies it was established that an increase of dangerous calls involving guns required a more organized and better equipped unit. Thus in 1976 the Emergency Task Force created tactical units to respond to dangerous situations. Crowd control and strike situations were still part of the mandate. By 1980 the modern version of emergency task force weapons teams was clearly mandated to support the regular patrol function in high risk incidents. These included hostage taking, barricaded and armed persons and gun calls. The task force also provides support and expertise in high risk arrests and searches. Six special weapons teams of eight officers provide fulltime response.

The Ontario Provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Unit was implemented on July 1, 1975 on the Commissioner's committee recommendation. By the end of 1975 five teams of six members were in place, located in Kingston, London, Downsview, North Bay and Thunder Bay.

The studies done to establish a need for police tactics included several incident reviews. In 1968 two Ontario Provincial Police officers, Sergeant L. J. Chapitis and Corporal J. Smith were gunned down in a high risk arrest of a deranged person in Minden, Ontario. A 1975 bungled robbery and hostage incident presented further evidence of a need for organized and expert response. The 1975 incident involved one, Donald Cline in a mobile hostage incident which might have been contained at the source.

These incidents plus world terrorist activity and the upcoming 1976 Olympics provided rationale and impetus for tactics and rescue units.

In 1980 the Kingston Team was moved to Perth to ensure quick response to embassies located in Rockcliffe Park, Ottawa. This responsibility was eventually turned over to the R.C.M.P. A sixth team at Mount Forest was placed there in part to safeguard nuclear facilities in case of armed intrusion. In January 1981 the Downsview team was moved to Barrie. In July 1986 the Thunder Bay Team was moved to Belleville and subsequently supplemented by the Perth team. In 1987 the Mount Forest unit was moved to supplement the London T.R.U. and Thunder Bay and North Bay were moved to Barrie.

The foregoing moves established three tactics and rescue units, being Barrie, Belleville and London. Membership increased to twelve officers on each unit including two supervisors.

The changes came about as a result of review of deployment and the creation of other tactical and emergency response units. The R.C.M.P. commitment to emergency response for internationally protected persons changed the focus for the Ontario Provincial Police to some degree.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have established two emergency response teams in Ontario. The fourteen member teams at Ottawa and Toronto are split into units of seven co-managed by two senior officers of inspector rank. The Ontario units are mandated to respond to incidents involving internationally protected persons. Large scale security efforts such as the 1988 economic summit also involve deployment of R.C.M.P., E.R.T. along with municipal and provincial response.

The fortunate paucity of political violence in Canada has allowed for limited statistical evidence of E.R.T. effectiveness. In R.C.M.P. contract provinces emergency response teams are used for incidents similar to the Ontario Provincial Police and municipal police tactical response.

The Regional Municipality of Peel implemented its 14 member tactical and rescue unit with amalgamation of forces in the area in 1976. World terrorist activity and proximity to the airport were a stimulus to implementation. Equally considered and now a primary function is the resolution of high risk incidents involving weapons.

The York Regional Police and Peel Regional Police assign tactical officers to plain clothes patrol in unmarked vehicles. The York Emergency Response Unit consisting of seven constables and a sergeant was implemented in 1980 and modelled after the Peel Regional Tactical and Rescue Unit.

The remaining forces which have emergency response were implemented to deal with high risk situations such as hostage situations and armed, barricaded persons. They utilize officers who are assigned to regular patrol divisions. These officers are "borrowed" from their assigned duties for training and emergency call-outs.

A major difference in the "part-time" units is the number of members. Some forces with relatively large membership rely on immediate availability of tactical response teams. Others with small units rely on one or two tactically trained officers to provide immediate consultation with additional unit members called out from their homes.

The Niagara Regional Police Force began implementation of emergency response in 1975. Its emergency task unit is designed to a membership of forty to provide ready team response in emergencies.

The Waterloo Regional Police Force Emergency Response Unit, implemented in 1978 is composed of twenty-five members so that a five man team is generally available for immediate response.

Guelph, implemented in 1976, and having eight officers on their emergency tactical unit, rely on calling out unit members for crisis incidents.

The Halton Regional Police Tactical Rescue Unit, implemented in 1981 and having sixteen members relies on immediate assistance of one or two tactical officers followed by a call-out procedure where necessary.

The Belleville Police Emergency Response Team, implemented in 1982 and consisting of ten members, relies on a call-out procedure for tactical support.

The Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Emergency Response Unit was implemented in 1976 and consists of sixteen members. Emergency response relies on immediate support of one or two trained tactical officers followed by a call-our procedure where necessary.

The Durham Regional Police Force Tactical Support Unit, formed in 1985, consists of ten members and a tactical supervisor. Tactical response is by a call-out procedure.

The Windsor Police Force Emergency Services Unit was begun in 1978 and presently consists of ten constables and a sergeant. Support by E.S.U. is by call-out procedure. Tactical officers who are working when an incident occurs will provide initial assistance and advice.

The Kingston Police Force Emergency Response Unit was formed in 1981 to respond to high risk incidents. The Kingston E.R.U. is composed of ten constables supervised by a staff sergeant. The Kingston Force relies on a call-out procedure which has been used about once a year since implementation.

The Brantford Police Force Emergency Response Team was implemented in 1977. The eight member E.R.T. is activated by call-out procedure and is used discriminately for dangerous situations. (eight calls in the last four years)

The Ottawa Police Force Tactical Team, implemented in 1976 has fourteen members. One or two members are generally available for initial support or advice. Team response is by call-out procedure.

COMMENTS

Except for the Ontario Provincial Police the implementation of tactical units in Ontario is the logical response to a perceived need in the community rather than the result of study and evaluation. The Ontario Provincial Police conducted studies and evaluated their needs before implementing tactics and rescue units at strategic locations.

It is apparent that tactical response was originally brought in to answer two areas of concern:

1. Terrorist activity was identified by several forces as a rationale for equipping and training tactical response. In fact terrorist activity in Canada has been extremely rare and is no longer the focus of tactical units in Ontario's police forces.

2. Incidents involving hostage taking, barricaded armed persons, and an increase in gun calls were a very real impetus to forming tactical teams.

Present police policy in use on tactical response is outlined in statements of purpose or procedure. These statements indicate that the function of tactical response is generally directed in accordance with force policy.

Hostage situations, barricaded armed persons and gun calls have been the designated incidents for tactical response. Most tactical units are also being deployed to lend support to high risk searches, high risk arrests and security details. Further comment will be made in the section on Utilization of Tactical Units.

Unit management varies from force to force but there is generally a clear and logical chain of command. Duties and responsibilities are clearly set out at all levels. Key personnel are the training sergeants or staff sergeants who are responsible for day to day administration, training and readiness of tactical units.

Police executives and boards of police commissioners also vary in the extent of support for tactical units. This will be seen in examining the commitment to training, manpower and equipment reported herein. It may be said at this point that a lack of equipment, insufficient training or lack of manpower will place tactical officers in jeopardy because it asks them to respond, at their peril, to situations beyond their capability.

Having no tactical unit to respond to dangerous situations, may result in a response which is safer to the police officer, but not to hostages or members of the public. This will be discussed in a section entitled, Alternatives to Tactical Response.

All forces should be encouraged to evaluate their need for tactical response capability against the risk now faced by officers responding to dangerous incidents involving firearms. The safety of the public and persons engaged in criminal acts should also be reviewed.

The events in recent history, along with this inquiry and its reports, will enable police forces with tactical units to evaluate their effectiveness, resources and professionalism.

Interviews with at least fifty tactical officers, supervisors and police managers indicate a unanimous sense of purpose directed to the safety of fellow officers, citizens and those who choose to place in peril their own lives and the lives of others.

TYPES OF TACTICAL UNITS

There are three basic organizational paradigms in tactical units. Structure generally is dependant on organizational needs and geographic and demographic conditions.

FULL-TIME IN UNIFORM

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Emergency Task Force, provides round the clock coverage by trained tactical officers. Special weapons teams of eight officers and a supervisor are mobile and available. Team members are uniformed in the dress of the day. Vehicles are clearly marked and equipped for emergency response. Response time is generally within twenty minutes.

The Ontario Provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Unit officers are also full-time members of their twelve man units. Uniformed patrol is generally assigned to individual members but no ready availability is provided. Geographic areas and the limitation of personnel resources, prevents quick response.

Deployment of T.R.U. often means several hours of travel and the following of a call-out policy which is somewhat time-consuming.

Uniformed tactical units on both the Ontario Provincial Police and the Metropolitan Toronto Force have the confidence of general patrol and investigative personnel. Ready availability and reputation of task force officers in Toronto assures that tactical response is relied on in dangerous and potentially life-threatening situations. Delay and distance present some difficulty in activating Provincial Police T.R.U. personnel, so they may not always be called upon when a need exists.

FULL-TIME PLAIN CLOTHES

The York Regional Police Emergency Response Unit consists of eight officers assigned on a full-time basis. Patrol is carried out in plain clothes with unmarked vehicles. The E.R.U. conduct crime and liquor enforcement patrol and do some static surveillance.

The Peel Regional Force Tactical and Rescue Unit is staffed full-time by officers in plain clothes. The fourteen members conduct crime and liquor enforcement patrol in unmarked vehicles which carry tactical equipment. These units generally provide an initial response of one or two officers followed by a call-out of other members when required.

The concern expressed by some police managers is that plain clothes units may tend to effect an elitist posture within the force and thus alienate tactical from the regular force officers. This is not a concern in the York force. Deputy Chief D. Cousineau advises that members are at times deployed in uniform and he is satisfied that their E.R.U. enjoys the confidence and respect of the rest of the force. In Peel Region, Deputy Chief Collins also reports deploying their tactical officers in uniform assignments. Deputy Collins is convinced that their T.R.U. are seen as a safety oriented support for regular force members. Our investigation supports the information from Deputies Cousineau and Collins.

PART-TIME UNITS

The remaining eleven units are composed of officers who are assigned to regular duties, mostly uniformed patrol. They are attached to their division or platoon and "borrowed" away from regular tasks for training and tactical response.

With the exception of the Niagara Regional and Waterloo Regional Police, the part-time units provide limited response. Generally several tactical officers are working at regular duties and will provide initial support by way of tactical advice and assistance in beginning containment. The remaining tactical officers are called out in accordance with force policy.

The Waterloo Regional Emergency Response Unit, provides full-time coverage in that a team of five tactical officers is generally available. Additional tactical officers will be called out if necessary. While immediate response is not fully available this structure does provide initial containment while other unit officers and supervisors are called. Though twenty-five members provides a significant training and equipment commitment it is seen as a manageable personnel commitment by the Waterloo Regional force.

The Niagara Regional Force Emergency Task Unit consist of part-time officers who are attached to the patrol strength throughout the region. Forty officers committed to E.T.U. provide the ability to activate on-duty personnel in emergency response. While this reduces overtime expenditures it increases equipment and training costs, and weakens the selection criteria.

COMMENTS

The varying structures in Ontario tactical units provide a wide range of commitment to personnel, equipment and training. The use of tactical response also varies according to factors such as availability and force practices and policy. While each organization must determine its own strategy for providing emergency support, certain observations were made in visits to tactical units.

- Full-time units allow for a single line of communication and supervision.

- Unit management is easier to co-ordinate from a single line of authority.

- Full-time units are employed in accordance with police force exigencies.

  i.e. R.I.D.E. Program, Drug Enforcement Patrol, Surveillance, Property Patrol, Traffic Enforcement Programs and others.

- Unit size may be controlled while maintaining a desirable level of response.

- Team unity is enhanced by full-time membership rather than made difficult by separating work commitments.

- Full-time units risk becoming isolated from regular strength officers.

- Part-time units are fully integrated into regular force functions.

- Full-time units are able to support regular functions in a time of need.

The provision of immediate, full tactical response is desirable but must measure needs against efficiency. The effective deployment of Metropolitan Toronto Task Force personnel in non-tactical duties makes full-time availability a sound organizational rationale. This takes into account the size of the force (approximately 5,391) and the population served (over 2.2 million).

The Ontario Provincial Police (approximately 4,490 officers) has T.R.U. officers deployed in the best interest of the force. Three units of twelve officers serve a population of over 2.1 million and provide tactical support for the provinces municipal forces who do not have tactical support teams. The vast distances and multiple jurisdictions involved, do not allow for immediate response, but, a full-time unit allows for a controlled number of officers to be quickly available.

Comparatively, around the clock full response in the Niagara Regional Police Force means training forty tactical officers to be deployed on five platoons. The Niagara force has 563 officers who serve a population of 370,312. As a result of this commitment, selection criteria and training time are difficult to maintain at an adequate standard.

The Waterloo Regional Force provides partial response immediately, to a level which is sufficient to contain an incident. This control is provided by twenty-five officers deployed on platoons in teams of five. The Waterloo force has a good commitment to training, but not without some conflict from platoon commanders who employ tactical members on their full-time assignment.

Other units provide limited initial response followed by a call-out of other team members. Unit strength varies from eight to sixteen members. Full response for even the most basic tactical emergency requires a minimum of six tactical officers and a supervisor. Annual leave and other reasons for absence would suggest an absolute minimum membership of eight trained tactical officers. This would require deployment of some regular force personnel in perimeter functions for any incident involving more than a single armed person in a very basic dwelling. A more realistic unit size in our view is twelve to sixteen members depending on; force size, unit deployment, and the area served.

The critical requisite for tactical response is commitment to properly equip, train and staff the teams of officers who volunteer to deal with life threatening incidents to protect the safety of others. The reviews of training, selection, equipment and utilization will include suggested minimum standards.

SELECTION AND TRAINING

Police organizations in Ontario who have tactical units are committed to a selection of mature, dedicated officers who demonstrate common sense, intelligence and self control in stressful situations. Methods of selection vary but all officers on tactical units in the province are volunteers.

The selection process tends to be more comprehensive on larger police forces. Most organizations demand first class constable status which means in excess of three years service. Metropolitan Toronto demands four years experience, Peel Regional Police and Durham Regional require five years of experience. Niagara Regional and Waterloo Regional Police require a minimum of two years experience. This minimal experience is allowed partly due to the large size of these tactical units. It is our view based on discussion with tactical officers that a minimum of three years experience should precede tactical unit membership. Tactical officers need not only a sound experience base but also the confidence of fellow officers.

When vacancies occur all forces, except Guelph, rely on written applications to indicate an interest in joining tactical response teams. The one hundred and twenty-six (126) member Guelph Police Force relies on word of mouth to identify volunteers for their Emergency Tactical Unit. Candidates are subject to supervisor's recommendations on all forces. Only those officers who have been evaluated as mature, hard-working officers and, are team oriented will be selected for tactical support units.

Psychological testing is conducted by eleven of the fifteen tactical units. Those that choose not to conduct this testing are the Durham Regional Police, the Guelph Police Force, Kingston Police Force, Niagara Regional Police and the Windsor City Police. Those who do not conduct psychological testing argue that their officers were tested for suitability on becoming police officers. In addition, supervision and evaluation reports are suitable measurements of maturity and judgment.

The subject of psychological testing could, in our view, be the subject of a separate review. The quality of psychologists is not questioned. It has been argued, however, that "self-reporting" personality tests have limited value. Some testing instruments offer questions which provide concern about tests which are outdated or culturally biased.

The California Psychological Inventory was copyrighted in 1956 and questions include:

8. I liked "Alice in Wonderland", by Lewis Carroll

9. I usually go to the movies more than once a week

33. Usually I would prefer to work with women

154. In school I was sometimes sent to the principal's office for cutting up

261. We ought to let Europe get out of its own mess; it made its bed, let it lie in it.

- A test called "How Supervise?" by Quentin File, and published by the Psychological Corporation of New York was copyrighted in 1948.

- The Alfred J. Cardall, "Test of Practical Judgment", was first copyrighted in 1962.

- The Otis self-administering test of mental ability was copyrighted in 1922.

- A test called I6PF was first copyrighted in 1949 by the Personality and Ability Testing Inc. of Illinois.

- The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory has been in use since before 1950 and is still being used today.

Psychologic testing ranges from mailed-in tests to testing supplemented by a "psychological interview". Conflict exists about the value of tests which are "self reporting" indicators of personality. Comment has been made in news publications in the last few years about cultural, ethnic or other bias found in psychological tests which measure personality characteristics or intelligence. Dr. Keith Travis, a psychologist who tests Metro Toronto officers, agrees there are some concerns. He believes that the quality of the psychologist who works with the tests is important. Dr. Sawatski who works with the Ontario Provincial Police agrees that these testing documents have some limitations.

Psychological testing by appropriate psychologists may be a safeguard to selection of tactical officers. We have not, in our brief examination of this issue, found evidence to suggest to forces who do not use psychological testing, that they are remiss in this choice.

Physical Fitness testing is conducted on all candidates for membership in tactical units. The stress of emergency response and the need for long hours of concentration demand physical and mental fitness. Some forces provide duty time to maintain physical fitness, from one-half to a full hour. Most forces rely on the officer to maintain personal fitness on his own time. The demand for top physical conditioning provides, in our view, a rationale for allowing tactical officers a minimum one-half hour per day or one hour every two working days for physical fitness maintenance.

Interviews of prospective tactical officers are part of the selection process in almost all organizations. They range from formal structured interviews of up to an hour to less formal talks about team membership and commitment. Belleville, Brantford, Guelph and Niagara are the least formal in conducting candidates interviews. It is our view that a structured interview for tactical candidates is appropriate to clarify for management, their motivation and personality. For applicants it provides opportunity to clarify any misconceptions about emergency response duties and the commitment required. This interview should be documented and compared against psychological assessments if any are used.

Initial and ongoing training varies to such a degree that it is necessary to describe each unit separately before making suggestions for consideration.

Belleville integrates new members into the unit's ongoing training which is four hours of paid overtime every two weeks. Members of the emergency response team do not join tactical response until judged ready by the unit supervisor. This is generally a period of nine months.

Brantford Emergency Response Team members originally took some training with the Hamilton-Wentworth Emergency Response Unit. New members are integrated into unit training which is one day each month. New members are not deployed tactically until judged ready by the training sergeant.

The Durham Regional Police Tactical officers have been trained by the Metropolitan Toronto Emergency Task Force. Durham Region also relies on the Ontario Police College, Basic Tactical Orientation Course. One pilot course in 1987, one is taking place in May of 1989 and is of three weeks duration. Initiates are deployed in secondary roles until judged capable by unit supervisors. Ongoing training consists of two days per month supplemented by a one-week training program.

The Guelph Police Force Emergency Tactical Unit integrates new members in the ongoing training. This training is one day per month and integration to acceptable level is generally nine (9) months and is judged by team supervisors.

The Halton Regional Police Force provides a one week basic orientation program for new members to Tactical Rescue Unit. The Ontario Police College Basic Orientation Course of two weeks was used in 1987 and is intended for future use if available. Further training is integrated with ongoing training sessions of one day for every twenty-one working days supplemented by a one week program. Each candidate is issued a tactical training manual for reference.

The Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Emergency Response Unit provide a two week orientation program and assignment to a coach officer for three months. New members are issued with tactical reference material. Secondary tactical roles are assigned during a members initial year on E.R.U. Ongoing training consists of twenty-four hours per month supplemented by a one-week program and a major training exercise.

The Kingston Police Emergency Response Unit, initiates its recruits into the regular ongoing training program beginning its new member with a five day training program. Ongoing training consists of this five day program and two and three day sessions to a total of twenty days annually. The Kingston force uses creative scheduling in low-choice holiday periods, to avoid overtime.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Force conducts a twenty-one day basic orientation course for new members. In addition ongoing training consists of three days for each ten day working cycle. This training coupled with one hour each day for fitness is an excellent program for maintaining professional standards.

The Ontario Provincial Police T.R.U. candidates are also extensively trained. Initial training is the most rigorous of all units. A two week selection course exposes candidates to physical and mental stress that has caused several candidates to withdraw. Successful candidates then receive a fifteen week course of instruction. The length of the course is explained by the addition of search, rescue and survival components and in comprehensive coverage of tactical skills and concepts. Ongoing training is one day a week.

Candidates also benefit from one hour a day allowed for physical fitness activity. The Ontario provincial Police are second to none in their commitment to professionally trained tactical officers.

The Niagara Regional Police Force trains new members for the E.T.U. by integrating them into ongoing training. Ongoing training through 1988 was eight hours per month notwithstanding exigencies of tourist season. Presently the force is committed to twelve hours per month regardless of other pressures. New members are used in secondary tactical roles until judged ready by supervisors. Interviews with Niagara officers confirmed their hopes for additional training time.

The Ottawa Police Force places a high priority to training of its Tactics and Rescue Unit officers. New members begin by joining the team when it is scheduled for a ten day basic tactical training program. The units annual training consists of two ten-day sessions supplemented by one day of training per month. Officers are expected to maintain their own physical fitness.

The Peel Regional Police Force Tactical and Rescue Unit is also committed to providing adequate training for the risks of tactical response. New officers receive tactical manuals and a two week orientation course. They receive significant coach officer guidance and are deployed in secondary tactical roles for at least six months while under close supervision. Ongoing training consists of one day per week supplemented by major exercises once or twice a year.

The Waterloo Regional Police Force provides a thorough initiation for new members of its Emergency Response Unit. A tactical manual is provided for candidates who are given eight weeks of instruction and training on tactical skills and concepts. Recruits to E.R.U. will be used in secondary roles until judged capable by the training sergeant. Ongoing training consists of thirty-two hours of training for every thirty-five day cycle. This training is supplemented by a three day training session. Major exercises are conducted about once a year.

The Windsor Police Force provides written reference material and a two week orientation course to new members of its Emergency Services Unit. Ongoing training shows a good commitment to maintaining professionalism by providing two days a month supplemented by two programs of five days each for a total of thirty-four training days annually.

The York Regional Police Force Emergency Response Unit officers must pass promotional qualification examinations as part of the selection process. Thus they bring a proven knowledge level to their initial training. Initiates receive three weeks of basic training and often attend ongoing weekly training days to prepare for membership to E.R.U. Each member receives a tactical reference manual.

Suggestions for Selection Criteria

A minimum of three years experience.

Successful completion of a basic tactical orientation course of at least ten days duration.

Formal interview by organization panel (documented).

Approval through performance evaluation.

Physical fitness testing.

Close supervision for a minimum six month probation period.

Suggestions for Training Standards

Completion of selection criteria.

Ongoing training for tactical officers will maintain professional response to dangerous situations. Many tactical skills require role practice in order to achieve and maintain a level of discipline and proficiency that allow reliance on firearms to be delayed as long as possible.

A desirable level of ongoing training is one day per week. As an absolute minimum standard we would suggest two days of training per month. Supplementary training such as major exercises and training sessions of several days or more are also desirable. Combinations of training such as presented by the Ottawa Force would certainly be acceptable.

All tactical officers should be issued with reference manuals.

Programs should include some scheduled training which integrates tactical units, negotiators and incident commanders at least six times annually.

In-service lectures by unit supervisors should familiarize regular officers with the basics of containment, safe approach to weapons calls and call-out procedures.

Commitments to tactical units should be for a significant time period due to training investment.

Public education programs should identify the role of tactical units in emergency response.

Training represents the greatest ongoing requirement for tactical response. It may be said of training that, *"You will pay for a training program whether you have one or not"*. Any force having a tactical response team has a significant onus to train these officers to perform their dangerous tasks at the highest level of safety.

THE ONTARIO TACTICAL ADVISORY BODY (O.T.A.B.)

O.T.A.B. consists of members of tactical response units in Ontario and meetings may be attended by organizations who have an interest in tactical response. Original meetings in 1986 between O.T.A.B., The Ontario Police Commission and the Director of the Ontario Police College resulted in a Basic Orientation Course of two weeks held in 1987. In 1989, May 15 - June 2 a second course will be conducted for three weeks at the Ontario Police College. This course is not funded at this time and relies on staffing contributions from contributing police forces and the availability of Ontario Police College resources.

Meetings of O.T.A.B. continue two or three times a year and committees are in place for training, equipment, special projects and training facilities.

The present course of training was designed by members of O.T.A.B. with cooperation of the Ontario Police College.

O.T.A.B. presents an opportunity for setting standards, sharing training programs, equipment standardization and other common concerns.

We would suggest that the Ontario Tactical Advisory Body meet once every four months. Committee reports and minutes should be distributed to all members.

A minimum of one course annually should be available for new members of tactical units.

The Chairman of O.T.A.B. should report in writing twice a year to the Assistant Deputy Minister of Policing Services, Ministry of the Solicitor General. This report would include a status of membership and committee recommendations and concerns.

We suggest funding for the Basic Tactical Orientation Course be made available.

TACTICAL UNITS EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT

Tactical units throughout the province are supplied with a wide array of equipment in order to perform their duties. What each unit is equipped with depends on many factors, including:

a) that equipment which is best designed for specific demands;

b) equipment on the market in relation to when the unit was implemented;

c) budgetary dollars allocated to the unit;

d) the opinion of the officer selecting the equipment;

e) the geography of the jurisdiction in which the unit is expected to police.

How a unit utilizes its equipment depends on the nature of the call for service and the tactical methodology adopted by the unit.

PERSONAL CLOTHING

All units are issued with a dark blue tactical uniform. The police force flashes are either sewn on, sewn on with a velcro patch available for covering it, or the flash is attached with velcro for easy removal. Some shoulder flashes, although depicting the official police force crests, are manufactured using only subdued colours.

The wearing of a dark coloured uniform and the hiding of the bright colours of the shoulder flashes are done in order to safeguard the officer while deployed in high risk situations.

Hamilton-Wentworth, Durham, Halton and Ottawa issue their unit officers camouflaged (broken pattern) uniforms for wearing when an occurrence is in a rural setting. The O.P.P. have issued their officers solid olive drab green outfits for this purpose.

The O.P.P., Hamilton-Wentworth, and Niagara also issue their officers an all white uniform to be worn during the winter.

The possibility of prolonged occurrences in inclement and/or changing weather conditions necessitates the issuing of winter parkas, boots, mitts, rain gear, etc. With few exceptions, the units are equipped with this type of gear.

COMMENTS

Tactical response presents an increased risk to the officers who have volunteered for this duty. Along with specialized training, specialized equipment must be made available to minimize the danger the officer will face. Tactical clothing developed by the military, or any other protection oriented agency has been primarily developed to reduce detection and threat of injury. By wearing clothing that blends in with the existing environment a stealth approach can be made with greater safety.

If a tactical situation is to be resolved in a peaceful non-violent manner, the police will have to gain positions within the inner perimeter to effectively control the situation. In order to accomplish this task they need to move in a stealthy manner, and avoid putting themselves in jeopardy. If the wearing of white, green, blue or broken pattern clothing is necessary to camouflage an officer for his safety then it should be done. The safety of hostages and the avoidance of precipitous action by suicidal persons may also require stealth approach. .

When identification of the officer as a police officer becomes necessary then fluorescent arm bands and/or large lettered POLICE insignias should be available. A component of a public education campaign would include demonstrations of this apparel.

With regards to foul weather clothing, the comfort of the officers is paramount to maintain a high level of readiness, and therefore high quality proper attire should be available.

TEAM EQUIPMENT

Personal Firearms

There are basically two types of personal firearms used by tactical officers in Ontario. They are, a .38 calibre six shot service revolver and a 9mm semi-automatic pistol with thirteen or fourteen round magazines.

The .38 calibre revolver is loaded using one of two methods.

The first method is to insert one bullet at a time into the guns revolving cylinder. The second method involves the use of a device called a "speed-loader" which holds six bullets. All six bullets are inserted into the revolving cylinder at once and the speed-loader's clamping mechanism is then released.

The 9mm pistol is loaded using a "magazine" or "clip". A magazine is a storage device for bullets. The number of bullets or rounds stored in a magazine depends on the manufacturer of the weapon. The magazine for a 9mm pistol is inserted through the bottom of the grip. Re-loading with spare magazines is a very quick process. The diameter (or calibre) of the bullet used in these weapons is virtually the same.

Belleville, Kingston and Windsor use the service revolver for patrol and tactical work.

Brantford, Hamilton-Wentworth, and Niagara use the service revolver for patrol and tactical work, and in addition they have access to a limited number of 9mm pistols for tactical work.

Ottawa, Metro, Durham, Halton, Guelph and Waterloo use service revolvers for patrol work. When tactically deployed the officers use a personally issued 9mm pistol.

York and Peel and the Ontario Provincial Police use a 9mm pistol for patrol and tactical work.

COMMENTS

There are three critical issues in the selection and use of a personal firearm for tactical officers.

a) Reliability - will the firearm function as designed at critical moments?

b) Familiarity - has the officer had sufficient training and practice with the weapon?

c) Capacity - does the weapon provide the officer with an adequate number of rounds in a perilous situation?

The .38 calibre Smith & Wesson service revolver has historically been a very reliable weapon and with practice an officer can become extremely proficient and comfortable in its use. The difficulty with this weapon arises out of its limited round capacity and time needed for reloading. Six shots can be discharged rather quickly, and even with "speed loaders" the officer may end up disadvantaged.

A 9mm semi-automatic pistol properly selected and cared for will provide the user with reliable service.

Where some difficulty may arise with this weapon is in familiarity. Officers are trained on the regular service revolver and the 9mm pistol. To be proficient in one or the other can be expected. Tactical officers working patrol called to a tactical occurrence, switch weapons at the scene. In discussions with tactical officers, they advised there is a possibility of confusion at that point. Tactical officers who have extensive training with a 9mm pistol and are then involved in a confrontation while armed with their regular service revolver, may experience some confusion. In any case, an officer relying on a weapon in a critical situation should carry that weapon at all times when working a patrol or tactical function.

The obvious advantage the 9mm pistol has over the 38 calibre revolver is the magazine capacity and the speed of reloading.

We agree with tactical officers and other experts that a 9mm semi-automatic pistol is the weapon preferred for tactical operations.

Pyrotechnics

There are two types of tear gas used by tactical teams in Ontario. CS gas (Orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile) and CN gas (Chloroacetophemone).

CS gas, which has a more profound effect on areas of the skin that are moist, is used by all units in Ontario. CN gas, which is less of an irritant overall, is used by Belleville, Kingston, Metro, Durham, and Peel.

Paraflares are used by most units and are designed to provide a brilliant light for between six to ten seconds.

Smoke canisters, give off a non toxic white smoke, providing cover for personnel movement and are also extensively supplied for team use.

Blast dispersion or muzzle blast are tear gas loads designed to be discharged very close to an assailant. The desired effect is to incapacitate the person long enough for tactical officers to move in and gain control. Tactical units are generally equipped with one form or another of this tear gas.

Stun grenades are another device extensively used by tactical units. This flash and percussion agent is designed to affect a person's balance, sight, and hearing for a short period of time.

COMMENTS

Tear gas and pyrotechnic devices are essential tools for tactical units. CS and CN tear gas are usually effective in incapacitating a subject, allowing tactical officers an opportunity to gain control and to safely resolve high risk situations. Tactical officers have stated examples where persons apparently suffering mental disorders were subjected to tear gas in the form of blast dispersion and this gas had little or no effect on that person. It is recommended that all tactical teams using blast dispersion be aware of its limitations.

Light emitting flares, smoke canisters, and diversionary devices are all intended to be used to give team members the upper hand in high risk situations, and therefore are necessary equipment.

Ballistic Armour

There are three basic materials used in manufacturing ballistic protection for individual officers. They are "Kevlar", ceramic, and steel.

Belleville, Metro, Halton, Hamilton-Wentworth, Waterloo, Windsor and Durham report supplying tactical officers with ceramic ballistic helmets. These helmets provide ample protection but are quite heavy.

York, Metro, O.P.P., Peel, Guelph, Durham and Niagara report having ballistic shields. These body shields, carried by the officer, weigh approximately 15 pounds and have a viewing port. Their basic function is to provide protection for a team member while working in stairwells and hallways.

Ceramic vests offer a high level of protection and have optional collar and groin protectors. Their weight is somewhat prohibitive, (25-30 lbs.) but tactical officers agree they are a necessity. All tactical units have ceramic vests in their inventory.

"Kevlar" vests are widely used by police officers across Ontario. Tactical officers use specially designed Kevlar vests that have over 20 layers of this material.

COMMENTS

There is a significant effort on the part of management of tactical units to provide high levels of ballistic protection to tactical officers.

Tactical teams as a whole were very supportive of this commitment. It should be noted that the use of ballistic armour does not negate the possibility of grievous bodily harm or death.

Team Firearms

Each tactical team has in their inventory a selection of shotguns and rifles. The type and number of these weapons used depends on the perceived threat, the tactics required, the expertise of the team members present, the presence of hostages or the public, and available time.

The 12 gauge shotgun is common among all tactical teams. It fires a variety of shells, from bird shot (many small lead pellets) to a 1 oz. rifled slug. A "rifled" slug has grooves in the lead bullet which cause it to spin. The spinning motion helps the bullet maintain a straight trajectory. Tear gas ferrets are also discharged from this gun.

The O.P.P. TRU only use the shotgun for firing tear gas, while all other tactical units have "00" Buck or rifled slugs available.

This weapon is used either as an entry weapon or a perimeter cover weapon.

The concerns expressed by tactical officers with regards to the shotgun are over penetration and errant pellets.

The benefits are its massive terminal ballistics and psychological fear factor.

Many teams are equipped with 9mm semi-automatic machine pistols used primarily as cover weapons by entry teams. Shorter models are used for security details. The benefits of this weapon are its reliability and magazine capacity.

All tactical units possess .223 calibre rifles in their arsenal. They are fairly versatile and provide excellent accuracy at long ranges. Magazine capacity ranges from 20 to 40 rounds. These weapons are used mainly for containment and cover.

All tactical units except Niagara and Guelph possess a .308 calibre sniper rifle. Niagara uses a .243 calibre rifle for this purpose, while Guelph uses a 22-250 calibre rifle. Specific officers are trained, on specific weapons, for long distance accurate shooting. The rifles used are designed for minimum target, maximum range precision shooting.

All sniper rifles are equipped with a high quality optical sight.

COMMENTS

The necessity to equip police officers with high powered rifles and semi-automatic weapons is not easily accepted in Canadian Society. The reality of the situation is demonstrated by a review of weapons calls responded to by Metropolitan Toronto's E.T.F. They responded to a total of 365 gun related calls in the last five years. They seized over 400 guns including: machine guns, high powered rifles, shotguns, semi-automatic pistols and handguns of every description.

It would be irresponsible to ask tactical officers to respond to these situations without fire power sufficient to overcome adversary force.

When looking at how tactical teams utilize the various weapons in their arsenal, it appears that there is a wide latitude of specific usage. As an example a .223 calibre weapon is used as a containment weapon, a cover weapon and also an entry weapon. Tactical training and/or situations may be reasons for variations in how weapons are used. It is agreed by most tactical officers that the .223 calibre rifle, depending on the ammunition used, would over penetrate when used as an entry weapon.

Sniper rifles of whatever calibre are necessary for those instances where a long range accurate shot is required. This may be for a hostage situation, or where someone is firing at people in a sniper fashion. Every effort should be made to enrol selected officers on an approved sniper course, and also provide each of those officers with a personal rifle.

Tactical teams are encouraged to dispose of all firearms not used in tactical response or which have been replaced by more up to date equipment.

AMMUNITION

Regulation 790, under the Police Act of Ontario, subsection 3(3) gives the Commissioner or chief of police the power to authorize a member of a police force under his control, to carry a firearm other than a .38 calibre service revolver. Subsection 3(2) stipulates the characteristics of the ammunition to be used in the .38 calibre service revolver. This ammunition shall be factory loaded and shall have a solid bullet of lead alloy of semi-wadcutter configuration with a muzzle velocity not exceeding 1000 feet per second when fired in a revolver with a four inch barrel. Although there is no legislated description of the ammunition to be used in other authorized firearms, the Commissioner or Chief of Police must approve all ammunition acquisitions for firearms.

Tactical teams, with the authorization of the Commissioner or chief of police, purchase ammunition, which is selected depending on the function of the particular weapon. A review of the ammunition of each of the weapons for each tactical team shows a rather broad spectrum of this ammunition in all weapons except for the shotgun.

Shotgun

The ammunition for this weapon is fairly constant throughout all the teams. "00" Buck or S.S.G. is carried by every team. This ammunition contains approximately 12 lead pellets depending on manufacturer.

The 1 oz. rifled slug is carried by all teams except Belleville.

Metro and Niagara also carry #4 shot, while Hamilton-Wentworth carries a full range of shotgun ammunition, from birdshot to the 1 oz. rifled slug. #4 shot contains a large number of small lead pellets (measured by weight), while birdshot contains even more pellets as this is the smallest lead pellet load.

9mm Handgun

Durham, Hamilton-Wentworth, Niagara, O.P.P., Ottawa, Peel, Waterloo, and Guelph are all using 'soft point' ammunition weighing either 95 or 100 grains. Hamilton-Wentworth, Niagara, Ottawa and Guelph report that their ammunition of this type is also partially jacketed.

Halton uses the same ammunition as the R.C.M.P. which is 115 grain silver tip hollow point.

Metro, O.P.P., and York all have 115 grain full metal jacket ammunition. Metro also has 154 grain full metal jacket available.

9mm Machine Pistol

Belleville, O.P.P., Windsor, and York report using 115 grain full metal jacket ammunition for this weapon.

Durham, Hamilton-Wentworth, Kingston, Ottawa and Peel use a soft point bullet. Halton uses the silver tip hollow point in this weapon.

.223 Calibre Rifle

Belleville, Halton, Ottawa and Windsor use a full metal jacket (some with boat tail) bullet for this weapon.

All tactical teams, except Belleville, have a soft point bullet of some form or another for this weapon.

.308 Calibre Rifle

Durham Region is the only tactical team that carries a 168 grain full metal jacket bullet for this weapon.

Brantford, Hamilton-Wentworth, Ottawa and Guelph all use a partially jacketed soft point bullet, while Halton, O.P.P., Peel, Waterloo and York report theirs as a soft point. Metro reports using a hollow-point boat tail.

.243 Calibre Rifle

Belleville uses a 100 grain pointed soft point bullet while Niagara reports using a soft point bullet.

COMMENTS

In order to put forth an informed comment on ammunition, the law as it relates to the use of force must be tabled.

Section 25 of the Criminal Code sets out the statutory protection for any person enforcing the law.

Section 25 C.C.

> *25. (1) Every one who is required or authorized by law to do anything in the administration or enforcement of the law*
>
> *(a) as a private person,*
> *(b) as a peace officer or public officer,*
> *(c) in aid of a peace officer or public officer, or*
> *(d) by virtue of his office,*
>
> *is, if he acts on reasonable grounds, justified in doing what he is required or authorized to do and in using as much force as is necessary for that purpose.*
>
> *(2) Where a person is required or authorized by law to execute a process or to carry out a sentence, that person or any person who assists him if, if that person acts in good faith, justified in executing the process or in carrying out the sentence notwithstanding that the process or sentence is defective or that it was issued or imposed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.*
>
> *(3) Subject to subsection (4), a person is not justified for the purposes of subsection (1) in using force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm unless he believes on reasonable and probable grounds that it is necessary for the purpose of preserving himself or any one under his protection from death or grievous bodily harm.*
>
> *(4) A peace officer who is proceeding lawfully to arrest, with or without warrant, any person for an offence for which that person may be arrested without warrant, and every one lawfully assisting the peace officer, is justified, if the person to be arrested takes flight to avoid arrest, in using as much force as is necessary to prevent the escape by flight, unless the escape can be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner, R.S.,c.C-34,s.25.*

Section 27 of the Criminal Code sets out the statutory protection for any person preventing an offence from occurring.

Section 27 C.C.

> *27. Every one is justified in using as much force as is reasonably necessary*
>
> *(a) to prevent the commission of an offence*
>
> *(i) for which, if it were committed, the person who committed it might be arrested without warrant, and*
>
> *(ii) that would be likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the person or property of anyone; or*
>
> *(b) to prevent anything being done that, on reasonable grounds, he believes would, if it were done, be an offence mentioned in paragraph (a). R.S.,c.C-34,s.27.*

And finally, section 26 of the Criminal Code, which sets out the parameters (legally) for the use of force.

Section 26 C.C.

> *26. Every one who is authorized by law to use force is criminally responsible for any excess thereof according to the nature and quality of the act that constitutes the excess. R.S.,c.C-34,s.26.*

Canadians, through Parliament and the Supreme Court of Canada, have decreed that in this society the preservation of life is paramount, and the use of lethal force must only occur under extreme unavoidable circumstances. Further, anyone using force must not only justify the use of force, but also justify the degree of force used.

Police officers in this province are sworn to duty that includes preventing breaches of the peace, preventing crime and apprehending people who break the law. They are called upon to intervene in many different types of high risk situations where the use of some degree of force may be required.

The firing of a bullet at a human being must only be done when the person pulling the trigger believes, based on the existing circumstances, this ultimate level of force is absolutely necessary for the preservation of his life or the life of another. Until that instant, the non-violent resolution of the circumstance or the use of a lesser degree of force would be preferred. However, it is also at this point-in-time that the life of the person posing the threat ceases to be a primary concern. Stopping the threat that is putting the life of an innocent person in jeopardy becomes the primary concern - even if the result is the death of the person posing the threat.

The remainder of this comment will be directed at the research into wound ballistics and ammunition selection.

Research papers, interviews and testimony by experts on the subject of wound ballistics reveal a number of important points on the effect of bullets. There are two key factors for this discussion:

(a) The organ injured.

(b) The severity of the wound.

Organ Injured

According to Dr. Vincent Dimaio, Chief Medical Examiner, Bexar County, San Antonio Texas, *"a bullet through the brain stem, the basal ganglia of the brain, the spinal cord in the neck will produce instant collapse and inability to move at all ... the calibre of the gun and type of ammunition is almost irrelevant."*[1]

This would indicate that shots directed at the brain or neck have the greatest potential for stopping a threat. The difficulty with this, in practical terms, is the ability of police officers in an extremely stressful situation to hit a small target.

Firearms training at the Ontario Police College stresses shooting at the largest mass, which in a full front shot would be the centre of the chest.

(b) The severity of the wound. Dr. Dimaio describes this as having three elements: the size of the temporary cavity produced by the bullet, the amount of tissue destroyed, and the kinetic energy transferred to an organ by the bullet.

One of the world's foremost authorities on wound ballistics Dr. Martin L. Fackler, Letterman Army Institute of Research,

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[1] Dr. Vincent Dimaio, 1987, FBI Wound Ballistic Workshop (Unpublished)

Wound Ballistics Laboratory, San Francisco California, in his evidence at the inquest into the death of Bernard Bastien, talked about his research on the effects of bullets in human tissue.

Both he and Dr. Dimaio agree that other than a shot to the brain or spinal cord, fast reliable incapacitation will only occur from massive bleeding from holes in the heart, or major blood vessels of the torso, causing circulatory collapse. Even with this type of injury there is still time for controlled action by the injured person. Dr. Dimaio cites an example of a man, whose heart was destroyed by a shotgun blast, and was still able to run for approximately sixty-five (65) feet. Dr. Fackler cited several examples where the wounded person was able to inflict fatal wounds on police officers. The most notable was an F.B.I. case where a man had been shot through the arm, and into the chest, and after receiving this wound killed two F.B.I. agents and wounded four others. This man was eventually killed by the F.B.I. and a study of the wound received from the first shot, showed that the bullet stopped just short of the heart. Had the bullet sufficient energy to continue on to the heart, the damage to that organ would in all likelihood prevented him from continuing on to the extent he did.

What is necessary in a bullet, according to Dr. Fackler, is sufficient weight, velocity and expansion to penetrate human tissue to reach and damage vital organs.

Through discussions with Dr. Fackler and tactical officers it is agreed there are two basic types of bullets. One is a full metal jacket and the other a soft point.

A full metal jacket is a copper or copper alloy covering the lead portion of a bullet. It is necessary for the bullet to maintain its shape when fired at higher velocities. If a pure lead bullet was fired from a high powered rifle some of the lead would be caught in the rifling of the barrel causing difficulties with subsequent rounds. The copper or copper alloy jacket prevents this from occurring. The difficulty with a full metal jacket round entering a body is that unless it hits bone, this round will exit the body, without expanding or causing injury sufficient to stop a threat.

A soft point or hollow point is sometimes referred to as a mushroom or expanding bullet. The main characteristic of this bullet is that the lead portion of the cartridge is either fully exposed or semi-jacketed. There may be a hole or indentation in the tip of the lead which is the reason for the term, hollow point. Variations in the soft point bullets are design concepts intended to cause expansion when the bullet strikes soft tissue.

It is important to note that all soft point bullets are designed to expand in soft tissues. They are aerodynamically sound during flight and when striking a target they flatten out or expand.

There is very little chance of a soft point bullet over penetrating. The opposite was true in the F.B.I. shooting described earlier. The bullet which struck the arm and chest failed to penetrate deep enough. That bullet was a 115 grain hollow point bullet fired from a 9mm pistol. According to Dr. Fackler's research had the bullet been a heavier grain it would have carried into the heart.

The F.B.I. have since switched to a 147 grain hollow point bullet travelling at 975 feet per second. It is our opinion supported by Dr. Fackler's research that all police low velocity firearms which includes 38 calibre revolvers and 9mm pistols, should use this ammunition.

Another variable, brought out during Dr. Fackler's testimony, is the inconsistency in the manufacturing of bullets. He gave examples of bullets designed to expand which did not. It is therefore our opinion that a testing procedure be set up and a standard of acceptance be developed by the Ontario Tactical Advisory Board.

High velocity weapons, such as the .308 calibre or .223 calibre, are used when longer accurate shots are required. If a full metal jacketed bullet is used there will be over penetration, unless a bone is hit. This bullet does not expand but it does make a 180° turn (end for end) at some point during its path through soft tissue. While the bullet is turning it causes significantly more damage than when travelling point forward.

Soft point or hollow point bullets used in high powered rifles cause *"a marked increase in crushed tissue or permanent cavity formation."*[2]

The bullet expands or mushrooms as it enters the tissue and also fragments, with the pieces crushing their own path through tissue. The more velocity, the greater the fragmentation of the bullet, and thus an increase in tissue damage.

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[2] Dr. Martin Fackler, 1987, FBI Wound Ballistic Workshop (Unpublished)

The soft point or hollow point bullet has greater stopping power than the full metal jacket based on the amount of tissue damage.

According to tactical officers the loss of accuracy, when using a hollow point bullet, is about 1/2 cm increase in grouping diameter of shots fired at 91 m, which is fairly insignificant.

It is the opinion of tactical officers and ours that soft point boat tail ammunition be used for all high powered rifles including the .223 calibre, 308 calibre, 22-250 calibre and .243 calibre. Testing of low velocity ammunition which has been conducted, should be duplicated for high velocity ammunition.

Shotgun ammunition is standard throughout the tactical teams. The resulting tissue damage of a shotgun blast is extremely severe when either a "00" Buck or rifled slug is used.

It is our opinion that the use of the shotgun should be considered with the greatest of circumspection. This view is based on the massive terminal ballistics of this weapon.

COMMUNICATIONS

Police forces continually upgrade communication equipment as technology improves and budgets permit. In most cases tactical teams report they are either testing new equipment, expecting new equipment or budgeting for new equipment.

Halton, Niagara and Peel are equipped with a 'General Electric' radio system. The remainder of the forces have 'Motorola' equipment. Waterloo E.R.T. use a 'Midland' portable radio with their Motorola system. This portable can be re-programmed to work in conjunction with frequencies of other police forces. Guelph E.T.U. use a General Electric portable with their Motorola system. The remainder of the tactical unit portable radios are the same make as the force radio system.

All portable radios used by tactical teams have at least two operating channels. Brantford, Metro and York have two, Belleville and Kingston have three, Guelph and O.P.P. have four, Durham, Peel, Waterloo and Windsor have six and Niagara has eight.

All tactical team portable radios, with the exception of Brantford, have access to the Ontario Police Commission common channel. Brantford's mobile radios give them access to the OPC common channel when required.

When tactical teams are deployed in response to a high risk situation, in all cases, there is a channel dedicated to their use. Metro and Niagara have a channel dedicated to their use whether deployed tactically or not.

Each tactical officer is issued either a head set or ear mike. A head set includes a boom mike and speakers. The push-to-talk button is located either on the radio or on a remote switch placed where the officer can access it easily. An ear mike is a voice activated microphone and speaker, combined and located in the ear. A single strand wire connects this apparatus to the radio.

Force	Radio System	Portable System	No. of Channels	OPC Common	Separate Tactical Channels	Head Set	Ear Mike
Belleville City Police Emergency Response Team	Motorola	Motorola	3	Yes	During Response	-	Yes
Brantford City Police Emergency Response Team	Motorola	Motorola	2	Not on Portables	During Response	-	Yes
Durham Regional Police Tactical Support Unit	Motorola	Motorola	5	Yes	During Response	Yes	-
Guelph Police Force Emergency Tactical Unit	Motorola	General Electric	4	Yes	During Response	-	Yes
Halton Regional Police Tactical Rescue Unit	General Electric	General Electric	5	Yes	During Response	Yes	-
Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Emergency Response Unit	Motorola	Motorola	6	Yes	During Response	-	Yes
Kingston City Police Emergency Response Unit	Motorola	Motorola	3	Yes	During Response	Yes	-
Metropolitan Toronto Police Emergency Task Force	Motorola	Motorola	2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Force	Radio System	Portable System	No. of Channels	OPC Common	Separate Tactical Channels	Head Set	Ear Mike
Niagara Regional Police Emergency Task Unit	General Electric	General Electric	8	Yes	Yes	-	Yes
Ontario Provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Unit	Motorola	Motorola	4	Yes	During Response	Yes	-
Ottawa City Police Tactical Team	Motorola	Motorola	6	Yes	During Response	-	Yes
Peel Regional Police Tactical & Response Unit	General Electric	General Electric	5	Yes	During Response	Yes	-
Waterloo Regional Police Emergency Response Unit	Motorola	Midland	5	Yes	During Response	Yes	-
Windsor City Police Emergency Services Unit	Motorola	Motorola	5	Yes	During Response	-	Yes
York Regional Police Emergency Response Unit	Motorola	Motorola	2	Yes	During Operation	Yes	-

COMMENTS

Communication technology is a major financial cost. Police management for the most part is seen to be committed to providing the latest technology available, within budgetary limitations. Police forces cannot be expected to change their communication equipment with every technological advance.

As has been said before communications is the lifeline of tactical units. This includes both technological and personal communication. Tactical officers must know the limitations of their equipment and operate within its boundaries.

Tactical officers have stated that the common problem with portable radios is the range in which reception continues to be reliable. There are a number of factors affecting transmitted messages including:

- building mass
- atmospheric conditions
- battery strength
- antenna condition

One of the most important factors affecting portable radio communications is the use of 'high band' or 'low band' frequencies.

Low band frequencies are used extensively by commercial and non-commercial users, which creates congestion in those airwaves.

High band frequencies provide users with a more reliable, less congested medium, but this frequency is more costly due to the sophistication of the technology.

The O.P.P. are faced with obstacles and costs unique to a Provincial Police force. Compounding their responsibilities are:

- a jurisdiction that is 412,582 square miles;

- the need for their communication equipment to be compatible with policing jurisdictions in each of their seventeen districts;

- the proportionate cost of up-dating equipment compared to other police forces;

- the complexity of government action involving massive funding may be seen as a delaying factor to implementation. Municipal organizations are able to make these decisions more quickly due to the simplicity of their structure and absence of opposition parties.

At present the O.P.P. have the necessary funds committed and implementation is occurring based on a fixed timetable.

It is the opinion of tactical officers and experts that the following will improve the reliability of tactical communications.

1. The use of 5 watt high band portable radios by all tactical officers.
2. A channel dedicated for use by tactical officers during tactical response.
3. Sufficient portable radios for all tactical officers involved in an occurrence.
4. Portable radios for the incident commander and other appropriate personnel.
6. A communications officer stationed at the command post to monitor radio and telephone messages and ensure all relevant communications are received by the incident commander.
7. All communications in the command post recorded.
8. Tactical training to include sessions on the proper use of the portable radio, antenna placement and avoidance of interference, and equipment maintenance.

VEHICLES

Each tactical team in the province maintains a tactical operations vehicle for equipment and personnel transportation. Most of the team equipment is kept in the vehicles reducing response time. These vehicles are fully marked with force colours and logos.

Brantford, Durham, Hamilton-Wentworth and Peel each have a 'retired' armoured car re-conditioned with extra protection against bullet penetration. These vehicles are available for equipment and personnel transportation and also for rescuing injured or trapped persons.

Both the armoured car and tactical vehicle are equipped with departmental mobile radios.

Metro, Durham, Guelph, Halton, Brantford and York are equipped with mobile command posts. Ottawa has a large step van that doubles as a command post and tactical vehicle. Mobile command posts are designed to accommodate the incident commander and other emergency personnel required during tactical response. The vehicles are equipped with mobile radios, static and cellular phones and other amenities required for prolonged occurrences. Brantford and Guelph share their mobile home command posts with other emergency response organizations in their respective cities.

Brantford has outfitted their command post with the necessary equipment to video tape an occurrence.

Metro has three sizes of mobile command posts. A full mobile trailer for major incidents such as large strikes, a smaller version for normal tactical response, and small trailers kept at precincts for other occurrences.

COMMENTS

Although there are a variety of vans and trucks used as tactical operations vehicles, they are all sufficient to transport personnel and equipment in times of crisis. These vehicles are easily identifiable as police vehicles, as they are painted and bearing decals similar to the regular force fleet. They are equipped with regular force mobile radios which ensures contact while in transit.

It is our opinion that police management has fulfilled its obligations in this area.

Those emergency response units that have an armoured car as part of their unit enhance the possibility of safe evacuation of persons trapped or injured by gunfire.

These vehicles have been acquired at a very low cost and even with the added cost of reinforcing plate and police markings, are viewed by tactical experts as a tremendous benefit. The Sarnia Police Force has entered into an agreement with "Brinks" to have Brinks provide an armoured car if required by the police. The call-out system, for this vehicle, has been tested during mock exercises and has worked satisfactorily.

It is our opinion that tactical units, without the services of an armoured car, investigate setting up an agreement similar to that of the Sarnia Police Force.

A command post is essential for co-ordinated professional response to crisis situations. Incident command personnel must give their full attention to events occurring and reducing distractions and inconveniences is important. Tactical units and incident commanders setting up a command post in apartment buildings or houses or offices are faced with the added burden of trying to ensure that all communication links are possible and reliable. Without a mobile command post there may be no choice as to the location of incident commands.

The benefits of a mobile command post are:

- the capability of changing locations should the situation dictate such a move;
- the capability of positioning the command post at the most advantageous location. If positioned at the outer perimeter, all personnel will have easy access to amenities provided by the command post;
- continuous reliable communication using regular force mobile radio;
- continuous monitoring of tactical movement through the tactical channel;
- telephones, both fixed and cellular;
- all amenities such as a washroom and fridge, available for prolonged occurrences;
- drawing boards and maps at hand for quick reference.

The prohibitive cost of a mobile command post can be offset by similar means used by Guelph and Brantford. In each case they share their mobile command post - in cost and use - with other emergency organizations in their respective cities. Funds for a mobile command post are more readily available when several agencies are served by its acquisition.

It is our opinion, shared by tactical officers that a mobile command post offers many benefits and is a necessity at major crisis situations. Also, a mobile command post operator, trained in the technical aspects necessary in running a command post, should be part of tactical response.

MACE

"Chemical Mace" is a brand name for a sensory irritant aerosol weapon. This product contains a number of chemicals, including chloroacetophenone (tear gas), which are expelled as a stream rather than a cloud as in other tear gas products. The concentration of chemicals at a localized point is intended to cause severe skin irritation and temporary incapacitation. Flushing the contacted area with water is the most effective decontamination treatment.

An aerosol dispenser produced by Smith & Wesson has an effective range of between six and twelve feet. The manufacturer recommends firing one second bursts at the face of the subject until the user is satisfied there has been a direct hit. The chemicals will begin to affect the subject within three to five seconds. Without first aid, the effects of the chemical will last from fifteen to thirty minutes. The manufacturer also suggests, that if the desired incapacitation does not occur, conventional methods of restraint should then be applied. Mace will not always stop individuals whose feelings of pain have been reduced by drugs, alcohol or mental disturbances.

Chemical Mace has been used in Nova Scotia by the Dartmouth Police Department since 1983. Thirteen incident reports, over a four year period, have been provided by the Dartmouth police. In reviewing those reports, the following data was extracted:

a) six occurrences involved weapons. A knife four times, a beer bottle once, and a pool cue once;

b) the effects of mace began immediately with four individuals, however, one individual was not visibly affected for 2 1/2 minutes;

c) six individuals were totally incapacitated, while six were partially incapacitated.

COMMENTS

Chemical Mace use by police officers requires a more in-depth study than what has been undertaken in this report.

From the information gathered, there would be extremely limited application of this weapon in the majority of calls responded to by tactical officers. We agree with tactical officers that the use of non-lethal force against the threat of lethal force poses a danger to the officer that may exceed what is reasonable.

UTILIZATION OF TACTICAL UNITS

Deployment of tactical officers varies between organizations. As reported in the section on type of units, non-tactical and non-training time are devoted to general police duties. Whether plain clothes or uniformed, tactical officers spend the majority of their working time on regular police functions. The time spent on regular duties varies in accordance with the time spent on training, fitness and tactical response.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police E.T.F. officers spend approximately sixty percent (60%) of their time on regular enforcement duties. The Metro force has the largest time commitment to ongoing training and is also the busiest in tactical response.

The Ontario Provincial Police have a significant initial training commitment which exceeds all other forces. Ongoing training of one day a week plus fitness time allows these officers to do general police duties about seventy percent (70%) of their working time.

Similar situations (70%) exist in Peel Region and York Region. Officers in Waterloo, Ottawa, Hamilton-Wentworth and Durham Region are cleared for regular duties about eighty-five percent (85%) of their working time. These forces have a commitment to training which meets the suggested minimum standard of two days a month.

Tactical officers in Halton Region and the City of Kingston are free for regular duties approximately ninety percent (90%) of their employed time. Training commitment may need to be reviewed.

The tactical units in Belleville, Brantford, Guelph and Niagara Region devote one day per month to training so their tactical officers are free for approximately ninety-five percent (95%) of their time for regular police functions. The commitment to training needs to be reviewed in these forces.

TYPE AND NUMBER OF CALLS

Police forces have clearly documented procedures to activate or call-out tactical response. Three basic types of incidents are universally identified as being appropriate for tactical response.

- Hostage incidents
- Barricaded armed persons
- Confirmed calls involving firearms

In addition to the foregoing calls, units are called upon for high risk arrests, searches for evidence or involving risk of violence, surveillance details and security assignments. The disparity in the number of calls for tactical response requires comparative comment on each unit.

The Belleville Emergency Response Unit has been used only six times in the last five years. The calls involved dangerous armed persons, and in one incident an armed suspect, who fired shots, and was shot and wounded by E.R.U. officers. No calls involved high risk searches or hostage situations.

The Brantford City Police Emergency Response Team has been used eight times in the last five years. All calls involved some form of dangerous armed person situation, including one hostage incident.

The Kingston Police Emergency Response Unit has attended six calls involving barricaded, armed persons. The unit also has been used for several surveillance details and court security.

The Guelph City Police Emergency Task Unit approximates Brantford in unit size and population served. Thirteen dangerous person calls and four searches were conducted by Guelph E.T.U. over a ten year period.

The Ottawa Police Tactical Team has responded to calls forty-two (42) times in the last seven years. Fully half of these calls involved security assignments.

The Niagara Regional Police Emergency Task Unit has responded to seventy-seven (77) calls over the last ten year period. Calls are appropriately relevant to the stated purpose; dangerous persons, high risk arrests and searches, and two hostage situations. The present calls for tactical support average about one a month.

The foregoing units provide statistical evidence of infrequent use. The reasons for infrequent use of tactical response must be reviewed to ensure that organizational objectives are being met. Our discussions and observations regarding infrequent use of tactical support include the following reasons:

- small population base;
- police force size;
- lack of in-force education on tactical support;

- lack of confidence in tactical response;
- discriminatory use of tactical response;
- lack of quick response;
- time consuming call-out procedure;
- a reluctance on the part of officers to call for assistance.

While infrequent use of tactical support is not necessarily bad, there is concern that officers are taking unnecessary risks in situations that are clearly identifiable as requiring tactical support.

The **Durham Regional Police Tactical Support Unit** has attended thirty-five (35) calls involving dangerous situations in the four years following inception of the unit. This level of usage is consistent with forces of similar size and population base.

The **Halton Regional Police Force Tactical Rescue Unit** has responded to fifty-seven (57) high risk situations in the last five years and also handled twenty-five (25) security details.

The **Waterloo Regional Police Emergency Response Unit** has handled forty-eight (48) high risk calls in the last five years and is rarely used in surveillance or security details.

The **Windsor City Police Emergency Services Unit** has handled seventy (70) high risk calls and fifteen (15) surveillance details in the last five years.

The **Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Force Emergency Response Unit** has responded to one hundred and fourteen (114) high risk incidents including two hostage situations. In addition the E.R.U. has assisted at ninety-three (93) high risk searches and handled one hundred and forty-four (144) security assignments. Hamilton-Wentworth E.R.U. by its number of calls reflects the readiness of regular force personnel to call for tactical support.

The Hamilton-Wentworth Unit is used significantly more than comparable units in Halton, Durham, Ottawa and Waterloo even though all are part time units and suggest support for similar incidents. Influences on use listed previously apply here as well as to those other units.

It may be argued also, that full time units are more readily called upon than those who are part time. Even considering population and force size, full time units are relied on more frequently for tactical support. The fact that officers are not withdrawn from regular duties may be instrumental. Full time units also are seen by regular force members as having a primary role of support in crisis situations rather than being taken away from their primary role.

The York Regional Police Emergency Response Unit has responded to two hundred and nine (209) high risk situations to lend tactical response. The majority of these calls are partial response at the initial stages of an occurrence which is often sufficient support for safe resolution of an incident.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Force is capable of full response within twenty minutes. An emergency task force, eight man, special weapons team is always available. Partial response is also provided and many occurrences are safely resolved with support of one or two tactically trained officers. Toronto E.T.F. in the last five years has responded to eight hundred and eighty-eight (888) high risk situations and handled in excess of nine hundred (900) security details.

The Peel Regional Police Force Tactical and Rescue Unit uses full time members to provide partial response at initial stages on weapons calls. Even though this results in many "unfounded" calls due to checks on reports of "gunshots heard" it also enhances the safety of officers on general duties. Peel T.R.U. has responded to seven hundred and forty-seven (747) high risk situations in the last five years. Many of these responses were partial support by two tactically trained officers.

The Ontario Provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Units are employed in different circumstances than other units in the province though the types of incidents identified as T.R.U. calls are identical to those of other units. In practice, there seems now (since October 1988) to be a limitation beyond that of other organizations caused by an executive level screening policy. (see call-out procedure).

Conditions which affect T.R.U. call-outs are unique from other units in several ways. The three units serve a population of over two million and also provide municipal force assistance. This has resulted in two hundred and one (201) calls to dangerous situations, one hundred and forty-five (145) supports of high risk searches and ninety-two (92) other searches for evidence or persons. These statistics of the last five years are supplemented by three hundred and twenty-one (321) security details and indicate a high level of confidence accorded to T.R.U. by many Ontario Police Forces and detachments of the O.P.P.

The unique conditions which complicate T.R.U. response create difficulties which have been instrumental in several tragedies.

COMMUNICATIONS

Jurisdictional considerations involve several difficulties. Communications technology has been incompatible between the municipality in which an incident occurs and the Provincial Police communication channels. Even the O.P.P. internal communication technology has been unsatisfactory in some rural incidents.

COMMAND CONFUSION

Jurisdictional confusion in incident command can occur where officers from different police forces are employed in co-operative or overlapping roles. Human communications must be practically failsafe to ensure that vital information will be properly channelled.

LOCAL CONDITIONS

Local conditions and geography are not always known to T.R.U. acting outside its own jurisdiction, this includes intelligence on persons as well as physical topography. Ongoing communication with local enforcement officers may offset this concern.

TIME DISTANCE

Time delay is caused by the fact of having to conduct a telephone round-up of members and travel time. It would be beneficial to implement criteria which allow for the quickest possible decisions on T.R.U. deployment.

UNIT	BARRICADED OR DANGEROUS PERSON CALLS	HIGH RISK ARREST	HOSTAGE INCIDENTS	HIGH RISK SEARCHES	SECURITY	UNFOUNDED AND MISC
O.P.P. T.R.U. 87-88	137	37	27	145 92 other	321	78 Misc
Belleville E.R.T. 82-88	4	2				
Brantford E.R.U. 85-88	5	1	1	1		
Durham T.S.U. 85-88	23	7	2	3	5	5 Surv
Guelph E.T.U. 77-88	10	3		4		
Halton T.R.U. 84-88	10	16	4	27	25	
Ham.-Went. E.R.U. 84-88	99	13	2	93	144	30 Misc
Kingston E.R.U. 81-88	6					
Metro Tor. E.T.F. 84-88	554	118	22	191	900	58 U/F
Niagara E.T.U. 77-88	41	14	2	13	3	
Ottawa O.T.T. 82-88	6	3	4	5	21	3 Misc
Peel T.R.U. 84-88	582	87	4	74		210 U/F 50 Surv
Waterloo E.R.U. 84-88	26		1	21		1 Surv 2 U/F
Windsor E.S.U. 84-88	10	22	1	37		15 Surv
York E.R.U. 84-88	172	9	5	23		
TOTALS	1,685	332	75	637 92 Other	1,419	111 Misc 71 Surv

COMMENTS

In reviewing the statistics of the various units it becomes clear that there are four main categories of calls attended.

- Barricaded armed persons
- Dangerous persons with firearms
- Hostage situations
- High risk arrests

In addition to these calls, ten of the fifteen tactical units in Ontario support a significant number of high risk searches and eight units are involved in security details.

The general use of tactical support seems relevant and proper. In some forces security assignments should be reviewed, in particular court and prisoner security done by part time tactical officers. These assignments may be using tactical support for routine tasks. If tactical officers are readily available for this function the concern is redundant. Airline security assignments done by the Metropolitan Toronto Emergency Task Force, may be a waste of personnel resources or a risky token of security against terrorist activity. The assigned personnel are not equipped to handle terrorist activity and would likely be the first victims in a terrorist action.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have the only full anti-terrorist capability and fortunately have seldom been called upon.

The original impetus for tactical units was to some degree, world terrorism. Canadian citizens are among the world's most tolerant on political, sectarian and racial issues and this is reflected in the infrequency of terrorist acts. Most of those acts which have been committed are by foreign nationals about issues which are non-Canadian in origin. R.C.M.P. preparedness and continued harmony in Canadian society should allow Ontario tactical units to continue their commitment to safe resolve of more insular crises.

CALL-OUT (ACTIVATION) PROCEDURES

All units in the province have clearly documented procedures on how to activate tactical response. Guidelines are generally less clear on when to call-out tactical support. This is evidenced by the statistics (chart, page 6) outlining disparity in the number of calls.

The authority to call-out tactical support in nine units of fifteen is vested in the duty officer. This is generally an officer of inspector rank acting on advice of a front line supervisor. In some cases it will be the station officer who may be a staff sergeant. This policy accomplishes reasonably quick decisions by placing authority in the most senior officer immediately available. This officer activates call-out of members not on duty and dispatch of those who are.

In the city of Windsor and the regions of Halton, Peel and York, tactical support may be activated on the authority of a front line supervisor confirming the request of a first officer at the scene of an incident. This increases the quickness of response and shortens the communications chain thus reducing opportunity for error. The front line supervisor also has a more intimate appreciation of the circumstances because he is at the scene speaking directly to first officers or even initial tactical officers who respond. In the region of Peel, two tactical officers often respond initially to "weapons calls".

In Metropolitan Toronto, authority to activate special weapons teams for partial or full response is given to the constable on patrol. In certain situations the radio dispatcher will initiate emergency task force response. Only fifty-eight (58) such calls were judged unfounded in the last five years. Generally front line supervisors confirm the request for tactical support while personnel are enroute.

The Ontario Provincial Police, before October 1988 gave authority to district commanders to call-out T.R.U. response. District commanders held this authority for the first decade of T.R.U. existence. This system caused some delay especially when two jurisdictions or district areas were involved. This high level of authority may be justified because of the expense of call-outs, the overlapping of jurisdictions and the need to act from a central authority in the district.

The present policy requires district commanders or their designates to obtain authorization from the deputy commissioner of field operations or his designated chief superintendent. These executive officers of the O.P.P. work at General Headquarters in Toronto.

The Coroner's jury in the death of Bernard Bastien recommends keeping the authority for T.R.U. deployment vested in General Headquarters Executives in Toronto.

We have uncovered no evidence to suggest a need for changing the level of authority to the Deputy Commissioner level. No inappropriate call-outs or rejections are cited. Rationale for distrusting the judgment of district commanders to follow force policy seems not to exist.

In May, 1986 Deputy Commissioner R. S. Rose cautioned that overtime and expenses should not have a bearing on whether to activate T.R.U. "Tactics and Rescue Units are strategically located throughout the province and are to be used when required."

Section 802.1 of Police Orders clearly includes hostage incidents and armed/barricaded suspects in the criteria for calling on tactical support.

T.R.U. Staff Sergeants and their unit members are unanimously opposed to the present call-out policy and agree with the reasons cited. In addition several district superintendents and inspectors who were contacted agree that the level of call-out authority is misplaced in Toronto and should be under local control.

Further, in 1986 the concern was expressed that there was "limited use of units". In this memorandum May 22, 1986 Deputy Commissioner R.S. Rose drew district superintendents attention to Part 10 of Police Orders, Section 802.1 which lists situations for T.R.U. call-out.

Once the circumstances are confirmed by officers at an incident it would appear that policy should dictate the action necessary. There seems now to be an added consideration for T.R.U. deployment.

EXAMPLE

On October 18, 1988 at about 9:30 a.m. Harold Christopher Madill seriously assaulted his estranged wife Lynn Madill. The incident took place at their home at Lot 117, Carney Street, R. R. #5, Owen Sound.

Harold Madill took a 12 gauge shotgun from a closet after assaulting Lynn Madill. Lynn Madill attempted to flee and in doing so was shot by Harold Madill. She fled from the house naked from the waist down and wounded in the left wrist and shoulder.

Police arrived shortly after the occurrence and sealed off the residence. There is thick bush immediately behind the residence.

Superintendent M. Peer was requested by Staff Sergeant J. Tiley to arrange for T.R.U. attendance. A return message from

Superintendent M. Peer was that T.R.U. would not attend because the call was "not a serious enough occurrence". Staff Sergeant J. Tiley officially expressed concern over this occurrence and the danger to which his officers were exposed.

Deputy Commissioner P. J. Campbell in response to the Superintendent M. Peer of No. 6 District states that the difficult decision to be made by his designee Chief Superintendent M. K. McMaster was, "compounded by recent T.R.U. team events".

Chief Superintendent M. K. McMaster (now Deputy Commissioner) communicated that he felt the Owen Sound situation was a containment situation which detachment personnel could handle.

EXAMPLE

On December 22, 1988 at 10:17 p.m. one James Edward Wilkes was contained in his residence at 195 Harvey Street, Chatham. He was known to be armed with a shotgun and rifles and in an irrational and suicidal frame of mind. There were no hostages in the residence. Mrs. Shirley Wilkes had reportedly been threatened with an axe.

Police had concern for the safety of Mrs. Wilkes and her children and there was some indication that James Edward Wilkes was suspicious and enraged at one John Snowdown of 147 Harvey Street for having what Wilkes believed to be, an affair with Shirley Wilkes.

The foregoing circumstances led police to set up containment and to attempt negotiation.

Inspector Charles Turner of Number One District O.P.P. was contacted to request the Ontario Provincial Police Tactical Response Unit. Inspector Turner acted in accordance with the policy of authorization at the Deputy Commissioner Field Operations level. Deputy Commissioner's designate Chief Superintendent Robert Faulhafer was contacted. Faulhafer denied permission to activate T.R.U. because there were no hostages and it appeared to be a waiting game situation.

This information was relayed to the Chatham Police Force.

The Chatham Force used a number of negotiators including relatives. Wilkes' brother, Ronald Wilkes invaded the containment by driving into the driveway at 195 Harvey Street. He was successfully evacuated. At 9:47 a.m. on December 23, 1988

James Edward Wilkes was arrested outside his residence.

Even though this twelve hour ordeal was successfully concluded certain facts have been pointed out by concerned officers.

- The occurrence suited the criteria demanded by policy, for activating tactical response.
- Containment as set up by the Chatham Force allowed at least one person to enter the danger zone. It appears also that police officers may have been unnecessarily exposed during containment.

For the following reasons we would suggest a review of O.P.P. call-out authority of T.R.U. response:

1. A decision making chain of command that extends further, causes delay in response.
2. Communications are complicated by increasing the levels of communication.
3. District commanders, inspectors and other experienced personnel are not credited for their professional judgment.
4. Knowledge of local personnel and conditions, improves decision making. Isolation and distance, weakens the ability to judge.
5. Headquarters personnel may be inclined to consider public image over policy.
6. Field commanders are generally more conversant with operational issues than executive officers who are primarily administrative.

COMMENT

In policing, the most critical decisions in the organization are made by the front line officers. While management provides guiding policy and support it can not implement or initiate high speed pursuit, arrests, searches or use of force. The policy requiring executive officers to make decisions on tactical deployment is an example of police executives making field decisions. When administrative executives authorize T.R.U. deployment they immediately lose control to the incident commander, thus the authority which is taken from the field officer must be immediately returned if T.R.U. is deployed.

The function of policy should be to establish guidelines or criteria for decision making. Once these criteria are clearly met the decision making process should be free of subjective considerations and become a duty rather than a judgment call.

INCIDENT COMMAND

A wide range of authority or rank structure for calling-out tactical response does not exist in incident command. Command positions are generally taken by duty officers who, in most cases, will be inspector rank. In the Ontario Provincial Police incident command is generally taken by the district commander (superintendent) or in his absence one of his command staff.

Incident commanders usually are at a command post location at the outer perimeter of an incident. The command post is the central control location where operational decisions are made.

The number of people at the command post depends on the scope of the occurrence. In all cases a tactical unit leader must be present at the command post to maintain a communication link and consultation with the incident commander. The link between the tactical unit and outside intelligence must be maintained. The communications link between the tactical unit and the incident commander must be maintained.

Incident commanders utilize other resources as well as tactical response and are responsible for the co-ordination of all operations. The commander needs a group of advisors representing various functions. This group will vary according to the scope of an incident and may include the following:

- scribe: A recorder of events in chronological order;
- outer perimeter or field operations commander: responsible for traffic, crowd control and perimeter security;
- communications control centre representative: responsible for communication channels;
- investigative representative;
- intelligence representative;

- negotiators.

Other personnel may include media relations, technicians, other agencies and services and persons deemed necessary as command advisors.

Tactical units are directed by the tactical unit representative at command post. The tactical unit representative/supervisor acts on orders of the incident commander.

The leader of the tactical officers at the inner perimeter receives direction from the tactical supervisor at command post and he is the link between tactical activity and the command post.

An illustration of such a communication through the command post occurs when a surrender is negotiated.

- The negotiator or his back-up or recorder advises command post about readiness to surrender.
- The command post communications control person advises the incident commander.
- Incident commander advises the tactical support representative of the intent to surrender.
- Tactical representative passes message to tactical leader (and unit).
- Tactical leader gives instruction on how surrender is to take place, i.e. in five minutes come out the front door with hands on your head, etc.
- Incident commander advised of instruction by tactical representative.
- Instruction relayed to negotiator.
- Agreement to instruction would travel the same communications route.

Similar information channels need to take place for all activity impacting on an incident. All those who may be affected by any action should be notified of its occurrence. All actions need to have the approval and consideration of the incident commander.

COMMENT

Incident commanders, tactical units and negotiators form the most integral components in emergency response involving barricaded or armed persons or hostage incidents. Persons trained in incident command infrequently use their training. Most forces conduct an annual exercise involving all personnel. We would suggest integrated training sessions between commanders, negotiators and tactical units take place at least once every two months.

Debriefing of incidents should be documented and resulting information communicated within the force. Often, lessons are learned regarding errors in approach, parking, cover position or other actions. These lessons should be part of "officer awareness" messages throughout the force. It is our experience that incident debriefing sessions are often beneficial only to the participants when wider benefit is available.

Communications have been called the lifeline of emergency and tactical response. The human side of communications is as vulnerable as any technology. Instructions which are critical to an operation must come from one source and be fed back or tested for understanding whenever possible. Once an operation is begun decision making needs direct channels of communication through which orders are passed and information fed back. Many concerns overlap so that it becomes imperative to have a single commander in control. This will prevent conflict between traffic control and evacuators, negotiators and tacticians, intelligence officers and investigators; and any other personnel or courses of action which present integrated concerns.

Group leaders for tactics, investigations, traffic or other concerns must direct only their own personnel and on the orders or approval of the incident commander. It will not do for instance to have a traffic sergeant instruct the tactical team to shift its perimeter.

TACTICAL RESPONSES

Containment is the first step in tactical response. It is the process of confining a threat to a particular area with specified limits. These limits are generally called the perimeter. The smallest area to which containment is possible is called the "inner perimeter". This danger zone is frozen by strategically placed officers who thus effect "containment".

An outer perimeter is generally established. This provides an area of safety beyond the inner perimeter and is usually set up by regular officers who man strategic positions to maintain this safety zone. The outer perimeter is important to the safety of the public, relatives and others who may have a motive to approach the vicinity of an incident.

Establishing control of a threatening situation is crucial to preventing expansion of a hostage or dangerous incident. The actual deployment of tactical officers effecting containment will vary with circumstances such as location, building type, incident type and personnel available.

While containment allows time for planning, organization and negotiation, it is the suspect's decision on whether containment will continue. Any holding action becomes a confrontation when a barricaded armed person so decides. For this reason containment officers must be equipped and prepared to deal with a suspect who attempts to leave the inner perimeter whether armed or not.

In the cases of non-response from a contained dwelling, containment at some point in time must cease and the dwelling checked or cleared. This is generally true in cases involving suicidal persons. In some cases suicidal persons rely on confrontation to effect suicide. These extremely dangerous situations make house-clearing a task for tactically trained officers.

Tactical response uses various levels of force as dictated by the suspects activity and circumstances. Minor variations exist in methods of response but levels of response are consistent.

- Containment is passive, and intended to freeze or hold a situation.

- Negotiation establishes verbal communication with an objective of accommodation or surrender.

- Tear gas may be used after negotiations break down or no response can be raised. Tear gas is intended to force surrender without injury.

- Countersniper action is an extreme measure which is justifiable only to protect lives. It may be used without exposing officers to a suspect's fire.

- Tactical assault is the most violent and risky use of force to be considered. This last resort tactical response is used only when all other options have failed or the situation is so volatile that no other option exists.

COMMENT

Incident command and communication present two of the most critical components of tactical response, yet these components are not trained to any meaningful extent. It is incumbent on police management and authorities to effect sufficient training to provide strength and cohesiveness at all levels of emergency response.

ALTERNATIVES TO TACTICAL RESPONSE

Tactical Response Units require major capital funding and ongoing commitment to training and personnel.

In discussion with police executives and tactical unit supervisors, considerations for instituting tactical support were seen to include:

- population size
- size of police force
- location or isolation of police force
- funding available
- availability of Ontario provincial Police T.R.U.
- non-tactical deployment of unit personnel
- level of training commitment
- types of duties handled in tactical response

In weighing all these factors, organizations will also consider the need or desire to be self-sufficient and the manner in which personnel safety may be reconciled.

Selected reviews on alternatives to tactical response will be reported here. These alternatives generally have limitations. It is our intent to make objective observations rather than negative comment. The goal of this segment is to share alternate solutions and ideas for evaluation.

The **London City Police Force** has three hundred and forty-six (346) sworn personnel which serves a population of over 225,000. The London Police Force deals with its own dangerous incidents by using officers who have had some training in "heavy weapons".

The London Force trains all its field supervisors and twenty-five (25) patrol officers in the use of shotguns. Several supervisors are trained to use rifles. The training consists of use and familiarity with shotguns and rifles. Classroom lectures and discussion is conducted on containment of dangerous situations. Training is held twice a year for one day. Supervisors and trained negotiators also conduct a training exercise.

The equipment used by the trained officers consists of eight (8) shotguns, two (2) .223 calibre rifles and a .22 calibre rifle. Regular bullet proof vests may be supplemented by larger bullet proof vests.

The force relies on the trained officers to implement containment of dangerous incidents. In situations where buildings need to be searched for a threat, the assistance of canine unit and/or tear gas is used.

The London Police Force is committed to maintaining a, "contain and negotiate", response to incidents. It does, however, rely on the containment officers, to enter and clear buildings or to deal with confrontation and hostage situations. The officers chosen for this support are first class constables with five years experience who volunteer for this assignment.

The Nepean Police Force has one hundred and thirty (130) sworn personnel and maintains a containment team of seventeen (17) officers. These officers receive two weeks of initial training from the Ontario provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Unit personnel. Ongoing training consist of seven (7) days annually including an exercise involving role play. Members are allowed one hour weekly for physical fitness.

The Nepean force has two containment team members on each of eight platoons. One investigator and a staff sergeant complete the membership.

Equipment for these officers includes shotguns and rifles. A "step van" serves to carry equipment. Tactical blue clothing and camouflage (where needed) is worn by the containment team. Special boots and rain gear have also been acquired and a protective "body shield" is on order.

The containment team is used for hostage or barricaded situations with emphasis on containing the danger and negotiating a resolution. Full tactical support is summoned for escalating or ongoing situations.

The Ontario Provincial Police T.R.U. is called as per policy even though the Ottawa Tactical Team is available much more quickly than Belleville T.R.U.

The Nepean Police administration recognizes that containment teams may operate in a tactical mode if a suspect refuses to be contained or a situation becomes violent. The Nepean force is content to maintain its present level of response.

The Orillia Police Force has thirty-eight (38) sworn officers and has a special weapons team of six (6) officers headed by a training sergeant. This unit is primarily a containment team whose objective is to contain and negotiate safe resolution to a dangerous incident. The unit has been called the Orillia Special Weapons and Tactical Team and has responded to "one or two calls a year".

Training has been received from the O.P.P. and at the Ontario Police College. Ongoing training consists of two - four hour sessions per month.

In Sarnia the city police have enlisted the resources of municipal and private interests to adequately plan for emergencies. The Brinks company has agreed to make a vehicle available for rescue purposes. Officers have been trained in its operation. The Sarnia Works Department has agreed to supply heavy equipment where needed and has trained some officers in heavy equipment operation. A "Command Bus" is available as a command post.

The Sarnia Containment and Arrest Team, C.A.T., consists of fourteen (14) officers. Training was conducted for these officers by a force specialist in unarmed self defence and two officers who have attended a street survival seminar of two days. In addition, a force inspector who has taken a hostage commanders course has instructed C.A.T. members. No scheduled or ongoing training is in place for the C.A.T.

In-service training on the Sarnia Police Force provides regular patrol officers with the basics of hostage incident or barricaded person response.

At an incident, C.A.T. members are equipped with shotguns and have two sniper rifles. Two heavy body armour vests are available to supplement regular vests. The Sarnia command will call on the Provincial Police T.R.U. for those incidents which can not be resolved or which escalate in violence. Sarnia officers are trained to effect the arrest of persons who surrender. They work in concert with force negotiators.

The Sarnia Police Force has ninety-one (91) sworn officers. With amalgamation of Clearwater the population base will rise to about 71,000 and Clearwater Police officers will join the Sarnia Force. The Sarnia organization is content to maintain the present level of response.

In Sault Ste. Marie, the force is in a planning stage and hoping to implement a containment team of sixteen (16) officers or four from each platoon. The force has a mobile command post and some special weapons. Plans for training, selection and further equipment are not yet complete. The Sault Ste. Marie Force of one hundred and twenty-seven (127) sworn personnel serves a population of about 83,000. The Sault Ste. Marie Force would have full tactical response if budget permitted.

The Sudbury Regional Police Force has two hundred and twenty-six (226) sworn officers. The force is planning to implement a five (5) man containment team as a full time unit to effect the first level of tactical response. The members would be deployed generally as a plain clothes unit. The Sudbury Force will resume its planning and organization when it has access to the public inquiry information.

Equipment presently available for emergency response includes a semi-automatic rifle, a sniper rifle, and tear gas. The Sudbury Regional Police would have a full tactical unit if budget permitted.

The Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Force has seventy-four (74) sworn officers and serves a population of 35,000. Several sergeants in the force have been trained in tactical response. Some in-service training is conducted in emergency response. Tear gas, rifles and shotguns and available. In crisis situations the Haldimand-Norfolk Force relies on the Ontario Provincial Police T.R.U. for tactical support.

The Peterborough Police Force has one hundred and four (104) sworn personnel and calls on the Ontario Provincial Police T.R.U. for tactical support. Peterborough does have some officers who have received supplementary training in rifles, shotguns and use of tear gas. The force has this equipment plus some heavy duty body armour to protect officers.

About eight (8) officers have had three (3) training sessions in special weapons and basic tactics. No ongoing training is scheduled for these officers.

The Cornwall City Police relies on the Ontario Provincial Police T.R.U. for tactical support. The force of eighty (80) officers serves 47,000 people. Negotiators and incident commanders have been trained for crisis situations. Containment training is not conducted and officers are expected to take normal safety precautions. The Cornwall force is committed to controlling dangerous situations until tactical support is available.

The Cornwall Force does have tear gas, rifles and shotguns available. If budget considerations allowed, the Cornwall Police Force would implement a tactical unit.

The Thunder Bay Police Force of one hundred and ninety-six (196) officers serves 113,000 population. A number of officers have been tactically trained by the Ontario Provincial Police. These officers handle tear gas, rifles and shotguns in crisis situations. The Thunder Bay Force has no intention at this time to implement a tactical unit. Present response, negotiators and commanders have successfully concluded dangerous occurrences.

Small police forces of twenty-seven (27) or fewer sworn personnel rely generally on the Ontario Provincial Police for tactical response. Our survey indicated that of eighty-six (86) such forces surveyed, fifty-one (51) did not provide extra training to members to deal with emergency response. The thirty-five (35) forces who provide supplementary training generally have several persons trained in use of shotgun and tear gas and some senior persons as negotiators or incident commanders.

Some exceptions exist in our survey and several respondents have a larger force size.

Timmins Police has provided some supplementary training to selected personnel, the force of seventy-one (71) officers has received some selective training in emergency response.

The Woodstock Force with forty-two (42) officers has no training in emergency response. The force calls on O.P.P. assistance only in extreme cases.

The Chatham Police Force of sixty-seven (67) officers has provided some specialized training to deal with emergency response. Chatham calls on the O.P.P. Tactics and Rescue Unit for tactical support.

The Brockville Force of thirty-eight (38) has provided some training for emergency response. The force has handled its own dangerous incident occurrences to this point in time.

The Barrie Police Force of eighty (80) officers relies on O.P.P. tactical support and has provided selected force members with selective emergency response training.

The Niagara Parks Police rely on the Niagara Regional Police Emergency Task Unit for tactical support.

The Bradford Police Force relies on resolving its own dangerous incidents. They have provided some special training to selected force members.

The Stratford Police Force has forty-one (41) sworn officers and handles its own emergency response. No special training for emergency response is provided to patrol officers.

The St. Clair Beach and Anderdon Township Police call on the Windsor Emergency Service Unit or Provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Unit for tactical support.

In summary, there can be seen to be four levels of preparedness for incidents involving armed, barricaded persons or hostage taking.

- Tactical response units are the highest level of support for dangerous incidents.

  Tactical response units are equipped and trained to deal with hostage incidents, barricaded armed persons and weapons calls. Where necessary tactical teams will take rescue or assault action.

  In addition tactical units are trained to:

  - assist in high risk arrests;
  - assist in high risk searches;
  - effect entry and clearing of premises;
  - escort dangerous prisoners;
  - conduct security.

- Containment teams, are organized in some respects similar to tactical units but not trained beyond a "contain and negotiate" level.

  Containment teams if properly equipped and trained are able to:

  - establish a perimeter to isolate an incident;
  - contain an incident until surrender is made or negotiated.

  Containment teams may be challenged by an isolated/contained subject. At this time action to maintain a perimeter becomes necessary.

  In the event of a "no response" situation containment teams may be asked to search or clear a premises to determine there is no threat.

Clearing and confrontation, force containment teams to take on an active role beyond their containment intention.

Containment teams should not take on tactical duties such as assault or counter-sniper action. Other duties not trained in containment include high risk searches, arrests and security assignments.

- Response by selective personnel is practised in police forces which have provided training to selected officers in the use of shotguns, rifles and tear gas. These forces generally have senior officers who have been trained as negotiators or incident commanders.

  These officers are generally not equipped or trained to set up containment.

  Proper training and equipment should be provided for tactical action of any kind. Officers who are trained only in safe operation of a shotgun can not be considered a containment team. In these situations public and officer safety are primary concerns. Department policy and officer action must be within the capabilities of the training and equipment provided.

- Response by general duty personnel relies on regular training as being sufficient to deal with situations. These organizations also may enlist tactical response by calling on the Provincial Police T.R.U. or other local force which will provide tactical support.

  Those organizations who call on no special equipment or training must limit emergency response to the capability of general duty personnel. Police forces of a small number of officers should be adequately trained in officer safety concerns with supplementary training on basic emergency response. Tactical units from larger forces should be called upon for support in appropriate situations.

The decision on which level of preparedness will be supported is unique to each organization. Municipal Police Authorities and their police executives have both the authority and responsibility to implement appropriate emergency response in their community.

The variables set out in the opening comments on "Alternatives" need to be examined to determine the appropriate level of response.

Concerns which have been expressed to us prompt a suggestion which we believe to be soundly based. The level of emergency response which is supported by an organization should also be the level of expectation. Where training is to a containment level, officers should not be expected to conduct building assaults. Those who have tactical units need to make a commitment to training and equipment that prepares members for tactical maneuvers.

In Volume III major incidents and police shootings are reviewed along with use of firearms information.

The Canadian experience, fortunately, does not offer the wealth of lethal statistics generated by our American cousins. It is possible, in Ontario, to have no specially trained response to dangerous incidents and to argue statistically that you are as effective as other municipalities in the Province. It may also be argued that crimes of violence are increasing, the use of firearms is more prevalent and the overall Canadian condition is becoming less passive and more apt to violent demonstration.

REGULATION 790

under the Police Act

EQUIPMENT

1. This Regulation applies to police forces established under the Act. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 790, s. 1.

2. In this Regulation,

(*a*) "board" means a board of commissioners of police;

(*b*) "chief of police" includes an acting chief of police;

(*c*) "committee of council" means a committee composed of the head or acting head of council and two other members thereof appointed by council;

(*d*) "firearm" means a firearm as defined in section 82 of the *Criminal Code* (Canada). R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 790, s. 2.

FIREARM

3.—(1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), where the Commissioner or chief of police carries a firearm or authorizes any member of a police force under his control or administration to carry a firearm, the firearm issued and carried shall be a .38 special calibre all-steel double action revolver, with a minimum barrel length of four inches, a safety hammer block and a swingout cylinder, and having a minimum weight of thirty ounces and a single action trigger pressure of not less than three and not more than five pounds, but the Commissioner or chief of police may authorize any policewoman on the force under his control or administration to carry a revolver of the same specifications except that the minimum weight shall be twenty-three ounces and the minimum barrel length shall be three inches.

(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), the ammunition supplied for and used in a firearm prescribed in subsection (1) shall be factory loaded and shall have a solid bullet of lead alloy of semi-wadcutter configuration with a muzzle velocity not exceeding 1,000 feet per second when fired in a revolver with a four-inch barrel.

(3) The Commissioner or chief of police or any other constable or police officer designated for the purpose by the Commissioner or chief of police, may authorize a member of a police force under his control to carry, for a special purpose, a firearm of a type other than that prescribed in subsection (1).

(4) Where on the 15th day of October, 1975 the members of a police force were carrying firearms of a type other than that prescribed by subsection (1), the Commission may, on such terms and conditions and for such period of time as it considers proper, authorize the continued carrying of such type of firearm. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 790, s. 3.

4. Before a firearm is issued to a member of a police force, the Commissioner or chief of police, as the case may be, shall satisfy himself that the member has received instruction and is competent in its use, and where there is no chief of police, the board or committee of council, as the case may be, shall so satisfy itself. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 790, s. 4.

5.—(1) A member of a police force shall carry his revolver in the holster issued to the member by the police force.

(2) The holster issued to a member of a police force shall be either,

(*a*) of a type that is covered by a full flap; or

(*b*) of a type that has been approved by the Commission for use by the members of the police force following an application by the board or, where there is no board, the committee of council.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to a holster that is worn concealed under clothing. O. Reg. 816/82, s. 1.

5a.—(1) No member of a police force shall alter or modify a firearm issued to the member, except as permitted under subsection (2).

(2) The Commissioner or chief of police or a member of the police force authorized by the Commissioner or chief of police may in writing permit an alteration or modification of a firearm issued to a member of the police force, except,

(*a*) an alteration or modification that would interfere with the safe and proper use of the firearm or of the holster in which it is carried; or

(*b*) the addition of a grip adapter, or of a trigger shoe or other device attached to the trigger. O. Reg. 364/84, s. 1.

6. No member of a police force shall draw or display his revolver, except when it is necessary to do so in the performance of his duty. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 790, s. 6.

7. No member of a police force shall threaten or attempt to intimidate any person by means of a firearm, except when necessary in the performance of the member's duty. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 790, s. 7.

8. No member of a police force shall draw a revolver except if the member believes, on reasonable and probable grounds, that to do so is necessary,

(a) for the protection of the life of a person; or

(b) for the apprehension or detention of a person who may cause death or grievous bodily harm to another person. O. Reg. 173/88, s. 1.

9.—

(1) No member of a police force shall discharge a firearm in the performance of duty except if the member believes, on reasonable and probable grounds, that to do so is necessary,

(a) for the defence of the life of a person;

(b) for the apprehension, when other means are insufficient, of a person who may cause death or grievous bodily harm to another person;

(c) to destroy an animal that is potentially dangerous or so badly injured that humanity dictates that its suffering be ended, or

(d) to give an alarm or call for assistance in a critical situation where there is no reasonable alternative. O. Reg. 173/88, s. 2.

9a.—(1) Unless otherwise directed by the board or committee of council, as the case may be, the chief of police or a superior officer, a member of a police force who is accompanying and supervising an auxiliary member of the police force may issue a firearm to the auxiliary member if the member believes, on reasonable and probable grounds, that they are entering into a situation in which it is necessary that the auxiliary member be armed,

(a) for the defence of the life of a person; or

(b) to assist in the apprehension, when other means are insufficient, of a person who may cause death or grievous bodily harm to another person.

(2) Sections 4 to 9, 10 and 11 apply to every auxiliary member to whom a firearm is issued under subsection (1). O. Reg. 173/88, s. 3.

10. Where a member of a police force, other than the Commissioner or chief of police, unintentionally or intentionally, except on a target range or in the course of ordinary weapon maintenance, discharges his firearm, the Commissioner or chief of police, as the case may be, shall immediately cause an investigation to be made into the circumstances. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 790, s. 10.

11.—(1) Where a member of a police force, other than the Commissioner or chief of police, by the discharge of a firearm in the performance of his duty, kills or injures another person, the Commissioner or chief of police, as the case may be, shall immediately cause an investigation to be made into the circumstances.

(2) The Commissioner shall submit a report of any investigation made by him under subsection (1) to the Commission and the chief of police shall submit a report on any investigation made by him to the board or, where there is no board, with the committee of council.

(3) The Commission or the board or committee of council, on receiving a report of the Commissioner or the chief of police, as the case may be, under subsection (2) shall, as soon as practicable, review the report and make such further inquiries as it considers necessary or expedient.

(4) The board or committee of council shall file with the Commission any report submitted to it by the chief of police under subsection (2), together with a report of any additional inquiries undertaken.

(5) Where the Commissioner discharges his firearm in the performance of his duty, he shall forthwith report the matter to the Commission, who shall inquire into the circumstances.

(6) Where a chief of police discharges his firearm in the performance of his duty, he shall forthwith report the matter to the board or committee of council, as the case may be, and the board or committee shall inquire into the circumstances and file a report of such inquiry with the Commission.

(7) The Commission shall inform the Solicitor General of the contents of any report filed with it under subsection (2), (4), (5) or (6) and, on his request, submit to him a copy of such report for whatever action he considers necessary. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 790, s. 11.

GAS AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

12.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), no member of a police force shall use any gas or chemical weapon.

(2) The use of the substance commonly known as tear gas is permitted, provided it is not applied intentionally in concentrated form directly to the person. R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 790, s. 12.

MOTOR VEHICLES

13. No member of a police force shall use a subcompact motor vehicle for the purpose of general police patrol. O. Reg. 336/81, s. 1.

Section 25 C.C.

25. (1) Every one who is required or authorized by law to do anything in the administration or enforcement of the law

- *(a) as a private person,*
- *(b) as a peace officer or public officer,*
- *(c) in aid of a peace officer or public officer, or*
- *(d) by virtue of his office,*

is, if he acts on reasonable grounds, justified in doing what he is required or authorized to do and in using as much force as is necessary for that purpose.

(2) Where a person is required or authorized by law to execute a process or to carry out a sentence, that person or any person who assists him if, if that person acts in good faith, justified in executing the process or in carrying out the sentence notwithstanding that the process or sentence is defective or that it was issued or imposed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), a person is not justified for the purposes of subsection (1) in using force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm unless he believes on reasonable and probable grounds that it is necessary for the purpose of preserving himself or any one under his protection from death or grievous bodily harm.

(4) A peace officer who is proceeding lawfully to arrest, with or without warrant, any person for an offence for which that person may be arrested without warrant, and every one lawfully assisting the peace officer, is justified, if the person to be arrested takes flight to avoid arrest, in using as much force as is necessary to prevent the escape by flight, unless the escape can be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner, R.S.,c.C-34,s.25.

Section 27 C.C.

27. Every one is justified in using as much force as is reasonably necessary

(a) to prevent the commission of an offence

(i) for which, if it were committed, the person who committed it might be arrested without warrant, and

(ii) that would be likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the person or property of anyone; or

(b) to prevent anything being done that, on reasonable grounds, he believes would, if it were done, be an offence mentioned in paragraph (a). R.S.,c.C-34,s.27.

Section 26 C.C.

26. Every one who is authorized by law to use force is criminally responsible for any excess thereof according to the nature and quality of the act that constitutes the excess. R.S.,c.C-34,s.26.

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We acknowledge the many documents provided by Tactical Units which reflect their units' policies and training. Papers from workshops and seminars have also contributed to our understanding of the issues involved in Tactical Units and their duties.

APPENDIX - C (III)

INQUIRY

INTO

ONTARIO POLICE TACTICAL UNITS

VOLUME III

Submitted to The Ontario Police Commission

Ontario

Ministry of the
Solicitor
General

APRIL 1989

INTRODUCTION

Any tactical response is an awesome responsibility and each level of force used must receive the utmost consideration.

The courage to use the necessary force must be tempered with a commitment to use the least force possible for safe resolution of dangerous incidents.

The nature and degree of tactical responses are dictated by the persons who are the cause of deploying tactical support. In the same way as a driver who flees police has primary responsibility for a high speed pursuit, a person who barricades himself with firearms and threatens lives has primary responsibility and control over the level of force used against him.

In our review of tactical support incidents we have found no evidence of use of force which is disproportionate to the threat presented. A total of just over two thousand occurrences in the last five years involved dangerous or barricaded persons (1,685) high risk arrests (332) and hostage incidents (75). In addition a total of 637 high risk raids or searches were conducted with tactical support. It is the opinion of Ontario's tactical officers that their support saves lives. In personal reviews of over one thousand occurrence reports involving tactical support we agree that tactical response is a life saving support system that benefits the public, the police and even those who choose to be the focus of tactical response.

Even though tactical response in Ontario can be seen as safety oriented, tragedies have happened in which human error played a part.

Logic indicates that a greater number of firearms in society means an increase in the number of people hurt or killed by firearms. Those who are employed to control this inexorable phenomenon must be expected to be part of the tragic consequences. The mission of attaining the safest possible resolution is the responsibility of all those in the chain of command from police constable to the highest level of government.

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BERNARD BASTIEN - INCIDENT REVIEW

On Saturday, August 13, 1988, Robert Clifford Jarriett age 19 was at his residence on Pike Road in Malden Township. In communication with relatives, Robert Jarriett said that he had taken a quantity of drugs and that he was armed with a shotgun. Evidence indicated this subject was suicidal and potentially violent to others.

The foregoing information was relayed to police officers from the Amherstburg Police Force and the Ontario Provincial Police. At 9:15 p.m. four officers were in the area of the Jarriett residence. Robert Jarriett, aware of police presence nearby escaped from his residence, undetected and armed with a 12 gauge pump action shotgun and a bandoleer of ammunition.

Subsequently police efforts were concentrated on containing the Jarriett residence until the arrival of tactical support.

The Ontario Provincial Police, Tactics and Rescue Unit was called to the Pike Road residence and Inspector Tom McKenna of 1 District took incident command. At 12:12 a.m. on August 14, 1988 T.R.U. officers reported to Inspector McKenna and subsequently relieved officers at the Jarriett residence on Pike Road. Attempts to contact Robert Jarriett were made until shortly after 4:00 a.m. when information was received that he was at the residence of a friend, one Sherry Harper, on the 6th Concession of Anderdon Township.

At 4:18 a.m. command post was advised that Robert Jarriett was believed to be at the Harper residence in Anderdon Township.

At this change of venue some critical deviations from policy take place or continue to take place. Detective Sergeant Matthews and Staff Sergeant Wade Lacroix would under normal circumstances direct subordinates from the command post and keep the incident commander fully informed. While there may have been reason to attend Pike Road, a change of plans should have involved planning at the command post before action in Anderdon Township.

Between 4:18 a.m. and 4:36 a.m. Detective Sergeant Matthews had Staff Sergeant Lacroix and four T.R.U. members follow him to Anderdon Township and the Harper residence.

Before containment of the Harper residence was completed, negotiator Sergeant David Smith telephoned the Harper residence. After initially being misled it was established that Robert Jarriett was at the Harper residence at 4:46 a.m.

The call to the Harper residence could have waited until containment was set up. The risk of having Robert Jarriett at large exceeded the inconvenience presented by not confirming his presence in the area.

At this same time, 4:45 a.m., a marked Ontario Provincial Police cruiser with no roof lights and a tactical van arrived in front of the residence of Evelyn Bastien, one-half kilometre south of the Harper residence.

The activity of the negotiator Sergeant Smith, the investigator Detective Sergeant Matthews and the tactical leader Staff Sergeant Lacroix had not been coordinated through the incident commander, Inspector McKenna. The tactical van and cruiser location also were not relayed to the command post.

Constable Gary Williamson of the Anderdon Police Force was in communication with the O.P.P. and was asked to assist in blocking the 6th Concession at the town line north of the Harper residence.

Constable Williamson did not notify his dispatcher of his assignment nor the fact that the location had changed to the 6th Concession of Anderdon Township.

At this point in time, 4:45 a.m., the Anderdon Township dispatcher, the Essex O.P.P. communications operator and the incident commander had no clear understanding of the events on the 6th Concession.

The lack of communication to the Sandwich West Police dispatcher became critical when dispatcher Mr. Sutton could not properly advise Mrs. Deborah Bastien about the presence of O.P.P. Tactics and Rescue Unit.

When Sergeant Smith learned of Robert Jarriett's presence at the Harper residence this information was relayed on the O.P.P. car to car channel. The communications link to T.R.U. officers was through the tactical van and Staff Sergeant Lacroix's vehicle. The Lacroix vehicle communication system was reported to be malfunctioning so that it would not receive T.R.U. channel messages.

At 4:59 a.m. Robert Jarriett left the south side of the Harper residence and was seen by Constable Swain who was containing the residence with Constables Toivenen, Fleming and Lewis.

Robert Jarriett was seen for only a few seconds. Constable Swain attempted to advise fellow T.R.U. officers of the sighting but his message could not be received.

The poor reception may be attributed to one or more reasons but is not known. The reasons include:

- low battery;
- atmospheric condition;
- buildings and other physical interference;
- antenna location and maintenance.

Sergeant Smith was on the telephone with Sherry Harper and received intelligence that Robert Jarriett would be "in a bush" and that if "cops come near there's gonna be trouble". This information did not reach tactical officers at this time. Tactical officers were not available on car to car channel and the tactical channel was not operated at the command post.

The malfunctioning radio of Constable Swain did not allow for immediate communication pinpointing Robert Jarriett's location. Thus, the focus of officers making preparations in front of the Bastien residence was not drawn toward the Harper residence as it should have been.

Subsequent (within several minutes) sighting of a man armed with a shotgun led naturally, but tragically, to the conclusion that Robert Jarriett was implementing his plan for confrontation. The focus of tactical officers was now on Bernard Bastien with the firm belief that this person was Robert Jarriett. The intensity of the situation would prevent anything but the clearest message from establishing a case of mistaken identity. This is true of the police officers as well as Bernard Bastien. The evidence of police presence did not penetrate Bastien's single minded commitment to protect his family. The tragic irony is that the clear evidence required was available to both Bastien and the police but its transmission was lost through technological and human shortcomings.

The confrontation with Bernard Bastien began at 5:05 a.m. Bernard Bastien was concerned for the wellbeing of his mother who lived next door. He took a loaded shotgun and went outside. Deborah Bastien called the Sandwich West Township Police Dispatcher Dave Sutton to ask for assistance. Mr. Sutton was unable to inform Mrs. Bastien that the "prowlers" were very likely police officers deployed in the area. Mr. Sutton had not been informed of the move of T.R.U. activity to the 6th Concession of Anderdon Township. Mr. Sutton pursued information by calling O.P.P. Essex at 4:38 a.m. Communications Operator Wendy Bolger had not been informed of the situation change and sc could not update Mr. Sutton.

At 5:07 a.m. Constable Williamson was alerted to the fact that Mr. Bastien, with a gun, was outside to chase off some prowlers. The dispatcher also relayed that Mrs. Bastien mentioned that the "prowlers" said they were police officers. This information was immediately passed to Detective Sergeant Matthews. The information was not relayed to tactical officers. We must wonder what would have been done with this information if it had been received and shared in the more detached atmosphere of a command post.

At 5:09 a.m. Sherry Harper informed Sergeant Smith that Robert Jarriett was at the Harper residence. This information conflicted with the belief of what was occurring at the Bastien residence.

Incident Commander, Inspector Tom McKenna was then unable to contact either Detective Sergeant Matthews or Staff Sergeant Wade Lacroix. Staff Sergeant Adams was sent to Matthews location and to have T.R.U. secure (contain) the Harper residence. At this time, (4:48 a.m.) Matthews reported to the command post that the Harper residence had been located and was being contained. He advised that other homes in the area would need to be vacated.

As this report was being made by Detective Sergeant Matthews, reports from negotiators and T.R.U. through Constable Wollison, indicated that Jarriett was outside.

Detective Sergeant Matthews returned to the 6th Concession at 5:02 a.m. when he received information at 5:07 a.m. that "a lady called about her husband with a gun, outside". He could not communicate with Lacroix and the team. This indicates that there was no link between Matthews and Lacroix and the information from Deborah Bastien did not reach tactical officers. Bernard Bastien was shot between 5:15 a.m. and 5:19 a.m. This is eight to twelve minutes after Deborah Bastien's second call identifying her husbands actions.

Bernard Bastien was continually being shouted to, to the effect that the men were police, put the gun down and the men used the name Bob. Flares fired to expose the police vehicles appeared only to confuse and bewilder Bernard Bastien. From the evidence of Denis Parent and Constable Fleming it appears that Bernard Bastien fired one shot from his shotgun and that this shot was followed by firing from officers, resulting in the death of Bernard Bastien. The total time of the armed standoff was from 15 to 19 minutes. Bernard Bastien moved from the front of his mothers house along the line of a trellis. This took him closer to Constable Fleming. When Bastien saw Fleming an exchange of gunfire took place. Some evidence of a speculative nature suggests that the police officer shot at the same time as Bernard Bastien. The Coroner's Jury correctly identifies this argument as a moot point in assessing the evidence.

The mental and physical state, and actions of Bernard Bastien should be examined only for the purpose of saving lives in the future. Bernard Bastien had spent until about 2:30 a.m. in an active role both socially and at work, starting on the morning of August 13, 1988. During the evening hours of August 13, 1988 Bernard Bastien consumed several bottles of beer. He was awakened after only two and one-half hours of sleep to receive distressing information about prowlers on his property. It is possible that the effects of lack of sleep and the previous days activity had some influence on the judgment of Bernard Bastien.

The armed response decided on by Bernard Bastien was founded in law but not in logic. A more prudent course of action would have been to telephone the senior Mrs. Bastien to check on her well being and then to call the police and maintain observation. We would suggest a public information campaign through Crime Prevention programs or community based policing on appropriate responses to suspicious activity or persons.

SUMMARY OF SUGGESTIONS

- Public education which discourages personal intervention while encouraging cooperation with police.
- Publicity on the role of tactical units including rationale for safety measures which may now be viewed as militaristic.
- Public education which demonstrates the safest possible response to outside threats.
- The role of incident commander be limited to designated senior officers trained in incident command and who receive continuous training integrated with tactical units. A minimum of one day every two months is suggested.
- Negotiators need similar training to that of incident commanders. Some suggest that designated negotiators be members of tactical units.
- Unit leaders such as investigative or tactical supervisors should remain at the command post unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.
- Incident commanders who move into contiguous jurisdictions must consider it a priority to notify the Chief of Police.

- Notify police telephone exchange personnel of incident status and location.
- Tactical operations centres (tactical vans) must be equipped with appropriate radio and telephone equipment.
- A well equipped mobile command post will improve communications and access to incident location.
- Cellular telephones should be standard equipment in tactical vans.
- Jurisdictional overlap requires excellent communications technology which has not been evident to this time.
- Jurisdictional overlap requires excellent organizational communication skills by key personnel. Training and planning will prevent some of the problems evident in the Bastien incident.

It is our profound belief however, that the review of this tragedy and other incidents will prompt sincere efforts to make police response in emergencies as safe as possible.

Errors in human communication were made here through persons concentrating on their own tasks. The need for current information most certainly exists at the telephone link to the citizenry. Despite this need, both Essex O.P.P. and Sandwich West dispatch were unable to inform Deborah Bastien about police activity near her property.

There is no purpose in placing blame on particular individuals. What is important now, is the resolve to improved communications in future emergencies. Where jurisdictions are contiguous or overlapping, all jurisdictions must be informed and kept up-to-date on events, and where possible, representatives of the various jurisdictions should be at the command post. In addition, all communication and information must lead to the incident commander and flow from the incident commander. A command post which is not properly staffed places at risk the communications which flow from it and which are received. The liaison or representative of the investigative process (in this case Matthews) and the tactical representative (in this case Lacroix) should endeavour to remain at the command post to channel information and offer consultation.

The Bernard Bastien, inquest jury, presented an incisive summary of the events. In assessing contributing factors the jury again demonstrated a fine ability to focus on vital issues. We would agree that T.R.U. choice of uniforms was a contributing factor to the perceptions of Deborah Bastien but not a contributing factor to the actions of Bernard Bastien. The officers did not expose themselves to Bernard Bastien because he was armed. We respectfully submit that camouflage is necessary in some situations while agreeing with the importance of establishing police identify with certainty and speed.

With respect to the recommendations, we wish to comment on these from the perspective of our investigation of tactical units in the province. We do not presume to gainsay the Bastien Inquest Jury about their deliberations. Our intent is merely to supplement the recommendations or to offer views based on independent considerations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Solicitor General and the O.P.P. continue to provide the operations of the Tactics and Rescue Unit by recognizing the necessity of such teams and realizing the ultimate goal is the preservation of human life.

   COMMENT

   We agree, and are pleased to report that the preservation of human life is the primary goal of Ontario's tactical response officers.

2. That the Solicitor General and Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police continue in effect the orders contained in the Police Commissions new order for the Tactics and Rescue Units 1988 (Schedule A attached).

   Continue the policy and criteria adopted since the order to deploy Tactics & Rescue Unit.

   COMMENT

   We respectfully disagree and will address the attached schedule separately.

3. The Ontario Tactical Advisory Body (OTAB) be made permanent. Holding regular meetings to exchange information and improve areas of training, training facilities and equipment.

COMMENT

The Ontario Tactical Advisory Body (O.T.A.B.) has had three meetings in the last year. Committees are active and discussion on common concerns have been facilitated at the Ontario Police College. A basic course of training for tactical officers has been designed and presented at the Ontario Police college. Funding will be a concern.

4. The O.P.P. and the Ministry of the Solicitor General make every effort to conduct an intensive public awareness campaign to educate the residents of Ontario to

    (i) The existence and functions of Tactical & Rescue Units

    (ii) The law respecting the possession, use and consequences of firearms in and around the home.

    (iii) A letter of request to the Attorney General of Canada to examine the need to create an offence of Handling Firearms While Impaired By Drugs Or Alcohol.

COMMENT

We agree and would encourage the participation of municipal police forces where appropriate.

5. One common name for all emergency and rescue teams for all municipal and provincial forces. (such as Emergency Response Team - E.R.T.)

COMMENT

We agree and would suggest either

Emergency Response Unit

or

Tactics and Rescue Unit

or

Emergency Response Team; this last name should be given consideration as being identified with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

6. All emergency response teams dress in a common tactical blue uniform for the safety of all officers and the public. Where the situation dictates and the life of the officer is in jeopardy a different uniform (eg winter white) maybe chosen jointly by the incident commander and the E.R.T. leader.

COMMENT

We agree, if the conditional provision for use of camouflage is available where necessary.

7. The word "POLICE" to be prominently visible on all uniforms when responding to a call. The incident commander and E.R.T. leader, where the safety of the officers involved clearly outweighs the need to identify the members to the suspect or the public at large, may order the word "POLICE" be covered.

COMMENT

Safety should be the main concern whether it involves identification or cover.

8. All emergency units be reorganized to include:

   (i) incident commander

   (ii) negotiator

   (iii) communications officer

   (iv) secondary communications officer

   (v) team leader

(vi) team members

and integrated training be provided as they would be expected to perform as a "TEAM".

COMMENT

We agree, except that those who are not tactical officers do not require as much training. Those expected to face physical danger and handle firearms require much more role practice.

9. A containment team should be formed in all districts (except London, Belleville and Barrie). These teams should consist of officers performing regular duties but having successfully completed the selection process for the T.R.U. (E.R.T.) training course. They would provide quicker response time, knowledge of the area, back-up E.R.T. on their arrival.

COMMENT

The motivation and rationale for this recommendation are safety oriented. Limitations of funding for training and equipment are a concern. Containment teams may also be forced into tactical response by persons who challenge containment or who commit violence to hostages.

10. Every effort should be made to station a local officer at the command post to provide basic knowledge of the area and people.

COMMENT

We agree and would add that area "packages" should be available to assist command officers, packages would include directories, maps, emergency numbers and any pertinent information identified in the interest of emergency response.

11. The Ontario Police College be directed to offer courses for all police officers in Ontario on the subjects of:

    (i) The operations, capabilities and the responsibilities of the E.R.T.

    (ii) Recognizing stress in themselves and others and the importance of reporting or responding to stress.

    (iii) A basic negotiators course for all police officers.

COMMENT

Part (i) is subject to funding and availability of time on appropriate courses. This may not be applicable to all Ontario forces and may be better covered in in-service training by local tactical officers.

Part (ii) is given limited attention on some courses of training.

Part (iii) is now being provided for selected officers by the Canadian Police College, Ottawa.

12. All police forces in the Province be required to have the capability to transmit and receive on the Ontario Police Commission common channel, as also requested by previous inquest juries.

COMMENT

We agree.

13. That immediately, a radio with the E.R.T. frequency be kept as part of the incident commanders kit for monitoring the E.R.T. communications.

COMMENT

We agree.

14. The O.P.P. acquire and implement mobile command posts (1 for each team).

Each unit should contain:

- (i) Full communication equipment (radio, all channels same as T.O.C.).
- (ii) Cellular phone, phone accesses and phones for negotiating.
- (iii) Space for negotiator and other supporting members.
- (iv) Work space for incident commander.
- (v) Work space for E.R.T. leader.

COMMENT

We agree and suggest this is a priority. Designated operators should be trained in the operation of mobile command posts.

15. That all communications to/from the T.O.C. be taped on voice activated recorders.

COMMENT

We agree this would assist in debriefing or follow up investigation.

16. All response team vehicles such as mobile command post (if any), T.O.C. van, equipment van, team leaders van be painted in the same colours in a manner designed to be highly visible. Including the word "POLICE" prominently displayed.

COMMENT

We agree with this recommendation.

17. Each E.R.T., for containment purposes, be assigned two (2) third generation night scopes.

COMMENT

We agree.

The thirteen point statement attached to the jury recommendations is an Ontario Provincial Police policy implemented in response to the Bastien incident. With no disrespect intended, we will comment on each statement from the perspective of our tactical inquiry.

1. A T.R.U. team may be deployed to an occurrence with potential for violence only with the approval of the Provincial Commander, Field Operations or his designee. A District Commander wishing to deploy a T.R.U. team to such an occurrence, either on behalf of the O.P.P. or a municipal force, shall seek approval through the normal chain of command.

COMMENT

We disagree, based on discussions with tactical officers, comparison with other tactical units, and history. This issue is discussed under utilization in Volume II, where further reasons for disagreement are outlined.

2. The Provincial Commander, Field Operations or his designee, upon receiving a request to activate a T.R.U. team, shall consult with the District Commander to ensure the appropriateness of the use of the T.R.U. team.

COMMENT

See 1.

3. A District Commander who receives a request for a T.R.U. team shall carefully consider the necessity of the T.R.U. team and ensure that no other reasonable alternative exists before proceeding with the approval process.

COMMENT

Call out should be based on the facts and circumstances as they exist. If the facts fall within the policy guidelines tactical support should be activated.

4. A commissioned officer of the District Command staff shall always accompany the T.R.U. team on major occurrences and act as the Incident Commander.

COMMENT

This statement is acceptable in our view except that it allows for no alternatives to the designated assignment by using the words "shall always". "Major occurrence" should be defined as clearly as possible.

5. The Incident Commander will ensure that the T.R.U. team understands that he is responsible for all aspects of the occurrence.

COMMENT

We agree, notwithstanding that all police officers involved share the responsibility.

6. The T.R.U. team leader shall remain with the Incident Commander throughout the occurrence unless directed otherwise by the Incident Commander.

COMMENT

We agree.

7. The T.R.U. team shall only act on the direction of the Incident Commander.

COMMENT

This statement is too absolute unless it is intended as a general comment and not as a restrictive measure for specific manoeuvres.

8. In determining the tactics, wearing apparel, and armament to be used by a T.R.U. team, safety of the public, other police officers, and the team members will be the primary consideration.

COMMENT

We agree.

9. The Incident Commander shall be aware of and discuss the appropriateness of the armament the T.R.U. team members propose to use in the occurrence.

COMMENT

This seems to be a matter for training and not part of a crisis decision making process. Further, the incident commander should not get too detailed about examining tactical facets. Personnel should be given credit for being able to perform their assigned roles. If this is not possible then the selection of personnel is a concern.

10. The disruptive pattern camouflage uniforms previously used by the T.R.U. team members shall be taken out of use immediately.

COMMENT

If tactical officers are expected to deploy in rural areas and effect stealth approach, this policy puts officers in increased danger. If this policy is implemented it will be the duty of management to instruct officers not to cross open terrain, regardless of the need to protect hostages or citizens.

11. The Incident Commander shall be aware of and discuss the appropriateness of the uniform the T.R.U. team members propose to wear in the occurrence, bearing in mind that, as is possible, maximum force identity is desirable.

COMMENT

This is an acceptable statement although safety concerns would appear to take priority over force identity.

12. The Incident Commander shall ensure that every effort is made to provide communication systems appropriate to the occurrence. Careful consideration must be given to the impact of inadequate communication on a proposed course of action.

COMMENT

We agree and commend the implied commitment to provide superior communication.

13. These guidelines are not intended to impact on the deployment of T.R.U. team personnel to routine police work, which under some circumstances would be completed by non-T.R.U. team personnel, i.e., routine prisoner escorts.

COMMENT

This statement needs to be clarified. The deployment of tactical officers in routine police work is not contentious. Clear statements on involvement in high risk arrests, raids, searches and surveillance must be made if policy differentiates between emergency situations and planned support.

JACK ROSS - DANIEL BELANGER - INCIDENT REVIEW

On October 7, 1984 a Mr. Grandpre was kidnapped in Montreal and his car was hijacked. Two suspects forced Mr. Grandpre to accompany them to the Woodstock area where he was released. It was learned that the suspects Denis Colic and Daniel Belanger were wanted for the murder of a police officer and citizen in Montreal.

Subsequently the Grandpre vehicle was located and the Woodstock Police Force learned of the whereabouts of Denis Colic and Daniel Belanger.

Because this serious matter first came to the attention of the Ontario provincial Police Detective Inspector L. Okmanas was sent to the Woodstock detachment to take charge. A request for T.R.U. officers went out at about 6:30 p.m. Detective Sergeant B. Crane was sent as the representative of the district commander. Intelligence officers were also summoned to Woodstock O.P.P. detachment.

At 8:00 p.m. a briefing was arranged at the Woodstock O.P.P. office. The briefing included representatives of O.P.P. T.R.U., Woodstock City Police and O.P.P. detachment and intelligence officers.

About ten officers were present at the briefing including Corporal Ron Thompson and Constable Jack Ross. Reports of the briefing revealed that it lacked formality and organization. People were instructed in small groups and some came and went from the room. Inspector Murray Kellar of the Woodstock Police Force remembers instruction to Jack Ross and Ron Thompson to go to the house north of 486 Norwich Avenue and to alert the occupants and go with the occupants to a safe part of this residence.

While this instruction was explicit, no provision was made for the occupants north of 486 Norwich to be absent. This event left Corporal Thompson and Constable Ross with undefined assignments. In fairness to the incident command there is no indication of an attempt by these officers to clarify their roles.

Discussion on inner perimeter and danger zone were either absent or unclear. The debriefing concluded at 8:50 p.m. and officers were sent to their assignments.

When Constable Ross and Corporal Thompson found no one home at their assigned residence they took up observation of 486 Norwich. Tactical officers were still in the act of setting up containment. There is no indication why containment had not been completed by this time (about 10:15 p.m.)

At this time Daniel Belanger and a female left 486 Norwich Avenue and were confronted by Corporal Thompson and Constable Ross. The officers were in the act of questioning Daniel Belanger when he shot Constable Ross and knocked him down. Corporal Thompson was also shot and wounded. Corporal Thompson returned fire and was able to wound and then kill Daniel Belanger.

Constable Ross was rising up from having been struck in his bullet proof vest when Constable Dave Smith responded to the gunshots. He rounded the corner of 480 Norwich Avenue and saw Corporal Thompson pointing his gun at a figure which was rising up. Constable Smith shot the person he believed to be threatening the life of a fellow officer. Tragically this was Constable Ross.

In the events before this tragedy, communications problems played a part in compounding the situation. T.R.U. officers were on a separate radio channel from regular O.P.P. officers. Some officers were equipped with Woodstock City Police portables. The various systems complicated communication and prevented officers from knowing each others location.

In reviewing the tragedy of Jack Ross some problems were revealed which are similar to the Bastien tragedy. The briefing did not properly instruct officers on the role of T.R.U.

Incident command is a critical function which impacts directly on the success or failure of emergency response. In this incident the position of commander was not properly defined between Detective Sergeant Crane and Inspector Okmanas.

Planning containment and setting up containment took significant time and was not coordinated in time with evacuation efforts.

Communications in this occurrence presented the problem of separate channels and overlapping jurisdiction.

The lack of proper safety practices demonstrated by Constable Ross and Corporal Thompson were a factor in their being shot by Daniel Belanger.

The jury in this inquest made certain recommendations which are reproduced here with comments. Comments include viewpoints based on our overall investigation as well as observations on this occurrence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All members of police forces involved in an operation must attend a formal, joint briefing headed by appropriate expertise of each unit involved and ensure all instructions are clearly outlined. All members must be aware of the position of all officers involved in the operation. Changes in position must be communicated.

COMMENT

Clearly established, short lines of communication and authority, will allow for only one incident commander and one set of instructions which should be reviewed for understanding.

2. Duties assigned to officers assisting T.R.U. must clearly avoid encroachment of the inner perimeter.

COMMENT

This recommendation has been rigidly adhered to since the Constable Ross inquest.

3. All detachments should have one or more officers trained in T.R.U. Team practices.

COMMENT

This is consistent with the recommendation from Bastien, implementation of this 1984 recommendation consisted of one-time training on incident command for commissioned officers. We feel this training should be ongoing and that designated commanders train with T.R.U. a minimum of one day every two months.

4. "Personal safety courses" should be expanded and accelerated and include municipal forces. Such training should be mandatory.

COMMENT

Since 1984 "Officer Safety" instruction has been enhanced for recruits at the Ontario Police College. In-service Training has also been increased. Ontario police officers are generally knowledgeable on appropriate arrest procedures.

5. Consideration should be given to the mandatory wearing of body armour.

COMMENT

This is not yet a compulsory legislated requirement.

6. The best radio system is to be implemented as soon as possible, allowing all police officers to have direct communications at all times.

COMMENT

In this incident several officers did not have portable radios and were not in contact with command post at all times. The radio communication problem persisted through to the Bastien occurrence.

7. All T.R.U. team members and spares should have their own weapons "sighted" in and kept in the [tactical] van. The best possible equipment should be available to them.

COMMENT

T.R.U. officers and tactical officers generally are properly equipped with firearms.

8. Our children should be taught that a policeman is their friend; advertisement of police activities with children should be considered, to develop good public relations from an early age.

Public information is a positive exercise. The police community and citizens of the Woodstock area recognize the tragic loss for the family of Jack Ross. The hope now is for dedicated commitment to improved safety in emergencies. The lessons learned must endeavour to be worthy of the sacrifice that reviewing incidents brings to those who suffer the loss.

DREW THOR N. CARLSEN - INCIDENT REVIEW

On January 12, 1983 at 1:24 a.m. police were called to 54 Fairway Heights Drive in the town of Markham. Police officers learned that Michael Stoyan was being held hostage in his residence. Two young persons who had been inside the residence reported that, Thor Carlsen was in possession of a rifle and had fired shots in a dangerous manner. Thor Carlsen's motivation was indicated as being jealousy against Michael Stoyan with alcohol as a contributing factor.

At 1:48 a.m. Detective Sergeant Lowel McLenny arrived at the scene. The York Regional Police Emergency Response Unit had been authorized at 1:30 a.m. and were being activated. Extremely icy conditions were delaying response time for all vehicles. A Metropolitan Toronto Tactical Unit was close by and available to the York Regional Police. These emergency task force officers offered assistance and agreed to act as standby and to assist with perimeter security.

Officers were deployed around 54 Fairway Heights when Detective Sergeant McLenny restructured the security around 54 Fairway Heights to better protect the officers of the York Regional Force. Security of the premises was maintained until the arrival of tactical support. Citizens were protected from entering the danger zone and the subject was contained at 54 Fairway Heights. The residence presented some difficulty for containment. The large house with upper windows and a balcony backs on to a golf course and is in a residential neighbourhood. Extreme (icy) conditions and the random gunfire complicated the situation.

At 2:44 a.m. E.R.U. officers arrived and met with Detective Sergeant McLenny at 52 Fairway Heights while a plan for containment was being made Thor Carlsen fired at a vehicle leaving Fairway Heights Drive. During implementation of containment Thor Carlsen fired shots at Constable Fleming of the E.R.U. who was across the street from 54 Fairway Heights Drive.

At the time Thor Carlsen was firing from the balcony of 54 Fairway Heights Sergeant Kirk backed up by Constable Greig moved out from the south east corner of the house. Thor Carlsen walked toward these officers and was told to "drop it" by Sergeant Kirk. Despite a repeat of a demand to drop his weapon, Thor Carlsen raised his weapon toward the officer. At this time Sergeant Kirk shot and killed Thor Carlsen. Constable Greig fired a shot which did not strike Thor Carlsen.

Several questions arose at the inquest and issues were raised after the inquest was completed.

Why was the Metropolitan Toronto Emergency Task Force not used at the York Regional Police occurrence?

Police agencies often assist each other and this assistance extends to tactical support. Generally this assistance is a common effort of a pre-planned operation. Generally police organizations take responsibility for occurrences in their jurisdiction. In this case E.T.F. personnel were on standby in case the subject exited from 54 Fairway Heights Drive.

Problems for E.T.F. to take charge of the scene would include working with York officers who were on a separate communication system. There were insufficient E.T.F. officers present (two) to set up containment by themselves.

On arrival of York E.R.U. a change of containment officers would have complicated dealing with the situation.

E.T.F. officers were on standby and the area was secured if not contained.

Why did the York Regional Police "withdraw" containment?

Containment is the isolation of an incident within a manageable perimeter. In this case containment set up by regular officers was judged as unsafe by Detective Sergeant McLenny. This was founded in the fact that Thor Carlsen was discharging his firearm and acting irrationally. Regular force officers are not equipped or trained for close containment. Whether Detective Sergeant McLenny was correct or not is not relevant because the incident was isolated until the arrival of tactical support.

Containment strategy follows basic formations but is flexible according to the circumstances.

Containment is the passive control of a situation and generally allows for a stabilizing effect.

Why did no one begin negotiation with Thor Carlsen?

Negotiation is generally not begun until containment is completed. In this case the behaviour of Thor Carlsen and the lack of close quarters containment did not allow for negotiation efforts to begin. It was discovered the telephone had been ripped out during the hostage taking incident.

Why did Sergeant Kirk and Constable Greig confront Thor Carlsen?

In this case Sergeant Kirk was concerned about one of his officers being under fire. He stepped out from the house to check the balcony and found himself facing Thor Carlsen. Constable Greig was the back up officer for Sergeant Kirk.

In a barricaded person incident involving firearms the police will contain as long as the subject does not take aggressive action. Thor Carlsen continued to discharge his firearm at and in the direction of police and others.

In a hostage situation the safety or the hostage is a priority concern. The safety of the public and police are of equal concern. While a hostage taker is threatening the safety of others he places himself in a dangerous position.

In this case the subject's actions continued to be life threatening and confrontation was a means of ending this threat.

Confrontation puts pressure on the subject to act. If the subject replies with lethal force the police response requires incapacitation.

Confrontation makes a subject aware that continued action is futile and this evokes submission unless completely irrational action is taken. This includes confrontational suicide.

The life of the hostage is at risk as long as a hostage taker is in control. The number of shots fired (over 100) and the remaining ammunition (over 400 rounds) indicated continued hostility.

In reviewing the jury recommendations our perspective included a review of inquest documents, events since 1983 and a study of tactical units in the province.

Recommendation #1

> The jury recommends that an administrative body be established to formulate provincial wide policies, procedures and training for all emergency forces with reference to hostage taking and other emergency situations.
>
> The jury apparently felt that the policies, procedures and training of emergency response units of police departments was a complex matter and warranted further study by an administrative body. Such matters as the definition, degree

and timing of "containment", the speed of availability and the number and size of emergency response units, the possibility of having available a trained "negotiator", the methods of information gathering, the equipment which would be appropriate for use by such units, either communication equipment or special weapons or gas equipment, could all be the subject of further study.

Comment

Given the independence of police agencies this unified approach to tactical response is difficult. However, the aim of uniform standards and response is commendable. The Ontario Tactical Advisory Body is committed to achieving this objective as far as practicable.

Recommendation #2

The Jury recommends that emergency forces should not necessarily be governed by municipal boundaries.

This Recommendation was prompted by the fact that a van containing two policemen of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Emergency Task Force arrived on the scene before the York Regional Emergency Response Unit but were not asked to participate in the incident and had not obtained permission to do so. The degree of co-operation possible or desirable between forces of adjacent municipalities appears to be the subject of the Jury's concern.

Comment

It may be argued that police organizations take responsibility for their own jurisdiction as much as possible. Assistance is given to other agencies on request. In this case, communications difficulties, and the fact that York E.R.U. was enroute prompted a request for E.T.F. officers to stand by. They did so, and provided some outer perimeter security.

Recommendation #3

The jury recommends that a Professional Association of emergency forces be established. This Professional

Association will assist all emergency forces to exchange ideas and experiences.

It was suggested during the Inquest that if the emergency personnel of the various police forces had an Association of such specialized officers for the exchange of ideas and experiences could be exchanged to the mutual benefit of its members and of the public. The Jury adopted this suggestion and made it a Recommendation.

Comment

The Ontario Tactical Advisory Body was formed in 1986. In the last year O.T.A.B. has met three times. Committee work is directed at uniformity of action, training and equipment.

O.T.A.B. has no legal authority and as an advisory group does not presume to direct independent organizations or set regulatory standards.

Recommendation #4

The Jury recommends that there be a study of radio communications with specific reference to "dead areas".

Some police officers testified that their portable unit radios were not working properly that night. They explained that this sometimes happens in certain areas which they call "dead areas" in which signals are not received. Hence the Jury's Recommendation.

Comment

The York Regional Police Force has responded to this recommendation. Repeater towers were installed and their entire radio system was upgraded.

STEVEN GEORGE SCOTT - INCIDENT REVIEW

Steven George Scott, aged 29 years was assessed on psychiatric evidence as a "borderline personality - a character disorder in which persons have a propensity for developing close interpersonal relationships. If relationships are disrupted they become violent and impulsive and may become acutely suicidal". Steven Scott had been attempting a reconciliation of a relationship with a former girlfriend and on September 4, 1985 assaulted her in a violent argument.

Steven Scott returned to his Wingham residence and obtained a semi-automatic rifle and a shotgun with a pistol grip. Scott went to the home of his girlfriend at Eden Mills, shot two dogs, destroyed the house and began a night of shooting at police officers and civilians. He fled to Clifford, Ontario where he shot up his girlfriend's mother's house. He was finally confronted by the police and fatally shot.

Steven Scott was reported to be shooting on the street of Eden Mills, Ontario at 11:10 p.m. Three Ontario Provincial Police officers responded and were joined by two others at 11:51 p.m.

Steven Scott discharged numerous shots and twice struck a police cruiser. Scott, driving a 1973 Plymouth was able to drive to Clifford, Ontario where he eluded police, on foot. When located, Scott fired at another police vehicle and at 12:30 a.m. September 5, 1985 an exchange of gunfire took place on the street. Constable McCullough was struck with a bullet that pierced his shirt (not injured) and he fired one shot at Scott. The officer believed at that time his shot struck Scott. Scott then ran around on foot and shot at Constable Motum who fired two shots from a shotgun (and missed).

In the early morning hours of September 5, 1985 O.P.P. Tactics and Rescue officers sealed off the village of Clifford. School buses were cancelled and residents warned as much as possible.

At about 8:00 a.m. Scott was located at the residence of his girlfriend's mother (where he had fired shots). Containment of this residence was set up and negotiation begun. Scott responded to negotiations by exiting from the residence armed with a semi-automatic firearm known as an M16.

At 8:30 a.m. Scott was on the street and was told four times to drop his weapon. At this point he wheeled on Constable Deevy and raised his gun as if to shoot. Constable Deevy from a kneeling position at 60 feet, shot Steven George Scott in the chest with one shot from his MP5.

Scott was taken by ambulance to hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival at 8:51 a.m. September 5, 1985.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That federal and provincial gun laws be revised to restrict importation and manufacture of military weapons which can be procured for civilian use. This would include weapons which are designed to have no other use but to kill people, and semi-automatic weapons that are designed, intended or can be altered to fire automatically.

   COMMENT

   The intent of this recommendation is commendable. These are not weapons which should be available under the guise of sporting or recreational use.

2. Regulations covering the issuing of F.A.C. licenses be reviewed and more stringently applied to segregate persons who may have a tendency to mental disorders.

   COMMENT

   It may be readily agreed that police investigations on suitability to possess firearms could include mental stability.

3. The communication systems be upgraded within police forces to ensure that each officer can maintain communication with home base at all times.

   COMMENT

   Progress to this end continues.

4. Regulations covering the number of officers assigned to each vehicle, (particularly night patrol) should be more strictly enforced.

COMMENT

This matter is between police associations and governing authorities.

5. Standard equipment for each vehicle should include soft body armour for each officer.

COMMENT

It may be argued that every officer should wear soft body armour on duty.

6. Police should implement follow-up procedures to reassure individuals directly involved in stressful situations.

COMMENT

We agree.

7. The jury feels that the Ontario Provincial Police, all things taken into consideration, handled the incident in a most professional and capable manner.

COMMENT

We agree.

THOMAS MAXWELL POST - INCIDENT REVIEW

Thomas Maxwell Post, age 37, died on August 26, 1988 at 8:13 a.m. as a result of a gunshot wound to the chest. The shooting took place at the apartment shared by the deceased and Mrs. Fran Millard at 45 Baif Avenue, Apt. 308, Richmond Hill.

On August 25, 1988 Thomas Post argued with Mrs. Fran Millard while under the influence of alcohol and in a public bar. Shortly after 2:00 a.m. Post and Millard returned to their apartment and continued to argue. At 2:15 a.m. on August 26, 1988 the York Regional Police were called. In the ensuing hour this occurrence developed into a hostage situation with Post becoming more and more agitated, resulting in the call-out of tactical support. The York E.R.U. arrived at approximately 4:00 a.m. and set up containment of the situation. Negotiator, Detective Sergeant Colangelo made contact with Thomas Post after 4:30 a.m. and tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a peaceful resolution. By 7:30 a.m. Mr. Post's increased threats and agitation prompted E.R.U. to formulate a rescue plan. Mrs. Millard was contacted by telephone and advised of the rescue effort.

Entry was gained by breaking a glass door. Thomas Post was waving knives in both hands as Constable Rogers entered. Rogers discharged a tear gas gun at Thomas Post striking him on the chest with a blast dispersion and knocking him back a distance of three feet. The tear gas did not incapacitate Post as expected. He stabbed at, and wounded Constable Rogers. Rogers was able to push Thomas Post away. Post then moved toward Mrs. Millard with the knives raised as if to strike. Constable Rogers concluded that Mrs. Millard was in grave danger and fired a single shot at Mr. Post striking his left elbow, the bullet penetrated Post's chest cavity which led to the internal bleeding which caused his death. A second shot by Constable Boheim did not strike Mr. Post. Thomas Post fell to the floor and continued to struggle while being handcuffed. When placed in an ambulance Thomas Post began to lose consciousness, handcuffs were removed. At 8:13 a.m. Mr. Thomas Post died at the York Central Hospital.

The deceased Thomas Maxwell Post had a history of drug and alcohol abuse and a criminal record dating back fifteen years. His record included assaults and he was judged as having a personality disorder. In this case officers risked an attempt to subdue a violent person armed with knives, by using blast dispersion tear gas at close quarters. The limitation of this method on disturbed persons must be taken into account in any commitment to use non-lethal force against violent individuals who are armed with weapons of any kind.

The inquest jury in this case made a number of recommendations. Some are not specifically relevant to this inquiry but will be paraphrased here because of their general interest and indirect influence on tactical response.

Recommendation #1

Every effort be made to speed up legislation changes regarding drug abuse, particularly cocaine.

Comment

No comment.

Recommendation #2

No comment.

Comment

No comment.

Recommendation #3

Laws on spousal abuse should be changed to allow information sharing between agencies concerned.

Comment

No comment.

Recommendation #5

The CS canister of tear gas failed to incapacitate the violent Mr. Post. In this case cocaine abuse may have contributed to the failure of the CS gas. The recommendation is to share this information between tactical and law enforcement concerns.

Comment

The ineffectiveness of CS blast dispersion has been observed also for mentally disturbed persons. This is now known by tactical officers in Ontario through the Ontario Tactical Advisory Body.

Recommendation #6

The building of a crisis intervention centre in the York Regional area.

Comment

No comment.

Recommendation #7

Counselling should be available in the community for alcohol and drug abuse as well as spousal abuse.

Comment

No comment.

Recommendation #8

Recommend a feasibility study on a drug and alcohol abuse facility similar to those in Metropolitan Toronto known as Bellwood and Donwood.

Comment

No comment.

The jury was of the opinion that the York Regional Police E.R.U. officers acted professionally and with consideration toward the life of the hostage and the deceased. The police officers were identified as acting with calm and restraint.

The Ontario Provincial Police are commended by the jury for an investigation that demonstrated thoroughness, professionalism and integrity.

This case demonstrates the need for tactical expertise in handling violent persons in barricaded or hostage situations. The potential for an officer to be seriously wounded or killed is greatly reduced. The safety of the hostage in this case was enhanced by the quick entry and the use of tear gas which caused the hostage taker to focus on the entry team of tactical officers.

POLICE SHOOTINGS - REVIEW

The following statistical data was obtained from a combination of Ontario Police Commission police shooting reports and verdicts of coroner's juries over the last five years.

An examination of the documents available, shows that there have been a total of sixty-three (63) people hit by police gunfire in the five year period from 1984 - 1989. Of those people hit, twenty-six (26) have died as a result of the injuries sustained. A breakdown, by year, is as follows:

YEAR		FATALITIES	WOUNDED
1984		7	11
1985		7	8
1986		4	12
1987		4	3
1988		4	3
	TOTAL	26	37

Of the twenty-six (26) fatalities, the deceased was known to be in possession of a firearm in eighteen (18) cases, and an edged weapon in four (4) cases. In two (2) cases the deceased had no weapon. One of those cases involved a motor vehicle while the other was a situation where the officer was being beaten. One situation involved the deceased using a replica of a handgun in a threatening manner.

Tactical response units were involved in five (5) fatalities and three (3) woundings of the sixty-three (63) shootings over the past five years. The five (5) fatalities have been individually reviewed in this report.

We have reviewed the remaining occurrences for the purpose of obtaining information which may be relevant to tactical response. In addition information relevant to the general use of firearms and other weapons was examined.

Relevant occurrences have been illustrated to qualify our comments on the use of other than tactical response.

OCCURRENCE #1

March 19th, 1988 at 5:15 a.m. the Hawkesbury detachment of the O.P.P. was notified of an intoxicated man with a firearm, identified as Sylvain Pilon, acting in an irrational manner. His wife and children who were initially involved been moved to safety at a nearby location.

The first officer arrived at the scene at 5:30 a.m. and attempted to negotiate using a loud speaker system. The officer requested assistance from the Hawkesbury police department and at 6:20 a.m. reported gunshots from inside the Pilon residence. The TRU team was requested at 7:08 a.m. and the call-out procedure activated.

At 7:42 a.m. Pilon was able to leave the house and walk about 100 metres to a position in front of the residence where his wife and children had sought refuge. He was confronted by the police and ordered to drop his weapons. He refused this demand, lowered his firearm in a threatening manner and was fatally shot by police.

COMMENT

This occurrence demonstrates the need for all officers to be aware of, and utilize, the correct procedure when dealing with an armed and barricaded person.

According to O.P.P. policy, the TRU team leader should have been contacted for advice in regards to the need for tactical response. Had tactical response been decided upon at that time, the TRU team mobilization and attendance at the scene would have begun much sooner.

The containment at this occurrence was such that Pilon was allowed to leave the house and move to the area where his family was staying in what they believed was a place of safety. This demonstrates a need for regular force officers to be trained in the basics of safe containment, minimizing the danger to the general public and police officers.

Sylvain Pilon's decision to confront the police may not have been avoided, however, tactical response and effective containment would have reduced the risk to both the family, the police and the general public.

OCCURRENCE #2

August 11th, 1985 officers of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Drug Squad executed a search warrant for narcotics at the residence of Alan Boyarski. The officers believed firearms would be present and therefore enlisted the assistance of two uniformed officers.

The drug squad officers thought they had fooled Boyarski into allowing them into the residence to use his telephone, however Boyarski excused himself for a moment, went to his bedroom, concealed a .32 calibre revolver under his shirt, and returned to the officers. When one of the officers produced his badge, to indicate their true intentions, Boyarski pushed the officer away, pulled his gun and shot at the officer. In total, three shots were fired by Boyarski at close range and all three missed the officers. One of the officers outside the residence, fearing for the lives of his fellow officers, fired a total of five shots from a shotgun - killing Alan Boyarski.

COMMENT

Given the apprehended danger, tactical support should have been used in this occurrence.

Tactical support, used to take control and gain entry into high risk premises, provides, in our view, a number of benefits:

- officer safety;
- citizen and suspect safety;
- quick control to prevent escape;
- quick control to prevent destruction of evidence;
- improved inter-departmental relations and co-operation;
- improved confidence in tactical support units;
- valuable experience in role execution for tactical officers;
- increased sense of unity within the force.

In three (3) of the woundings and one (1) fatality occurring over the five year period, imitations of weapons were used in a threatening manner towards police officers. These replicas caused the police to shoot in the belief they were facing a genuine threat. Regardless of motive, brandishing imitation firearms is a foolhardy exercise.

In 1985, a coroner's jury recommended that manufacturers of non lethal (replica) weapons make those weapons easily recognizable. It may be argued that if this were done, real weapons could be made to look like imitations and vice versa, causing greater confusion. A public education program, stressing the dangers and implications presented when police or members of the general public are threatened with real or imitation weapons would better serve to reduce this dangerous practice.

POLICE USE OF FIREARMS

In addition to reviewing police shooting occurrences an attempt was made to obtain information on the use of firearms and the seizure of firearms.

The following statistical data was obtained through:

- a survey of students in senior courses at the Ontario Police college;
- the Metropolitan Toronto Police;
- the Ontario Provincial Police.

ONTARIO POLICE COLLEGE STUDENT SURVEY

The significant statistics for our purpose focuses on the apprehension of dangerous persons and defence of life categories.

This survey was conducted at the Ontario Police college, during the months of January, February and March 1989. The students surveyed were all police officers on one of the following courses:

- Advanced Training;
- Criminal Investigations;
- Management Level I.

The three hundred and sixteen (316) students surveyed, represented a cross section of Ontario police forces. The Metropolitan Toronto Police were under-represented as they do not participate in the Advanced Training courses.

Three hundred and sixteen (316) officers drew their firearms 3,904 times in a five year period. They identified the Police Act authority for each as follows:

- In defence of life	2,092 times;
- To apprehend a dangerous person	1,173 times;
- To destroy an animal	307 times;
- To sound alarm	78 times;
- Not specified	254 times.
TOTAL	**3,904 TIMES**

The average number of times each of the 316 officers drew his firearm over a five year period was 12.4 or 2.5 times per year.

The number of times officers discharged their firearms over the five years was 383. They identified the Police Act authorities as follows:

- In defence of life	8 times;
- To apprehend a dangerous person	7 times;
- To destroy an animal	290 times;
- To sound an alarm	78 times.
TOTAL	**383 TIMES**

The average number of times each of the 316 officers discharged his firearm, in either defence of life or to apprehend a dangerous person over a five year period is .047 times or .0095 times per year. This equates to one firing of a firearm, for defence of life or to apprehend a dangerous person, for every 260 times the firearm is drawn for that purpose.

METROPOLITAN TORONTO POLICE FORCE

Metropolitan Toronto has 5,391 police officers serving a population of 2,233,612 people. The statistics quoted are for the time period from 1983 - 1987.

There were one hundred and sixty-five (165) firearm discharge incidents over this five year period where one hundred and ninety-four (194) officers fired their guns. A total of four hundred and forty (440) shots were fired during this time period.

The Police Act authorities are broken down as follows:

-	In defence of life	149 times;
-	To apprehend a dangerous person	17 times;
-	To sound an alarm	12 times;
-	To destroy an animal	245 times;
-	Accidental discharge	17 times.
	TOTAL	**440 TIMES**

During this five year period one officer was killed and two were wounded.

During this same period of time Metro officers seized six thousand nine hundred and forty-nine (6,949) firearms of which three thousand seven hundred and thirty-six (3,736) were handguns and three thousand two hundred and thirteen (3,213) were shotguns and rifles. In addition, members of the public turned in another two thousand two hundred (2,200) firearms for disposal.

ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE

The Ontario Provincial Police, Quartermaster Stores receive and dispose of seized weapons for Provincial Police detachments and municipal forces of fewer than fifty (50) officers.

The firearms have not been listed in categories to distinguish between handguns and long guns. The available statistics are as follows:

1984	received	664	firearms
1985	received	1,111	firearms
1986	received	825	firearms
1987	received	958	firearms
1988	received	987	firearms
TOTAL RECEIVED		**4,536**	**IN FIVE YEARS,**
ON AVERAGE		**907**	**EVERY YEAR.**

COMMENT

Statistics provide solid evidence for constructing theories only if they are properly representative. Our limited information from various sources does not have uniformity of presentation from one organization to another. This information is supplementary to our mandate, and time constraints prevent more in depth gathering of this kind of data. Certain observations can, however, be made from the information received.

Police officers draw their revolver many more times than they discharge it (260 to 1 in life threatening situations). This points to one of two probabilities:

1. Officers draw their revolver much more often than necessary

   or

2. Officers use good judgement and discretion in discharging firearms.

The second suggestion is probable to us, simply because we have no indication of significant numbers of complaints about unnecessary drawing of guns and because we have found only one instance of an innocent bystander being struck by stray gunfire.

The statistics also indicate a worrisome number of firearms in society which come to the attention of the police.

Metropolitan Toronto's seizure of about one thousand three hundred and ninety (1,390) guns every year included just over fifty percent (50%) of that total as handguns. If Provincial Police categories are similar (50%) the yearly total of handguns from those sources is about one thousand one hundred and forty-five (1,145) handguns per year. Regional forces and city force are not included in this total. Even this cursory information tells us that a conservative estimate of the number of guns that come to police attention is:

- a minimum of one thousand five hundred (1,500) handguns are seized in Ontario by its police agencies every year.
- A minimum of one thousand five hundred (1,500) other assorted firearms are seized in Ontario by its police agencies every year.

The significant total of firearms involved in police occurrences provides a rationale for expertise to deal with dangerous incidents involving firearms.

SENIOR STUDENT SURVEY

The survey of police officers with over five years experience included the following question:

4. My training in use of firearms

(a) _____ is limited to recruit training and requalification with service revolver.

(b) _____ includes supplementary training in use of other weaponry.

(c) _____ includes a course of Advanced Training in tactical response skills.

Of the three hundred and thirteen (313) respondents to this question one hundred and sixteen (116) reported receiving no training beyond a recruit firearms training level.

One hundred and seventy three (173) officers report some supplemental training on weapons other than revolvers. This generally involves safe handling and shooting of shotguns.

Only twenty-four (24) officers have received some tactical level training.

COMMENT

The level of firearms training is not sufficiently attended to on completion of recruit training. This may indicate a further need for tactical support to enhance the capability of regular officers.

In the remarks option of our survey, responses varied or were not made. Of three hundred and sixteen (316) officers in the survey, one hundred and sixty (160) offered no opinion on the need for tactical support units. Remarks included a need for general improvement in firearms training and officer safety.

One officer felt that his force was adequately responding to dangerous situations with trained negotiators and officers trained in the use of shotguns.

Nine (9) respondents were critical of tactical units without saying they were opposed to their existence. Criticism included the use of inexperienced officers, communication difficulties, time needed for response and three (3) officers commented on the militaristic approach of tactical officers.

One hundred and forty-six (146) officers chose to make statements in support of tactical response availability. The safety of the public and police officers were presented as the main reason for tactical support.

COMMENT

The senior student survey points to an acceptance of tactical support units in Ontario.

The response to firearms training and use of firearms should not, in our view, be cause for alarm. There may be a need to increase follow-up training for police officers in both, officer safety and firearms. The disparity between officers in their drawing of firearms may indicate a need to clarify when a firearm may be drawn in the line of duty. Some of the disparity is due to the difference in deployment of the survey respondents.

The survey response reflects the interest of police officers to the safest possible community. To quote one officer:

> *.... "Tactical units are absolutely necessary for the safe effective management of many life threatening situations, there will be more officers and civilians killed if tactical units are disbanded" ...*

It is our sincere belief that this inquiry may benefit Ontario citizens by endorsing tactical support.

It is our hope that efforts will be made to avoid mistakes of the past.

It is our expectation that professional standards will be achieved through dedicated commitment.

APPENDIX A

ONTARIO POLICE COLLEGE

SENIOR STUDENT SURVEY

Police College personnel are presently involved in an inquiry on the use of Tactical Units in Ontario. It will be of assistance to identify situations which have a potential for use of lethal force for comparison purposes.

Your co-operation is sought in this survey which will help to maintain professionalism in policing, through objective evaluation. Your anonymity is protected by omitting name and police force information. We ask that you protect our integrity by taking a few minutes to provide thoughtful and straightforward answers.

Thank you for your contribution.

Martin van Weert
Deputy Director

1. I have been a police officer for _______________ years.

The following questions are intended to reflect crisis situations encountered during general police duties. Do not include participation in organized Tactical Unit response.

2. In the last five years I have drawn my revolver __________ times. Please identify the various Police Act authorities involved.

__________ times to destroy an animal.

__________ times to sound an alarm.

__________ to apprehend a dangerous criminal.

__________ in defence of life.

3. In the last five years I discharged my firearm __________ times. Please identify the various Police Act authorities involved.

__________ times to destroy an animal.

__________ times to sound an alarm.

__________ to apprehend a dangerous criminal.

__________ in defence of life.

4. My training in use of firearms

(a) _____ is limited to recruit training and requalification with service revolver.

(b) _____ includes supplementary training in use of other weaponry.

(c) _____ includes a course of Advanced Training in tactical response skills.

5. My police force (check applicable statement/s)

_____ Has a Tactical Response Unit.

_____ Has some personnel specially trained for emergency response.

_____ Utilizes Tactical Units of other forces.

_____ O.P.P. _____ Other.

_____ My force handles dangerous crisis situations with the personnel available at the time.

Thank you for taking the time to contribute. Please feel free to make further remarks or to contact Cal Bond or Martin van Weert with submissions on the use of Tactical Response Units.

REMARKS: ____


7.62 mm NATO
Vel-2830 f/s (862 m/s)
Wt-150 gr (9.7 gm) FMC
Permanent Cavity
Temporary Cavity
0 cm

APPENDIX - D (II)



WW + P 38 Special
110 gr HP
vel-903 ft/sec (2 in. brl)



Permanent Cavity
1.5 cm
Temporary Cavity
0 cm
5
10
15
21.5

APPENDIX - D (III)


38 Special + P
Semi Wad Cutter
Vel - 901 - 960 f/s
Wt - 158 gr
Temporary Cavity
Permanent Cavity
0 cm
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
53
Depth of Penetration

24 May 1989

Ten shots with the 158 grain "Impact" lead semi-wadcutter 38 Special plus P bullet showed the following:

1. None of the bullets deformed, but they all yawed and turned around thus ending their path in tissue in the base forward position.

2. Velocities were all between 901 and 960 ft/sec; all shots were made from a Ruger "Security Six" revolver with a 4 inch barrel.

3. Penetration depths were from 46.7 to 54.5 cm.

4. The bullets yawed (through 90 degrees) at between 6 and 19 cm; maximum temporary cavities occurred at the point of maximum yaw - which was at about 12 cm penetration depth.

Comments

The early yaw and turning over of this bullet makes it an attractive alternative to the hollow-point bullet design for the following reason:

A. The bullet is travelling base-first for most of its path -the sharp edges of the base cause considerably more tissue disruption (especially to things like blood vessels) than the round nosed bullet which tends to push things aside, especially as it is nearing the end of its path. This is the advantage of the full wadcutter that was pointed out by Hatcher in his book on Textbook of Pistols and Revolvers, your semi-wadcutter turns into a full wadcutter by virtue of its yaw.

B. The penetration depth is ideal (as defined by the group that met for the FIB Wound Ballistics Workshop). There should be little problem with over-penetration but still adequate penetration.

C. This bullet has the advantage of reliability. The FBI workshop points out that in some instances the hollow-point bullets do not expand in the body as expected. Intermediate targets such a heavy clothing can hinder expansion of hollow-point bullets. Your bullet is far better than a hollow-point that does not expand, and not far behind even those that do expand.

Martin L. Fackler, M.D.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Martin L. Fackler, MD

Revision Date: May 1989

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Martin L. Fackler, MD   195-26-7890

Director, Wound Ballistics Laboratory
Letterman Army Institute of Research

PERSONAL

Born: 8 April 1933, York, PA
Height & Weight: 5'9, 160 lbs
Marital Status: Married, Nancy Fackler; no children

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED

1951-1955	Gettysburg College, BA, Magna Cum Laude
1955-1959	Yale University Medical School, MD
1959-1960	University of Oregon Medical School Hospitals, Portland, OR, Rotating Internship
1961-1965	Naval Hospital Boston, MA, General Surgery Residency
1966-1967	Naval Hospital, Bethesda, MD, Plastic Surgery Residency
1972 (Feb-Apr)	Zahn Mund und Kieferklinik, University of Hamburg, Germany, Head and Neck Surgery Fellowship

TEACHING APPOINTMENTS

Clinical Instructor in Plastic Surgery, University of Tennessee Medical School, Memphis, TN, 1972-1975

Member of the Education and Research Staff, Department of Plastic Surgery, City of Memphis Hospital, Memphis, TN, 1972-1975

Clinical Assistant Professor of Surgery, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD, 1982-present

University of California Graduate School, Berkeley, CA, Advisor and member of Qualifying Examination committee in Forensic

Sciences for the Ph.D. Thesis research of Mr. Ferdinand Rios (subject-Intermediate Target Effects on Projectiles) 1984-present

ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND

Chief, Department of Surgery
United States Naval Hospital
Memphis, TN
1972-1975

Chief, Plastic Surgery
Landstuhl Army Regional Medical Center
Germany 1977

Chief, Department of Surgery
Landstuhl Army Regional Medical Center,
Germany 1978-1980

Chief, Department of Surgery
MEDDAC Ft. Carson, CO
1980-1981

OTHER POSITIONS

Staff Surgeon
Naval Support Activity Hospital, DaNang, RVN
December 1967 - December 1968

Staff Surgeon
U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan, 1968-1972

Director, Wound Ballistics Laboratory
Division of Military Trauma' Research
Letterman Army Institute of Research
Presidio of San Francisco, CA (current)

Staff Surgeon, General and Plastic Surgery, Letterman Army Medical Center, San Francisco, CA (current)

PROFESSIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES

Fellow of the American College of Surgeons, 21 October 1971-present

Member of the American College of Surgeons regional (Tennessee) Committee on Trauma, 1974-1975

Member of the American College of Surgeons regional (Military) Committee on Trauma, 1984-present

Assn of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners, Technical Advisor, 1983-present

ORGANIZATIONS

National Rifle Assn - Life member

HONORS RECEIVED

Phi-Beta Kappa - 1955

AWARDS

Skyptical Chymist (Honorary Chemistry Society) award for best scientific presentation of the year (Smokeless powder; production methods, burning rates and effects), 1956.

Certificate and cash award for adoption of suggestion to simplify paperwork by use of overprinted Discharge Note and Narrative Summary. 2nd General Hospital, Landstuhl, Germany, 1980

U.S. Patent # 4,461,284 for Surgical Retractor Retaining Device, awarded 24 July 1984

The Meritorious Service Medal, awarded for wound ballistics research, Letterman Army Institute of Research, 28 August 1986

SPECIAL APPOINTMENTS

Member of United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Restrictions and Limitations of Conventional Weapons, Geneva, Switzerland, 10-28 September 1979

Member of Core Panel for Formulation of Recommendations on Current Concepts of Causalty - Symposium, Bethesda National Naval Medical Center, Washington, DC, August 1979

Member of Working Committee on Wound Ballistics, USUHS Medical School, 1984-1985

US Army Medical Research and Development Command Research

Proposal Evaluation Committee Member, Bethesda, MD, November 1983

Member of Medical Steering Committee dealing with the less-than-lethal-weapon development program of the National Institute of Justice, 1986-present

Member of Wound Ballistic Workshop, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA, 15-17 September 1987.

Special Consultant on Wound Ballistics to International Defense Review

Member of Committee on Police Ammunition, Canadian General Standards Board, 1989-present

Chairman, Section on body armour related to wound ballistics, 11th Int Symposium on Ballistics. Brussels Congress Centre, Royal Military academy, Brussels, Belgium 9-11 May 1989.

Expert witness in Wound Ballistics and Surgery: qualified in Northern California US District Court, State of New Mexico District Court, various California city and county courts, and courts in Canada.

Consultant on effects of penetrating projectiles to various Forensic Science Criminalistics Laboratories, Military Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies worldwide.

LICENSURE AND CERTIFICATION

Diplomate of the National Board of Medical Examiners, 1 July 1960

Certified by the American Board of Surgery, 21 February 1967

Licensed to practice Medicine by the State of California

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

German - Translate and converse

French - Translate and converse

PUBLICATIONS

1. Fackler, M.L. Surgical Companion, 1st Edition. Naval Support Activity Hospital, DaNang, RVN, 1968.
Chapter 4 - Esophagus, stomach, and small intestine injuries
Chapter 10 - Complications of surgery
Chapter 13 - Plastic surgery

2. Fackler, M.L. War Surgery, 4th Conference on, Commander in Chief Pacific, Tokyo, Japan. 16-19 February 1970 (co-author).

3. Fackler, M.L. Reconstruction surgery in Vietnam. US Navy Medicine 58:12-17, 1971.

4. Fackler, M.L. Post-traumatic acute acalculous cholecystitis in evacuees from the Vietnam conflict. US Navy Medicine 58:8-11, 1971.

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6. Fackler, M.L. A simple technique for improving the intravenous catheter placement unit. Am J Surg 123:622, 1972.

7. Fackler, M.L. Simple modification improves Collier suture needle holder. US Navy Medicine 64:46, 1974.

8. Fackler, M.L. A new concept in extending the usefulness of self-retaining retraction. Am J Surg 129:712-715, 1975.

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Emergency War Surgery, NATO Handbook. Washington, US Govt Printing Office, 1988.

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92. Kneubuehl, B., Fackler, M.L. New methods of measurements in wound ballistics research. (in press- Proc 6th Int Wound Ballistics Symposium- Chungking, Nov 1988)

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95. Fackler, M.L. Letter to the editor. J Trauma (in press)

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97. Breteau, J. P., Fackler, M.L., Courbil, L. Blessures experimentales par balles de petit calibre et grande vitesse initiale (900 a 1100 m/s)- consequences pratiques. Med et armees (in press).

98. Snodgrass, P.A., Riddick, L., Fackler, M.L. Epidemiology of Gunshot wounds , Mobile, Alabama 1986-1987. LAIR Inst Rep (in press)

PRESENTATIONS

1. Noma - Two case presentations from the DaNang area with emphasis on surgical reconstruction. Far East Sectional Meeting of the Society of Military Surgeons, Yokosuka, Japan, August 1968.

2. Mass casualty management. US Navy Medical Corps Reserve Seminar, US Naval Hospital, Memphis, TN, September 1972.

3. Subcutaneous mastectomy for fibrocystic disease. Plastic Surgery Staff Conference. University of Tennessee Medical School, Memphis, TN, March 1973.

4. Triage. Emergency Medical Technician Seminar, University of Tennessee Medical School, Memphis, TN, July 1973.

5. Triage and mass casualty management, Surgical Specialties Staff Conference, Jackson Medison County General Hospital, Jackson, TN, December, 1973.

6. Trauma care. Emergency Department Nurses' Assn Seminar, University of Tennessee Medical School, Memphis, TN, January 1974.

7. Patient examination and triage.Introductory lecture for course on Emergency Care and Transportation of the Sick and Injured, sponsored by the Am Acad Orthopedic Surg at University of Tennessee Medical School, Memphis, TN, June 1974.

8. Triage and casualty care. Shelby State Community College, Memphis, TN, October 1974.

9. Repair of facial trauma. Am Assn Maxillofacial Surgeons in Europe. Berchtesgaden Germany, January 1979.

10. Care of the trauma patient. Am Assn Maxillofacial Surgeons in Europe. Berchtesgaden, Germany, January 1979.

11. Bilateral rotation flap reconstruction for anal carcinoma-in-situ. General Surgery Specialty Session, USAREUR Medical-Surgical Training Conference, Garmisch, Germany, May 1979.

12. Surgical management of war casualties. General Surgery Specialty Session, USAREUR Medical-Surgical Training Conference, Garmisch, Germany, May 1979.

13. Lessons from war casualties. General Session, USAREUR Medical-Surgical Training Conference, Garmisch, Germany, May 1979.

14. Basic principles of war surgery - projectile wounds. US Air Force in Europe Medical Training Symposium, Garmisch, Germany, October, 1979.

15. Initial evaluation of the shock patient. General Surgery Specialty Session, USAREUR Medical-Surgical Training Conference, Garmisch, Germany, May 1980.

16. Initial evaluation and treatment of head injuries.
    Triage.
    The acutte abdomen.
    Balliatics and gunshot wounds.
    Chest trauma.
    USAREUR continuing medical education training conference for Physician's Assistants, Rhon Park Hotel, Germany, May 1980.

17. Bullet fragmentation. NATO Wound Ballistics Research Group 11, Royal Army Medical College, London, May 1982.

18. Upper airway obstruction.
    Extremity injuries including gunshot wounds.
Presentations were made as part of the American College of Surgeons Advanced Trauma Life Support Course, given at:
Tawam Hospital, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 30 August 1982.
Army Hospital, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 3 September 1982.
Army Hospital, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 8 September, 1982.
Al Shana Hospital, Saana, North Yemen, 12 September, 1982.

19. Wound ballistics and gunshot wound management. As part of a course in Emergency War Surgery to the 6253 D Army Reserve General Hospital. Letterman Army Institute of Research, San Francisco, 25 September 1982.

20. Instructor at American College of Surgeons Advanced Trauma Life Support COurse. Letterman Army Institute of Research, San Francisco, 2 December 1982.

21. Development of a surgical retractor holder. Phi Delta Epsilon Graduate Club Annual Medical Seminar, Vail, CO, 4 March 1983.

22. Wound ballistics. Gary Wratten Surgical Symposium, Augusta, GA, 30 March 1983.

23. Ultra-high Velocity Missiles. Gary Wratten Surgical Symposium, Augusta, GA, 30 March 1983.

24. Wounds made by the Russian AK-74 assault rifle. Assn of Firearms and Toolmark Examiners Annual Training Seminar. San Mateo, CA, 15 March 1983.

25. Wound ballistics research and treatment of gunshot wounds. Surgical Service, Highland Hospital, Oakland, CA, 22 June 1983.

26. Wound ballistics. Lecture to 4th year medical school class, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD, 31 October 1983.

27. Instructor, American College of Surgeons Advanced Trauma Life Support Course. USUHS Medical School, Bethesda, MD, 31 October, 1983.

28. Gelatin block wound ballistics study method developed at LAIR. CA Assn of Criminalists Seminar, Letterman Army Institute of Research, San Francisco, 2 December, 1983.

29. The wound profile: a visual method for quantifying wound components. Meeting of the Working Committee on Wound Ballistics, USUHS Medical School, Bethesda, MD, 29 February 1984.

30. The wound profile: a visual method for quantifying wound components. Joint Services Small Arms Research and Development Group Seminar, Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ, 2 March 1984.

31. Forensic applications of recent wound ballistics research. Forensic Medicine Seminar at Coroner's Court, San Francisco, 27 April 1984.

32. The wound profile. 63rd Semi-annual Seminar of the CA Assn of Criminalists, Monterey, CA, 12 May 1984.

33. Visualization and quantification of wounding effects in muscle tissue with gelatin blocks. Army Science Conference, West Point, NY, 20 June 1984.

34. Method of predicting wound profile. Annual Small Arms Symposium of the Am Defense Preparedness Assn, Ft. Bragg, NC, 3 October 1984.

35. Limitations off wound ballistics study techniques. The wound profile: a visual method for quantifying the gunshot wound. Internal deformation of the AK-74 bullet: a possible cause for its erratic path in tissue. NATO Wound Ballistics Research Group 11, Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, MD, 10 October 1984.

36. The wound profile (exhibit). Am College of Surgeons Clinical Congress, Moscone Center, San Francisco, 22-26 October 1984.

37. The wound profile (exhibit). Assn of Military Surgeons of the US, Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, 4-9 November 1984.

38. Mechanism of injury in gunshot wounds. Wounding effects of the Russian AK-74 assault rifle. Nurnberg Surgical Festival, Nurnberg, Germany, December 1984.

39. A controlled study of gunshot wound treatment methods: Proposal for collaborative Franco-American research. Surgical research Laboratory of the French Army Medical Corps Institute of Tropical Medicine, Marseille, France, 12 December 1984.

40. A controlled study of gunshot wound treatment methods: Proposal for collaborative Franco-American research. Direction Centrale du Service de Santee des Armees, Hotel des Invalides, Paris, France, 16 December 1984.

41. Bullet fragmentation: The major wounding mechanism of the M-16 and the SS-109 assault rifle bullets. Ballistics Research Division, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD, 21 January 1985.

42. The wound profile (exhibit). Fifth International Wound Ballistics Symposium, Gothenburg, Sweden, 11-14 June 1985.

43. A reconsideration of the wounding mechanism of very high velocity projectiles: Importance of projectile shape. Fifth International Wound Ballistics Symposium, Gothenburg, Sweden, 12 June 1985.

44. Internal deformation of the AK-74 bullet: a possible cause for its erratic path in tissue. Fifth International Wound Ballistics Symposium, Gothenburg, Sweden, 12 June 1985.

45. Wound ballistics: panel discussion. Fifth International Wound Ballistics Symposium, Gothenburg, Sweden, 13 June 1985.

46. The wound profile (exhibit). Am Defense Preparedness Assn Meeting, Ft. Benning, GA, 18-20 June 1985.

47. Mechanism of injury from small arms as shown by the wound profile. Small Arms Section, Am Defense Preparedness Assn Meeting, Ft. Benning, GA, 19 June 1985.

48. Realistic expectations of handgun stopping power. US Secret Service Academy, Beltsville, MD, 29 August 1985.

49. Misconceptions in wound ballistics. NATO Wound Ballistics Research Group 11, Military Health Academy of the German Army, Munich, Germany, 25 September 1985.

50. Overview of Franco-American wound ballistics research at the Surgical Research Laboratory of the French Army Medical Corps Institute of Tropical Medicine in Marseille, France. Translated and presented in English for COL Jacques Breteau. NATO Wound Ballistics Study Conference, Military Health Academy of the German Army, Munich, Germany, 25 September 1985.

51. Comparison of gelatin and soap as tissue simulants for wound

ballistics studies. Israeli-American Research Seminar, Shorash Hotel, Jerusalem, Israel, 19 December 1985.

52. Triage and mass casualty care. Wound ballistics. US Navy and Marine Reserve Medical Groups, Treasure Island, CA, 11 Jan 1986.
53. Wound ballistics. General Surgery Staff Conference, Letterman Army Medical Center, San Francisco, CA, 29 January 1986.

54. Ballistic injury. Portland Surgical Society, Portland, OR, 25 February 1986.

55. Incapacitation of the human target. Firearms Effects Symposium, Gainesville Police Dept., Gainesville, FL, 14 March 1986.

56. Ballistic injury. Winter Symposium of the Am College of Emergency Physicians, Orlando, FL, 20 March 1986.

57. Wound ballistics study techniques. Technical Information Exchange Seminar of the California State Crime Laboratories. Assilomar Conference Center, Monterey, CA, 27 March 1986.

58. Wound profiles of common small arms. Forensic Science Update, Admiral Semmes Hotel, Mobile, AL, 9 June 1986.

59. Treatment of gunshot wounds. Mobile Surgical Society, Mobile, AL, 9 June 1986.

60. Ballistic injury. Surgical Grand Rounds, University of Southern Alabama Medical School, Mobile, AL, 10 June 1986.

61. Ballistic injury. Emergency Room and Surgery Staff Conference, Los Angeles County USC Medical Center, Los Angeles, CA, 17 June 1986.

62. Wound ballistics research at LAIR. Wound ballistics Workshop at U of Tennessee Space Institute, Tulahoma, TN, 29 July 1986.

63. Weapon effects on the human body. Battelle Memorial Institute Ordnance Seminar, Columbus, OH, 31 July 1986.

64. Treatment of uncomplicated gunshot wounds of the extremities. NATO Wound Ballistics Research Group 11, French Army Medical Academy, Lyon, France, 23 October 1986.

65. Wound ballistics. LAIR Research Seminar, Letterman Army Institute of Research, Presidio of San Francisco, CA, 13 February 1987.

66. Bullets in babies. Oakland Children's Hospital Trauma Seminar, Oakland, CA, 20 February 1987.

67. Wound ballistics potential in evidence evaluation. Forensic Sciences Seminar, U of CA Graduate School, Berkeley, CA, 20 Feb 1987.

68. Applications of wound ballistics research. High 12 Masonic Club, San Rafael, CA, 18 March 1987.

69. Mass casualty management. US Navy Reserve Medical Groups, USNH Oakland, CA, 21 March 1987.

70. Battlefield applications of wound ballistics research. US Navy Reserve Medical Groups, USNH Oakland, CA, 21 March 1987.

71. Battle hazards impacting casualty production. Medical Imaging on the Modern Battlefield Conference, LAIR, San Francisco, CA, 7 April 1987.

72. Studies in wound ballistics related to imaging. Medical Imaging on the Modern Battlefield Conference, LAIR, San Francisco, CA, 7 April 1987.

73. Present concepts of French battlefield doctrine - an overview. Presented in French by COL J.P.L. Breteau and simultaneously translated into English by M.L. Fackler. Medical Imaging on the Modern Battlefield Conference, LAIR, San Francisco, CA, 7 April 1987.

74. Overview of the Franco-American wound ballistics collaborative research. Direction Centrale, Service de Sante des Armees, Hotel des Invalides, Paris, France, 21 May 1987. (presented in French)

75. Cavitation in simulants and living tissue. Technical Panel W-1, TTCP (Wound ballistics focus officers from Canada, Australia, USA), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 26 May 1987.

76. The wound profile: illustration of a projectile's disruption poteintial. 18th Annual Assn of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners training seminar, Seattle, WA 14-19 June 1987.

77. Estimation of range of fire from bullet deformation. 18th Annual Assn of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners training seminar, Seattle, WA 14-19 June 1987.

78. Management of battlefield casualties and applications of wound ballistics research on the battlefield. US Navy Reserve Medical Groups, USNH Oakland, CA, 24 June 1987.

79. Mass casualty care and wound ballistics research applications, in treatment. Emergency and surgical services training conference. USNH Oakland, CA, 17 July 1987.

80. Determination of shooting distance and other unknowns from bullet deformation and tissue disruption pattern. 11th Meeting of the International Assn of Forensic Sciences, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 3-7 August 1987.

81. The wound profile: a visual illustration of a projectile's tissue disruption potential (exhibit). 11th Meeting of the International Assn of Forensic Sciences, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 3-7 August 1987.

82. Tissue disruption from penetrating projectiles. 11th Meeting of the International Assn of Forensic Sciences, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 3-7 August 1987.

83. Handgun effects misconceptions: primary importance of bullet penetration depth. Wound Ballistic Workshop: 9mm vs .45 Auto. Firearms Training Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA, 15-17 September 1987.

84. Wound ballistics, handling of injuries, application of ballistics research to evidence gathering. Multidisciplinary Trauma Conference, Highland General Hospital, Oakland, CA, 23 September 1987.

85. Protective vests on the battlefield. NATO Wound Ballistics Research Group 11, Wound-Ballistic Aspects of Personnel Protection, Ministry of Foreign affairs, The Hague, Netherlands, 13 October 1987.

86. Appropriate use of prophylactic antibiotics in war wounds. Third annual conference on military medicine. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Bethesda, MD, 26 October 1987.

87. Wound ballistics in crime scene investigation. Staff conference, U.S. Army Crime Laboratory, Ft. Gillum, Atlanta, GA, 29 October 1987.

88. Bullet wound interpretation. Combined staff conference of Metropolitan Dade County Medical Examiner's office, Metro-Dade Crime Laboratory, Depts. of Surgery and Emergency Medicine of the University of Miami School of Medicine, 4 November 1987.

89. Wound ballistics. Law of War course, Kaneoe Bay Marine Corps Air Base, Honolulu, Hawaii, 11 Feb 1987.

90. Wound ballistics and care of the soft-tissue wound. Combat casualty care course. Oakland Naval Hospital, CA, 30 March 1988.

91. Wound ballistics research. FBI Firearms instructor update course. Mare Island Naval Base, CA, 5 April 1988.

92. Wound ballistics and debridement. Tri-service combat casualty care medical readiness training program. Travis AFB, CA, 10 April 1988.

93. Wound ballistics and care of the gunshot wound. Surgical grand rounds. Oakland Kaiser Hospital, CA, 14 April 1988.

94. Gunshot wounds. Death investigation seminar for pathologists, medical examiners and death investigators. University of Washington School of Medicine, Department of Pathology, Seattle, WA, 22 April 1988.

95. Missile wound ballistics -- What's new and what's true. Royal Australasian College of Surgeons programme on Surgery in civil and military hostilities. Cairns, Australia, 11 May 1988.

96. Pathology indicated principles of wound excision. Royal Australasian College of Surgeons programme on Surgery in civil and military hostilities. Cairns, Australia, 13 May 1988.

97. Triage in combat casualty care: panel discussion. Royal Australasian College of Surgeons programme on Surgery in civil and military hostilities. Cairns, Australia, 13 May 1988.

98. Wound ballistics research briefing. Conference held by the International Defense Review at the editorial offices, Geneva, Switzerland, 18 May 1988.

99. Treatment of soft tissue extremity wounds. Orthopedic Staff conference. Oakland Naval Hospital, CA, 8 July 1988.

100. Mass casualty handling and wound ballistics. Combat casualty care course. Oakland Naval Hospital, CA, 29 August 1988.

101. Treatment of gunshot wounds of the extremities. Orthopedic Grand Rounds, Letterman Army Medical Center, 20 September 1988.

102. Law enforcement applications of wound ballistics research. California Department of Justice Basic Rangemaster Course. Sacramento, CA, 21 September 1988.

103. Effects of wound ballistics research of the post-Vietnam era: a giant step backwards. NATO Research Study Group 11, Royal Army Medical College, London, 18 October 1988.

104. Fackler, M.L., Breteau, J.P.L., Sendowski, I.C.P., Martin, P.D.F. Perforating wounds of the abdomen by the modern assault rifle. Sixth International Wound Ballistics Symposium- Chungking, China, 3 Nov 1988.

105. Fackler, M.L., Kneubuehl, B. Applied wound ballistics: What's new and what's true. Sixth International Wound Ballistics

Symposium, Chungking, China, 3 Nov 1988.

106. Adams, D., Fackler, M.L. Grenade fragmentation injuries. Sixth International Wound Ballistics Symposium, Chungking, China, 4 Nov 1988.

107. Presentation on wounding effects with live fire demonstration of various types of 9mm handgun ammunition into 10% ordnance gelatin. USA Criminal Investigation Laboratory, Fort Gillum, GA (at the request of General Palastra, Commander of FORSCOM), 6 Dec 1988.

108. Testing of bullet terminal effects their significance. Firearms Training Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA, 7 Dec 1988.

109. Wound ballistics seminar. Phoenix Law Enforcement Assoc. Phoenix, AZ, 11 Feb 1989.

110. Applications of wound ballistics research. General Surgical Conference. Letterman Army Medical Center, San Francisco, CA, 1 Mar 1989

111. Burkhalter, W.E., Fackler, M.L. Missile caused wounds. The 4th Int Congress of the Int Feferation of Societies for Surgery of the Hand. Tel-Aviv, Israel, 9-14 April 1989.

112. Dougherty, P.J., Fackler, M.L. History of wound ballistics. Assn of Firearms and Toolmark Examiners 20th Anniversary Training Seminar, Virginia Beach, VA, 23-28 April 1989.

113. Fackler, N. A., Wound ballistics and blast injuries. Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region 20. Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA, 7 May 1989.

114. Effects of small arms on the human body. Proc. 11th Int Symposium on Ballistics. Brüssels Congress Centre, Brussels, Belgium 10 May 1989.

115. Gunshot wounds: misconceptions versus rational management. American College of Surgeons Northern California Chapter meeting. San Francisco, CA, Trauma Section, 20 May 1989.

116. Soldiers with penetrating injuries. Ninth annual medical symposium of the 8th Medical Brigade. New York, NY, 3 June 1989.

APPENDIX - G

EXHIBITS

POLICE TACTICAL UNITS INQUIRY

Exhibit #1	Volume #1 OPC
Exhibit #2	Volume #2 OPC
Exhibit #3	Volume #3 OPC
Exhibit #4	Shotgun ammunition display
Exhibit #5	Service revolver ammunition display
Exhibit #6	Rifle ammunition display
Exhibit #7	Dr. Fackler's C.V.
Exhibit #8	Wound Profiles (Dr. Fackler)
Exhibit #9	York Regional Police Force Emergency Response Unit Tactical Incidents 1980 to Present
Exhibit #10	York Regional Police Force Statement by Deputy Chief Cousineau
Exhibit #11	Basic Tactical Orientation Course - Ontario Police College
Exhibit #12	Ontario Tactical Advisory Body Report
Exhibit #13	Dr. Fackler's report on 158 grain "impact" lead semi-wadcutter 38 special plus P bullet which is standard ammunition for Ontario police officers
Exhibit #14	Robert A. Collins - C.V. Deputy Chief of Police Peel Regional Police Force
Exhibit #15	Verdict of Coroner's Jury - Steven George Scott
Exhibit #16	Verdict of Coroner's Jury - Thomas Maxwell Post
Exhbit #17	Verdict of Coroner's Jury - Jack Ross & Daniel Belanger

Exhibit #18		Verdict of Coroner's Jury - Bernard Bastien
Exhibit #19		Verdict of Coroner's Jury - Drew Thor N. Carlsen
Exhibit #20		Synopsis of Carlsen incident
Exhibit #21		Richard W. Kobetz - C.V.
Exhibit #22	A)	"Hostage Negotiations" - Police Magazine
	B)	"Special Weapons & Tactics" - Training Key #236
	C)	"Terrorism Tryout" - Human Behaviour, May 1978
	D)	"Terrorism Hostage Situations" - The Police Chief, June 1979
	E)	"Hostage Incident Escalation Stresses need for Training - Crime Control Digest, April 11, 1977
	F)	"Hostage Incidents - the new police priority" - The Police Chief, May 1975
	G)	"Checklist for Tactics & Negotiation Techniques in Hostage Incident Responses" - The International Association of Chiefs of Police
Exhibit #23	A)	Aerial photo of Carlsen home looking north
	B)	Close-up aerial view of Carlsen home (front view)
	C)	Aerial view of Carlsen home (back view)
	D)	Aerial view of Carlsen home looking south
Exhibit #24	A)	Close-up of Carlsen home (photo #83 front view
	B)	South-east view of Carlsen home (photo #73)

Exhibit #24 (cont'd)	C)	South-east corner of Carlsen home - from ground looking up to balcony (photo #71)
	D)	Close-up photo of front balcony of Carlsen home (photo #70)
	E)	Photo from front balcony of Carlsen home looking down to South-east corner of the home (photo E)
	F)	Photo of balcony railing showing bullet hole in railing (photo #75)
	G)	Photo of officer measuring distance from balcony to South-east corner of the Carlsen home
Exhibit #25		York Regional Police Force - Inter-office correspondence - Carlsen inquest jury recommendations
Exhibit #26		Nepean Police Force - Containment Team - Operational use

APPENDIX - H

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
POLICE TACTICAL UNITS INQUIRY

1. Francis A. Beauregard
2. Edward Chadband
3. Marie Ducharme
4. William Egan
5. Ivan Foster
6. R. R. Garrett, Sr.
7. Ernie Harris
8. Robert Hyland
   Assistant Manager
   Windsor Provincial Ambulance Service
9. J. Dalziel Johnson
10. William R. Kent
11. Peter J. Krecklo
12. Dan & Isabelle Lauzon
13. Dugald M. McGill
14. P. McKeating
15. Irene Meloche
16. Mary Lynn Metras
17. Laura Pcrue
18. David G. A. Purvis
19. Henry Rasmussen
20. G. F. Small
21. Peter Spurr
22. A. W. White
23. Mayor Lowell C. Yorke
    Corporation of the Town of Perth
24. Police Association of Ontario
25. Leon Paroian
26. Roy McMurtry & Peter Shoniker
27. Municipal Police Authorities
28. Mrs. Muriel Komonko
29. S. A. C. Franklin
    Site Manager
    Bruce Nuclear Power Development
30. F. D. Harrington

31. Edward Chadband
32. Jack Douglas

ORAL SUBMISSIONS
POLICE TACTICAL UNITS INQUIRY

Martin T. van Weert, Deputy Director, Ontario Police College

Calvin B. Bond, Instructor, Ontario Police College

Dr. Martin Fackler, Director, Wound Ballistics Laboratory
Letterman Army Institute of Research

Deputy Chief Bryan Cousineau, York Regional Police Force

Deputy Chief George Usitalo, Guelph Police Force

Sergeant Roy Book, Guelph Police Force

Sergeant Peter Button, Metropolitan Toronto Police Force

Staff Sergeant Bruce Kruger, Ontario Provincial Police

Sergeant Larry Wheatley, Metropolitan Toronto Police Force

Constable Jerome Brannagan, Windsor Police Force

Mrs. Marjorie Dobreen

Acting Staff Sergeant Kim Peters, Ontario Provincial Police

Constable Ian MacGregor, Ontario Provincial Police

Deputy Commissioner Peter Campbell, Ontario Provincial Police

Staff Superintendent Gord McFarlane, Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Force

Mr. Peter Johnson, Ontario Hydro

Mr. Peter Krecklo

Mr. Michael Hargreaves

Staff Sergeant Brian Greenham, Windsor Police Force

Inspector Orval Hodgkin, Windsor Police Force

Mr. Leon Paroian

Mrs. Wigle

Mr. Greg Stewart, Reeve, Anderdon Township

Gerald Bastien

Chief Kenneth Mansell, Anderdon Township Police Force

Dr. Richard Kobetz

Inspector Bert Sheane, Sarnia Police Force

Deputy Chief Devon Fermoyle, Nepean Police Service

Inspector Ian Fiegenwald, Nepean Police Service

Staff Sergeant Wayne Stephenson, Nepean Police Service

Sergeant Larry Hill, Ottawa Police Force

Chief Gerry Ouellette, Thunder Bay Police Force

Constable Scott Smith, Thunder Bay Police Force
Sergeant Keith Hobbs, Thunder Bay Police Force
Chief Barry King, Sault Ste. Marie Police Force
Superintendent Ron Graham, Ontario Provincial Police, Thunder Bay
Staff Sergeant Terry Kelly, Metropolitan Toronto Police Force
Staff Sergeant Rick Deering, Ontario Provincial Police